Battle of Preveza (1538)

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147967156634005.png
Duration: September 28th, 1538
(479 or 480 years ago)
Result: Decisive Ottoman Victory
Belligerents:
Flag of Turkey.svg.png Ottoman Empire
JAfqr6d.jpg Barbarossa Pirates



----------
Supported by:
//Open:

N/A

Belligerents:
Spannish Empire Flag.jpg Spanish Empire
Holy Roman Empire Flag.jpg Holy Roman Empire
Venitian Flag.jpg Republic of Venice
Flag of Genoa.jpg Republic of Genoa
Catholic Papacy.jpg Catholic Papacy
----------
Supported by:
//Open:

N/A

Strength:
//Open:

122—150 ships
3,000—20,000 Men
3,000 guns

Strength:
//Open:

302—600 Ships
60,000 Men
2,500 guns

The battle of Preveza was one of the greatest naval battles of 16th century Ottoman history, which saw them smash a Christian European fleet which consisted of over 60,000 sailors, and up to 600 ships. By contrast the Ottomans had approximately 170 ships, and between 3,000—20,000 men (3,000 of whom were janissaries, heavily armed with arquebuses). The Turkish Muslim fleet was lead by the Khayreddin (known as Barbarossa in the West) and his crew of pirates, along with the Ottoman state navy. At the time of Suleiman's ascension to power, the Muslim world was finding it's population well on the decline, and losing important markets to the Europeans, and feeling an economic squeeze. In order to correct this imbalance of power and in order to survive, the sultan chose war and expansion to safeguard and secure their interests. Therefore the battle of Preveza represented an opportunity to hold the Mediterranean, which had already been won by the Muslim empire in 1499, at the battle of Zonchio.

By the wars end, the Europeans had lost a grand total of one third of their fleet before they surrendered and turned back home. Casualties amongst the Ottomans hardly hit the 1,000s, whilst for the Europeans, amounted to over 3,000 dead. The victory enabled Barbarossa to once again prove his worth to the sultan. For Venice, the victory was a disaster. They ended up losing a significant amount of territory as recompense for their pro-war attitude. They felt as if the Europeans had betrayed them, already exacerbated by a deep mistrust of the Holy Roman Empire. As a result of the prowess of the Ottoman military, the battle ensured the Muslims would control the sea for at least another two decades until 1560, when the battle of Djerba would erupt. This time again, the Ottomans would defeat their enemies, crushing them until 1571, where finally, after over 70 years, control of the sea would be lost to the Europeans. Whilst not a huge blow, the symbolism of the latter battle would go down in European history as one of their best.

History

Setting & Background

Ottoman admiral's gallery ship.

Introduction:— Suleiman the Lawmaker—also known as the "Shadow of God"[1]—was the reigning emperor of the Ottoman Empire from 1520 to 1566.[2] Although he was not present at the Battle of Preveza, his trusted aid, Hayreddin Barbarossa, admiral of the imperial Ottoman fleet since 1533 was;[3] leading the battle on his behalf.[4] Suleyman oversaw an oldworld empire, governing a staggering 28 million people (1550) across his domain.[5] By the 1600s it became the largest empire the world had ever seen.[6] Yet despite this, the Muslim population had actually began to decline, though they were still extremely powerful.[5] China, by contrast, had a population of well over 100 million (1500),[5] and the Eastern Europeans 33.5 million.[5][n. 1] As a result of Suleyman's shrewd and calculated rule, the empire reached it's zenith, after which it began to decline.[7] By 1500 the entire European population ballooned to some 81 million, whilst Muslim power (at least in Cairo by 1450) was steadily losing room to them, as a result of it's decreasing demographic. Traditional industries such as paper-making, sugar production and clothing saw ever decreasing market shares.[5] The Muslims needed to do something fast in order to protect their interests, and so chose war and expansion to survive. The battle in 1538 however, became one of three defining naval wars of the 16th century, the others being Djerba (1560) and Lepanto (1571)—with the Turks winning the first two, precisely because they could stand up to the Europe threat.[8][9][10] Preveza was lost in September 1684.[11]

