China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

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147967156634005.png
The 1,800 mile CPEC roadmap from the Pakistani government.[1]

Introduction:— The China—Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is an economic investment plan between China and Pakistan which originally involved investments totalling $46 billion dollars,[2][3] but which as of 2017, amounts to a total of $54 billion dollars.[2][4] In Pakistani currency this translates to over Rs. 5.7 trillion Rupees.[4] Chinese president Xi Xinping announced the deal on April 20th, 2015,[2] when he visited Pakistan to cement the agreement, calling the relationship between the two an "Iron Brotherhood".[2][n. 1] The significance was not lost on Pakistan, the nation launched eight JF-17's which were used to protect the Chinese plane carrying him as he entered Pakistani airspace.[2] It represented a significant moment for Pakistan, as US influence over the country virtually turned to dust overnight. Pakistan also reciprocated in kind by signing a $4 billion—$5 billion dollar[5] deal of 8 Yuan-Class S20 nuclear[n. 2] armed submarines.[6] The initial announcement was said to have covered 1,800 miles;[2] from the tip of Pakistan to the southern, outermost gates of the Gwader Port. The opportunity represents significant inroads for Pakistan and China, in that Pakistan gains a lot of foreign investment (larger than the combined foreign direct investment made in the country between 2008 and 2015), and perhaps more tantamount, access to the lucrative markets of the Middle-east for China.[2] It dwarfed the $5 billion dollar US-deal from 2010.[2] Total investment is expected to exceed $75 billion dollars up to 2020.[1]

Importance

Importance:— The advantages for China are immensely significant for it's geopolitical aims. The economy of China relies heavily on the straits of Malacca for 80% of it's energy needs, which covers a distance of 16,000 km with cargo taking two to three months to arrive at Shanghai.[1] Such a choke point has threatened China ever since the US initiated their "pivot to Asia".[7][n. 3] China likely feels threatened by the US (and also by extension India), which are attempting to contain[n. 4] it's influence.[8] Oil taken through the CPEC corridor will cut the road journey from 12,000 km to only 2,395 km, "act[ing] as a bridge for the new Maritime Silk Route".[1] Similarly the economic benefits to Pakistan will give them increasingly optimised access to Chinese markets and the central Asian states. Additionally 700,000 jobs will be created between 2015 and 2030,[1] with CPEC also expected to add 2.5% to the Pakistani economy every year[1] (which currently stands at a non-CPEC level of some 4%).[9] Additionally China's concentration on energy projects will feed the voracious Pakistani appetite for energy, which the nation has regularly been starved of (a problem it's ally the US has never adequately helped with despite Pakistan also losing more than 80,000 people for it's so-called "war on terror",[10][n. 5] it having cost the economy more than $118.3 billion dollars).[11] Approximately 10,400 MW of energy projects are expected to be completed by the end of 2020 (energy shortages currently amount to a shortfall of 4,500 MW—6,000 MW).[1][n. 6]

CPEC will give China direct access to the straits of Hormuz, and Pakistan access to Chinese markets and the central Asian states.[1]
A map of the $33.7 billion dollar energy infrastructure project locations.

Energy Projects:— The Gaddani Power Park (1,320 MW) is the most expensive project costing $3.96 billion dollars (with additional costs of $1.2 billion dollars).[12] The others are the Kohala Hydel (1,100 MW; $2.4 billion dollars), the Engro Thar (1,320 MW; $2.0 billion dollars), the SSRL (1,320 MW; $2.0 billion dollars), PQEC (1,320 MW; $1.98 billion dollars), Suki Kinari Hydro (870 MW; $1.80 billion dollars), Sahiwal (1,320 MW; $1.6 billion dollars), the Rahimyar Khan (1,320 MW; $1.6 billion dollars), Muzaffargarh (1,320 MW; $1.6 billion dollars), Karot Hydro (720 MW; $1.42 billion dollars), Quaid-e-Azam Solar Park (1,000 MW; $1.35 billion dollars), the Thar Mine Mouth Oracle (1,320 MW; $1.3 billion dollars), HUBCO Coal Power Plant I (660 MW; $0.97 billion dollars), HUBCO Coal Power Plant II (660 MW; $0.97 billion dollars), Gwadar Coal/LNG/Oil (300 MW; $0.60 billion dollars), Gas Power (525 MW; $0.55 billion dollars), UEP Wind Farm (100 MW; $0.25 billion dollars), Pakistan Wind Farm II (100 MW; $0.15 billion dollars), Sachal Wind Farm (50 MW; $0.134 billion dollars), and the Dawood Wind Farm (50 MW; $0.125 billion dollars).[12] Additionally, several transmission lines for transporting electricity are also in active construction, which are the Matiari—Lahore ($1.5 billion dollars) and the Matiari—Faisalabad ($1.5 billion dollars).[12] Projects which have an unknown generation capacity are the SSRL Thar Coal Plant Block I ($1.3 billion dollars) and the the Surface Mine Thar Coal Plant ($1.47 billion dollars).[12]