Ottoman & Venetian Economic Ties:— Despite Venice's turbulent history with the Ottoman Empire, it actively traded intimately with the Turks. In 1532 for instance, a royal crown was crafted with significant Ottoman investment, that was worth tens of millions of dollars in today's money.[12] It was sold to Suleiman for between 115,000 golden ducats—144,400 golden ducats (worth between $16.10 million dollars—$19.45 million dollars based on April 2016 gold prices).[13][14][15] This was based on the Venetian ducat conversion price, which contained 3.5g of gold (99.7% pure), who's composition remained unchanged from 1284 to 1797.[16] The crown cost at least $7.75 million dollars to make (57,500 golden ducats), and was sold for 100% profit,[14] consisting of 4 crown tiers, 50 diamonds, 49 pearls, 47 rubies, 27 emeralds, and 1 turquoise.[17] The crown was delivered to the Sultan on May 12th, 1532.[12] A throne was also sold to Suleiman later in year, worth 40,000 golden ducats.[12] Additionally, a jewel-studded saddle and saddle cloth was also sold at a price of 100,000 golden ducats, and in 1536 a 100,000 golden ducat golden sceptre was sent to the Turks.[12] However, these items were not worn by the Sultan nor valued, as such items of "crowns, scepters, orbs, or golden chains were foreign to the Ottoman tradition", and were merely a show of the wealth of his power.[12] This trade however, did not mean that the Venetians and the Ottomans were at peace with one another, and neither were the internal European powers or the internal Muslim powers. The Venetians had previously warred with the Ottomans on three previous occasions.[n. 2]

The Ottomans & Venetians launched eight wars on one another.
Ottoman admiral's gallery ship.

Introduction:— Suleiman the Lawmaker—also known as the "Shadow of God"[1]—was the reigning emperor of the Ottoman Empire from 1520 to 1566.[2] Although he was not present at the Battle of Preveza, his trusted aid, Hayreddin Barbarossa, admiral of the imperial Ottoman fleet since 1533 was;[3] leading the battle on his behalf.[4] Suleyman oversaw an oldworld empire, governing a staggering 28 million people (1550) across his domain.[5] By the 1600s it became the largest empire the world had ever seen.[6] Yet despite this, the Muslim population had actually began to decline, though they were still extremely powerful.[5] China, by contrast, had a population of well over 100 million (1500),[5] and the Eastern Europeans 33.5 million.[5][n. 3] As a result of Suleyman's shrewd and calculated rule, the empire reached it's zenith, after which it began to decline.[7] By 1500 the entire European population ballooned to some 81 million, whilst Muslim power (at least in Cairo by 1450) was steadily losing room to them, as a result of it's decreasing demographic. Traditional industries such as paper-making, sugar production and clothing saw ever decreasing market shares.[5] The Muslims needed to do something fast in order to protect their interests, and so chose war and expansion to survive. The battle in 1538 however, became one of three defining naval wars of the 16th century, the others being Djerba (1560) and Lepanto (1571)—with the Turks winning the first two, precisely because they could stand up to the Europe threat.[8][9][10] Preveza was lost in September 1684.[11]

The Ottomans & Venetians launched eight wars on one another.

Ottoman & Venetian Economic Ties:— Despite Venice's turbulent history with the Ottoman Empire, it actively traded intimately with the Turks. In 1532 for instance, a royal crown was crafted with significant Ottoman investment, that was worth tens of millions of dollars in today's money.[12] It was sold to Suleiman for between 115,000 golden ducats—144,400 golden ducats (worth between $16.10 million dollars—$19.45 million dollars based on April 2016 gold prices).[13][14][15] This was based on the Venetian ducat conversion price, which contained 3.5g of gold (99.7% pure), who's composition remained unchanged from 1284 to 1797.[16] The crown cost at least $7.75 million dollars to make (57,500 golden ducats), and was sold for 100% profit,[14] consisting of 4 crown tiers, 50 diamonds, 49 pearls, 47 rubies, 27 emeralds, and 1 turquoise.[17] The crown was delivered to the Sultan on May 12th, 1532.[12] A throne was also sold to Suleiman later in year, worth 40,000 golden ducats.[12] Additionally, a jewel-studded saddle and saddle cloth was also sold at a price of 100,000 golden ducats, and in 1536 a 100,000 golden ducat golden sceptre was sent to the Turks.[12] However, these items were not worn by the Sultan nor valued, as such items of "crowns, scepters, orbs, or golden chains were foreign to the Ottoman tradition", and were merely a show of the wealth of his power.[12] This trade however, did not mean that the Venetians and the Ottomans were at peace with one another, and neither were the internal European powers or the internal Muslim powers. The Venetians had previously warred with the Ottomans on three previous occasions.[n. 4]

Battle

Strategy

Battle Preparations:— Venice, threatened by the rise of the Ottomans, grew increasingly discomforted at the economic rise of their rival, and had also complained of feeling hard-pressed.[18] Collectively the Venitians, with aid from Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire and Pope Paul III, and later the skilled Genoese leader Andrea Doria, lead a campaign to destroy the Turkish fleet.[18] This battle was however met with sharp aggression on the Ambracian Gulf,[18] with the Europeans surrendering to the Turks after having many of their own ships blown apart "like matchsticks". The Turks suffered no losses despite being outnumbered.[18] Two years following the battle, the Venetians eventually bent the knee, even giving up the Peloponenesus in 1540.[18] Despite the Europeans uniting against the Ottomans, they Europeans deeply distrusted one another,[n. 5] even up to their victory decades later at Lepannto in 1571, where the Spanish and the Venetians almost declared war on one another, mere days before that battle.[19] Several weeks before Preveza, Charles V was even suspected of trying to negotiate a "separate peace" with Suleiman, based on rumours circulating amongst the Council of Ten.[19] This was not totally implausible, the French had been negotiating and working with the Turks ever since the Franco—Ottoman alliance had formed in 1536.[20][21] Two decades after Preveza had been won, the Ottomans lead an unknown amount of profitable raids across Southern Europe and North Africa, whilst the Emperor himself was busy in Persia until 1555,[20] with the signing of the Treaty of Amasia,[20] that brought Georgia, amongst other territories, into the Ottoman fold.[20] The Europeans heeled, but Preveza would eventually be lost in 1684.
The battle occured at the Gulf of Ambracia.
Turkish warships damaged a third of the European fleet without losing a single ship.

Battle:— The battle itself occured on September 27th, 1538.[20] The two naval powers however did not engage in naval warfare, but merely began sizing each others strength.[22] Barbarossa was clearly at a significant disadvantage. He had a small, but powerful, fleet; and as it later transpired, very capable and daring soldiers.[22] He was smart enough not to go in wrecklessly, but analysed the situation—and whilst keeping the rear of his navy well defended and his soldiers refreshed—surveyed the battlefield for his chance to pounce.[22] Doria's fleet was in the open however, having been afforded that ability as a result of their larger size.[22] However, Doria, for whatever reason, decided to tactically retreat and draw the Muslims out.[22] Instead of backing away as would be predicted, the Ottomans shot directly for him.[22] By the time this was realised, the Europeans failed to communicate effectively enough to engage the enemy.[22] The Ottomans seized their chance and lead a pincer like Y-formation;[23] sailing directly in front of the Christian fleet.[22] This one chance allowed them to pound the Europeans, while skillfully taking none themselves. With the enemy's barques disabled, and unable to move (and the wind suddenly declining), Doria ran.[22] He abandoned the Venetians, and the Papal warships to their own vices.[22] He had probably realised that he could not control the battle and would rather flee.[22] In total, 49 European warships were left unsailable and a third of their fleet was left severely damaged; 36 warships were captured, 10 were sunk, and another 3 had been burnt.[22] The battle was probably the greatest naval battle in Ottoman history.[22] The Venetians later surrendered their fortresses on the Dalmation coast, and their claims to the Aegean islands.[22]

The battle occured at the Gulf of Ambracia.