Other Projects:— A grand total of 21 energy projects, worth $33.8 billion dollars will form the majority of CPEC, followed by transport infrastructure ($9.78 billion dollars), and the Gwadar Port itself will be the focus of eight Chinese investment projects, worth $793 million dollars.[13] The four infrastructure projects will cover a total distance of 2,246 km (1,395.6 miles), and will cost in total $7.84 billion dollars.[14] Broken down by each construction plan, it consists of the KKH Phase II section which will cover a road from Thakot to Havelian (118 km), costing $1.31 billion dollars and the Peshawar—Karachi Motorway covering roads between Multan and Sukkur Section (392 km), costing $2.85 billion dollars.[14] The last two are rail projects which will consist of expanding and reconstructing the aged ML-1 line, which covers a distance of 1,736 km and which will cost $3.65 billion dollars and the Havelian Dry Port which will cost $40 million dollars (and cover an unknown amount of distance).[14] There's also a $44 million dollar fibre optic cable line, that will stretch a total distance of 820 km (2.2% of it will be laid in the capital Islamabad, 56.7% in Gilgit-Baltistan, 35.1% in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and 5.8% in the Punjab) from Khunjrab to Rawalpindi (with an additional project dubbed Digital Terrestrial Multimedia Broadcast (or DTMB), costing an unknown amount of money and covering an unknown amount of distance).[15] Outside of CPEC, there are also other massive infrastructure projects being built.[16]

An 820 km fibre optic cable line has been approved costing $44 million dollars.

India

India probably doesn't want to join CPEC because of the Kashmir issue. Pictured is a Kashmiri stamp.

India:— The Indian government views CPEC as a threat, despite it's media having been won over.[17] The Pakistan military offered to extend an "olive branch" to India, but it has never responded.[18][19] One of the largest English language daily newspapers in India, "The Hindu", stated that "[w]hile there can be little expectation of any room for India in CPEC at present, there is space for India to step back and see where China and Pakistan want to go with it".[17] The Modi government probably doesn't want to join it because it passes through liberated Kashmir, which India, rather humourously, calls "Pakistan occupied" (Modi also views Muslims with disdain, contempt and has even participated in terrorism and genocide against them in his home state of Gujurat). The Indian website, "The Economic Times, India" stated that Indian analysts had always seen a future Pakistan either as India's Canada or India's Mexico, but that CPEC had changed this, and forces India to rethink it's policy on Pakistan; "[i]ndeed, CPEC is rewriting the economic geography and regional integrity of the subcontinent in a manner that will require more than a tactical, episodic response".[20] Other Indian media reports have said that India joining CPEC would threaten and "hurt" it's "sovereignty".[21] The way India deals with things has lead China to sometimes come out and criticise it openly (it has previously called India a "spoilt" child for getting "carried away by the lofty crown of being 'the biggest democracy in the world'").[22]