Battle Preparations:— Venice, threatened by the rise of the Ottomans, grew increasingly discomforted at the economic rise of their rival, and had also complained of feeling hard-pressed.[18] Collectively the Venitians, with aid from Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire and Pope Paul III, and later the skilled Genoese leader Andrea Doria, lead a campaign to destroy the Turkish fleet.[18] This battle was however met with sharp aggression on the Ambracian Gulf,[18] with the Europeans surrendering to the Turks after having many of their own ships blown apart "like matchsticks". The Turks suffered no losses despite being outnumbered.[18] Two years following the battle, the Venetians eventually bent the knee, even giving up the Peloponenesus in 1540.[18] Despite the Europeans uniting against the Ottomans, they Europeans deeply distrusted one another,[n. 6] even up to their victory decades later at Lepannto in 1571, where the Spanish and the Venetians almost declared war on one another, mere days before that battle.[19] Several weeks before Preveza, Charles V was even suspected of trying to negotiate a "separate peace" with Suleiman, based on rumours circulating amongst the Council of Ten.[19] This was not totally implausible, the French had been negotiating and working with the Turks ever since the Franco—Ottoman alliance had formed in 1536.[20][21] Two decades after Preveza had been won, the Ottomans lead an unknown amount of profitable raids across Southern Europe and North Africa, whilst the Emperor himself was busy in Persia until 1555,[20] with the signing of the Treaty of Amasia,[20] that brought Georgia, amongst other territories, into the Ottoman fold.[20] The Europeans heeled, but Preveza would eventually be lost in 1684.

Turkish warships damaged a third of the European fleet without losing a single ship.

Battle:— The battle itself occured on September 27th, 1538.[20] The two naval powers however did not engage in naval warfare, but merely began sizing each others strength.[22] Barbarossa was clearly at a significant disadvantage. He had a small, but powerful, fleet; and as it later transpired, very capable and daring soldiers.[22] He was smart enough not to go in wrecklessly, but analysed the situation—and whilst keeping the rear of his navy well defended and his soldiers refreshed—surveyed the battlefield for his chance to pounce.[22] Doria's fleet was in the open however, having been afforded that ability as a result of their larger size.[22] However, Doria, for whatever reason, decided to tactically retreat and draw the Muslims out.[22] Instead of backing away as would be predicted, the Ottomans shot directly for him.[22] By the time this was realised, the Europeans failed to communicate effectively enough to engage the enemy.[22] The Ottomans seized their chance and lead a pincer like Y-formation;[23] sailing directly in front of the Christian fleet.[22] This one chance allowed them to pound the Europeans, while skillfully taking none themselves. With the enemy's barques disabled, and unable to move (and the wind suddenly declining), Doria ran.[22] He abandoned the Venetians, and the Papal warships to their own vices.[22] He had probably realised that he could not control the battle and would rather flee.[22] In total, 49 European warships were left unsailable and a third of their fleet was left severely damaged; 36 warships were captured, 10 were sunk, and another 3 had been burnt.[22] The battle was probably the greatest naval battle in Ottoman history.[22] The Venetians later surrendered their fortresses on the Dalmation coast, and their claims to the Aegean islands.[22]

Weapons

Weapons:— The Ottomans used several different types of weapons in the battle, and were said to have been very innovative with gunpowder technology, inventing for themselves terracotta grenades for instance, and used powerful arquebuses, and cannons to oblierate the Western ships.[24] These terracotta grenades that the Ottomans used were small spherical objects, dented with a circled cut at the top.[24] Prior to Preveza, the battle of Zonchio (1499)—which saw the worlds first use of cannons[n. 7] in naval warfare, an innovation introduced[n. 8] by the Ottomans[25][26][27]—saw the Muslims smash Venetian hegemony in the Mediterranean (which proved successful again, even with the Europeans armed with the same technology).[28][29] The Turks also used powerful manoeuvrable ships, with mounted fixed-cannons (as opposed to free cannons, which would have placed safety in jeapordy). On the Venetian side, their ships both functioned as merchant ships and fighting boats. This was presumably because of the Barbary pirates who were known to conduct piracy throughout the Mediterranean well into the industrial age (even raiding Iceland in 1627 and Ireland in 1631 (and along with help from the Turks managed to wrestle Algiers, Bugia, and La-Gollette Tunis from the powerful Spaniards by 1574).[30] Venice also later set to arm their fortresses, and dedicated a portion of their unit in charge of this (the "Magistracy of Fortresses" in 1542).[31] Virtually all of their major islands (whatever was left) underwent this process.[30]

Terracotta grenades, an Ottoman innovation.
Terracotta grenades, an Ottoman innovation.

Weapons:— The Ottomans used several different types of weapons in the battle, and were said to have been very innovative with gunpowder technology, inventing for themselves terracotta grenades for instance, and used powerful arquebuses, and cannons to oblierate the Western ships.[24] These terracotta grenades that the Ottomans used were small spherical objects, dented with a circled cut at the top.[24] Prior to Preveza, the battle of Zonchio (1499)—which saw the worlds first use of cannons[n. 9] in naval warfare, an innovation introduced[n. 10] by the Ottomans[25][26][27]—saw the Muslims smash Venetian hegemony in the Mediterranean (which proved successful again, even with the Europeans armed with the same technology).[28][29] The Turks also used powerful manoeuvrable ships, with mounted fixed-cannons (as opposed to free cannons, which would have placed safety in jeapordy). On the Venetian side, their ships both functioned as merchant ships and fighting boats. This was presumably because of the Barbary pirates who were known to conduct piracy throughout the Mediterranean well into the industrial age (even raiding Iceland in 1627 and Ireland in 1631 (and along with help from the Turks managed to wrestle Algiers, Bugia, and La-Gollette Tunis from the powerful Spaniards by 1574).[30] Venice also later set to arm their fortresses, and dedicated a portion of their unit in charge of this (the "Magistracy of Fortresses" in 1542).[31] Virtually all of their major islands (whatever was left) underwent this process.[30]

Aftermath

Strength & Causalties

Janissary, 16th Cent.

Strength & Casualties:— The Ottomans were armed with between 122[32]—150 Ships-of-the-Line, a much more smaller force when compared to the estimated 196—600 ships the Europeans had.[32][23][33] Other sources have said that the Europeans were armed with 80 Venetian galleys, 36 Papal galleys, 30 Spanish galleys, 50 sailing galleons, machined with 60,000 men and 2,500 guns, whereas the Turks had 3,000 Janissaries altogether, each armed with an arquebus.[34] Modern European sources say the Christians had had 112 galleys, 50 galleons, and 140 barques.[22] Another notes that the Christians had had 162 galleys (combining the galleys and galliots) and 140 barques, against 122 galleys and galliots of the Ottomans altogether.[35] Approximately 20,000 Germans fought on the side of the Venetians, whilst the rest were made up of Spanish and Venetian soldiers.[36] By the end of the war, the Turks had disabled 49 of their enemy's ships, held 3,000 prisoners, and damaged 33% of the Christian fleet.[23] The Turks themselves lost 400 men, and 800 were left wounded,[23] but they didn't lose a single ship.[23] Immediately after the war, most of Barbarossa's fleet was destroyed by a storm, thus making them incredibly lucky to win Preveza.[37] It is also notable that the Europeans also lost 70 of their ships in a storm two days after the battle.[22] The Venetian galley warships were 51m (in length) x 5.5m (by beam) x 1.5m (by draft).[38] Although there are very few surviving records from the Ottoman period, a Ship-of-the-Line was generally up to 79m long in Europe.[39] Further, the galleon was shorter than the galley, but much taller.[40] However some sources have claimed that the Muslims were much more mobile than their European counterparts, perhaps giving them a technological advantage.

Janissary, 16th Cent.

Strength & Casualties:— The Ottomans were armed with between 122[32]—150 Ships-of-the-Line, a much more smaller force when compared to the estimated 196—600 ships the Europeans had.[32][23][33] Other sources have said that the Europeans were armed with 80 Venetian galleys, 36 Papal galleys, 30 Spanish galleys, 50 sailing galleons, machined with 60,000 men and 2,500 guns, whereas the Turks had 3,000 Janissaries altogether, each armed with an arquebus.[34] Modern European sources say the Christians had had 112 galleys, 50 galleons, and 140 barques.[22] Another notes that the Christians had had 162 galleys (combining the galleys and galliots) and 140 barques, against 122 galleys and galliots of the Ottomans altogether.[35] Approximately 20,000 Germans fought on the side of the Venetians, whilst the rest were made up of Spanish and Venetian soldiers.[36] By the end of the war, the Turks had disabled 49 of their enemy's ships, held 3,000 prisoners, and damaged 33% of the Christian fleet.[23] The Turks themselves lost 400 men, and 800 were left wounded,[23] but they didn't lose a single ship.[23] Immediately after the war, most of Barbarossa's fleet was destroyed by a storm, thus making them incredibly lucky to win Preveza.[37] It is also notable that the Europeans also lost 70 of their ships in a storm two days after the battle.[22] The Venetian galley warships were 51m (in length) x 5.5m (by beam) x 1.5m (by draft).[38] Although there are very few surviving records from the Ottoman period, a Ship-of-the-Line was generally up to 79m long in Europe.[39] Further, the galleon was shorter than the galley, but much taller.[40] However some sources have claimed that the Muslims were much more mobile than their European counterparts, perhaps giving them a technological advantage.

Aftermath

Venetian Underestimations:— The Venetians had held a remarkable "comtemptuous condescension" towards the Ottomans, who they considered to be wholly ignorant on naval warfare, although they did admit the Turks had had exceptional skills riding horses into wars.[41] Pietro Loredan, who had previously defeated the Turks in naval arms (having also a deep hatred of Christians who served the Ottomans, and had even massacred those allied to them), and citizen of Venice, arrogantly wrote "[h]enceforth we can say that the power of the Turks in this sea has been destroyed for a long time to come and that they will never be able to arm a squadron nor recruit crews".[41] He was proven wrong, with the defeat of the European powers in the following wars to come.[41] Yet after the battle of Preveza, the Venetians were split on who their real enemies were.[41] In 1551, a council was held in the Senate, where Franceco Longo saw the Turks as their real allies, and the pope and the Spanish as their real enemies.[41] In the 1551 speech, Longo read that "[our] commonwealth has retained its state and wealth thanks to friendship with the Turks, who protected you from the damage that Christian princes wanted to inflict upon you. When the mainland state was occupied by the enemy...you felt no fear because the maritime routes remained open, there were plenty of supplies, trade continued...and the Republic maintained its government—it did not waver...the Turks...were protecting you from the threats of Charles V and Ferdinand, who if they had not feared the Turks...might have been tempted once again to plunder you".[41] Longo was referring to the conflicts lead by previous European royalty that had attempted to sack Venice or attack it, notably Hungary, Spain, and the Holy Roman Emperors. Constantinople had even been sacked by the "noble" holy crusaders, decades prior.

Turkish naval warships.
Turkish fisherman.

Venetian Public:— The Venetian public however thought differently;[41] they were very fearful, so fearful even to the point where they blamed Jews for causing the Fire of Arsenale (1569), as the "perfidious Jew" was the "natural ally of the [Muslim] infidels".[41] This was despite the fact that the Venetians, along with the Ottomans, were liberal empires that permitted persecuted refugees to settle on their lands.[41] This included protestants and Jews who were kicked out of Spain.[41] The Venetians viewed the Turks as a barbarous enemy, that was "distant, powerful, invincible" and, most importantly, "barbarian".[41] The Turks were far from this however, as they were so militarily advanced that they even had spies in all of Venice's vassal states, as well as Venice itself.[41] This fear kept the Venetians in line, allowing the Turks to strike a "long period of peace and friendly relations", both economically and politically.[41] Venice also depended upon the Ottomans as they wanted the English, French and the Dutch to stay away from the near-east.[41] The Venetians even regularly traded and lived in the near-eastern territories of Syria, opening up merchant trade.[41] Conversely the Ottomans also needed the Venetians as the empire was it's best customer for it's lucrative caravan trade.[41] The English and Dutch even signed capitulations with the Ottomans, who allowed them to trade with the Ottoman ports, years after granting them to Venice.[41] As Turkey integrated itself more and more into Europe, there was even a period of "Turkophilia" in the enlightened circles of renaissance Italy.[41] They would however, fight another set of four wars with the fourth occurring between 1570–1573, the fifth in 1645–1669, the sixth 1684–1699 and the seventh in 1714–1718.

Turkish naval warships.

Venetian Underestimations:— The Venetians had held a remarkable "comtemptuous condescension" towards the Ottomans, who they considered to be wholly ignorant on naval warfare, although they did admit the Turks had had exceptional skills riding horses into wars.[41] Pietro Loredan, who had previously defeated the Turks in naval arms (having also a deep hatred of Christians who served the Ottomans, and had even massacred those allied to them), and citizen of Venice, arrogantly wrote "[h]enceforth we can say that the power of the Turks in this sea has been destroyed for a long time to come and that they will never be able to arm a squadron nor recruit crews".[41] He was proven wrong, with the defeat of the European powers in the following wars to come.[41] Yet after the battle of Preveza, the Venetians were split on who their real enemies were.[41] In 1551, a council was held in the Senate, where Franceco Longo saw the Turks as their real allies, and the pope and the Spanish as their real enemies.[41] In the 1551 speech, Longo read that "[our] commonwealth has retained its state and wealth thanks to friendship with the Turks, who protected you from the damage that Christian princes wanted to inflict upon you. When the mainland state was occupied by the enemy...you felt no fear because the maritime routes remained open, there were plenty of supplies, trade continued...and the Republic maintained its government—it did not waver...the Turks...were protecting you from the threats of Charles V and Ferdinand, who if they had not feared the Turks...might have been tempted once again to plunder you".[41] Longo was referring to the conflicts lead by previous European royalty that had attempted to sack Venice or attack it, notably Hungary, Spain, and the Holy Roman Emperors. Constantinople had even been sacked by the "noble" holy crusaders, decades prior.

Turkish fisherman.

Venetian Public:— The Venetian public however thought differently;[41] they were very fearful, so fearful even to the point where they blamed Jews for causing the Fire of Arsenale (1569), as the "perfidious Jew" was the "natural ally of the [Muslim] infidels".[41] This was despite the fact that the Venetians, along with the Ottomans, were liberal empires that permitted persecuted refugees to settle on their lands.[41] This included protestants and Jews who were kicked out of Spain.[41] The Venetians viewed the Turks as a barbarous enemy, that was "distant, powerful, invincible" and, most importantly, "barbarian".[41] The Turks were far from this however, as they were so militarily advanced that they even had spies in all of Venice's vassal states, as well as Venice itself.[41] This fear kept the Venetians in line, allowing the Turks to strike a "long period of peace and friendly relations", both economically and politically.[41] Venice also depended upon the Ottomans as they wanted the English, French and the Dutch to stay away from the near-east.[41] The Venetians even regularly traded and lived in the near-eastern territories of Syria, opening up merchant trade.[41] Conversely the Ottomans also needed the Venetians as the empire was it's best customer for it's lucrative caravan trade.[41] The English and Dutch even signed capitulations with the Ottomans, who allowed them to trade with the Ottoman ports, years after granting them to Venice.[41] As Turkey integrated itself more and more into Europe, there was even a period of "Turkophilia" in the enlightened circles of renaissance Italy.[41] They would however, fight another set of four wars with the fourth occurring between 1570–1573, the fifth in 1645–1669, the sixth 1684–1699 and the seventh in 1714–1718.

Sources

Footnotes Note: mobile footnotes are duplicated in this section. It's a known bug.

  1. ^ Considering only Austria, the Holy Roman Empire, and Poland.
  2. ^ The first conflict arose between 1422—1430, then 1463—1479 (and this was actually termed the "first" Ottoman-Venetian War), and 1499—1503 (which was termed the "second" Ottoman-Venetian War).
  3. ^ Considering only Austria, the Holy Roman Empire, and Poland.
  4. ^ The first conflict arose between 1422—1430, then 1463—1479 (and this was actually termed the "first" Ottoman-Venetian War), and 1499—1503 (which was termed the "second" Ottoman-Venetian War).
  5. ^ This might have been down to differences in ethnicity between the European powers and Venice. Venice was not wholly European. They were more of a multicultural empire, precisely made up of a mix of European, Arab, Greek, and Jewish artisans that were "central to the economics of it's northern cities, which communicated constantly through trade and war with the Holy Roman Empire, which was the buffer zone between East and West".
    1. Adam Geczy (28 February 2013). Fashion and Orientalism: Dress, Textiles and Culture from the 17th to the 21st Century. A&C Black. p. 21. ISBN 978-1-84788-599-9.
  6. ^ This might have been down to differences in ethnicity between the European powers and Venice. Venice was not wholly European. They were more of a multicultural empire, precisely made up of a mix of European, Arab, Greek, and Jewish artisans that were "central to the economics of it's northern cities, which communicated constantly through trade and war with the Holy Roman Empire, which was the buffer zone between East and West".
    1. Adam Geczy (28 February 2013). Fashion and Orientalism: Dress, Textiles and Culture from the 17th to the 21st Century. A&C Black. p. 21. ISBN 978-1-84788-599-9.
  7. ^ Although, prior to this it is alleged that the French had mounted cannons to their ships in 1494, however this was not successfully used; the French first used their cannons in 1512. The Ottoman Turks had mounted cannons in and before this time, and used them in 1499.
    1. Bernard Brodie; Fawn McKay Brodie (1973). From Crossbow to H-bomb. Indiana University Press. p. 64. ISBN 0-253-20161-6.
    2. Charles D Stanton (30 June 2015). Medieval Maritime Warfare. Pen and Sword. p. 512. ISBN 978-1-4738-5629-5.
    The Ottomans had however began to develop cannon-carrying naval vessels between 1470 and 1499.
    1. Jeremy Black (5 July 2005). European Warfare, 1494-1660. Routledge. p. 176. ISBN 978-1-134-47708-1.
    The Venetians also had cannons but they were unsuccessful in using them, and even backfired and blew their own ships up.
    1. Thomas Allan Brady; Heiko Augustinus Oberman; James D. Tracy (31 December 1993). Structures and Assertions: Ed. by Thomas A. Brady; Heiko A. Oberman; James D. Tracy. BRILL. p. 555. ISBN 90-04-09760-0.
  8. ^ The Ottomans were also very innovative when it came to developing grenades. They developed the terracotta grenades and used them in the battle of Preveza in 1538.
    1. R G Grant (3 May 2010). Battle at Sea: 3000 years of naval warfare. Dorling Kindersley Limited. pp. 89-90. ISBN 978-1-4053-3505-8.
  9. ^ Although, prior to this it is alleged that the French had mounted cannons to their ships in 1494, however this was not successfully used; the French first used their cannons in 1512. The Ottoman Turks had mounted cannons in and before this time, and used them in 1499.
    1. Bernard Brodie; Fawn McKay Brodie (1973). From Crossbow to H-bomb. Indiana University Press. p. 64. ISBN 0-253-20161-6.
    2. Charles D Stanton (30 June 2015). Medieval Maritime Warfare. Pen and Sword. p. 512. ISBN 978-1-4738-5629-5.
    The Ottomans had however began to develop cannon-carrying naval vessels between 1470 and 1499.
    1. Jeremy Black (5 July 2005). European Warfare, 1494-1660. Routledge. p. 176. ISBN 978-1-134-47708-1.
    The Venetians also had cannons but they were unsuccessful in using them, and even backfired and blew their own ships up.
    1. Thomas Allan Brady; Heiko Augustinus Oberman; James D. Tracy (31 December 1993). Structures and Assertions: Ed. by Thomas A. Brady; Heiko A. Oberman; James D. Tracy. BRILL. p. 555. ISBN 90-04-09760-0.
  10. ^ The Ottomans were also very innovative when it came to developing grenades. They developed the terracotta grenades and used them in the battle of Preveza in 1538.
    1. R G Grant (3 May 2010). Battle at Sea: 3000 years of naval warfare. Dorling Kindersley Limited. pp. 89-90. ISBN 978-1-4053-3505-8.

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