Combating Threats:— The Pakistani government has even set up a force to combat any forms of sabotage or anti-CPEC activity from both foreign and domestic sources.[23] The announcement was made on December 27th, 2016 at Peking University, where it was also announced that $30 billion dollars worth of projects were also implemented.[23] This special force is called the Special Security Division (SSD), and consists of over 17,000 armed personnel.[24] This new force has been allocated an annual budget of over Rs. 22.6 billion rupees, and currently protects over 8,800 Chinese workers.[25] However, according to other sources, the SSD consists of 15,000 men (9,000 army personnel and 6,000 paramilitary troops) with set up fees amounting to a total of Rs. 5 billion rupees.[26] Any form of conflict has also been alleviated within the country, particularly with the Balochistan province, who's worries have always been that Punjab gets far more attention from the government than itself. However, the Pakistani government and China have allocated the energy projects as fairly as possible. Both Balochistan (excluding Gwadar) and Punjab receive an allocation of approximately $7 billion dollars each, with the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Gilgit-Baltistan receiving over $11 billion dollars each.[1] Balochistan has always been a concern for Pakistan, as Indian terrorism is rife in the region, with it also being the largest (800,000 km2) and most impoverished state of the country.[27] It is also the least populated region.[28]

China and Pakistan require protection from anti-CPEC and separatist movements.
India wants to circumvent China and Pakistan, rather than work with them.

Indian Equivalent:— The Indians have tried to rival China's investment in Pakistan, albeit on a much, much more smaller scale. Prime minister Modi announced a $500 million dollar investment for the port of Chabahar, close to the border of Pakistan, in Iran.[29] This port is hoped to open a route into Afghanistan without having to go through Pakistani territory.[29] India wants to use this route as a way of circumventing it's enemies, whilst at the same time expanding the Indian export economy into Central Asia.[29] Indian ambitions also hope to transport gas and oil mined from the Central Asian republics to itself.[29] Perhaps more significantly, it would make it far easier for the Hindu country to also step-up it's terror operations in Balochistan and liberated Kashmir as per it's terrorism policy.[30][31][32][33] However, how serious the Indians are in financing the port is not certain. The country has previously reneged on agreements with Iran in the past. One Persian newspaper was quick to point this out, stressing "[w]e should raise our complaints...and ask them [India] to be more honest in their trade with Iran, and to fulfil their obligations more seriously".[29] Such turn-arounds have included the fact that India supported the (hypocritical) American-lead resolution condemning Tehran's nuclear programme in 2009,[29] and also participated in sanctioning it[34] by reducing it's oil imports from the country.[29] Analysts have also cast doubt as to whether the project can be effective given India's unstable nature, and Iran's own interests.[35]

India's Mistake:— The port of Gwadar, ironically, was even offered to India when it became independent.[36] Oman originally owned it, and which was given as a gift from a Muslim sultan.[36] Prior to 1947, Oman had owned the port for approximately 200 years, having been given it by the Khan of Kalat in 1783.[36] Between 1863 and 1947,[37] it was administered by the British.[36] India even took charge of the port at one point, directly from Oman.[36] India in not accepting the offer, rode out one of the biggest blunders in it's history, according to journalists within the country.[36] It would have given direct access to Pakistan, and restricted it's maritime freedom; not to mention the vast military applications the port would have had had they accepted the offer. After declining, the Omanians sold it to Pakistan for $3 million dollars[38] on September 8th, 1958.[36][39][40] The initial offer to India has no historical record, but it is believed that it was offered verbally.[36] It is unknown precisely why India did not decide to pursue it,[36] given the straits of Hormuz are right next to it, where 20% of the worlds crude oil passes through,[41] making it one of the most important strategic locations in the world.[n. 7] Gwadar worries India so much now that Indian "navy veterans...sense concern...[i]f Pakistan and China were to actually operationalize Gwadar Port within the timeline, it will not only bring massive economic benefits to Pakistan, it will become the primary hub of oil trade...the Indian armed forces consider it as a strong lever of blockade".[42]

The port rivalry between Pakistan, Iran, China and India.
The 1,800 mile CPEC roadmap from the Pakistani government.[1]

Introduction:— The China—Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is an economic investment plan between China and Pakistan which originally involved investments totalling $46 billion dollars,[2][3] but which as of 2017, amounts to a total of $54 billion dollars.[2][4] In Pakistani currency this translates to over Rs. 5.7 trillion Rupees.[4] Chinese president Xi Xinping announced the deal on April 20th, 2015,[2] when he visited Pakistan to cement the agreement, calling the relationship between the two an "Iron Brotherhood".[2][n. 8] The significance was not lost on Pakistan, the nation launched eight JF-17's which were used to protect the Chinese plane carrying him as he entered Pakistani airspace.[2] It represented a significant moment for Pakistan, as US influence over the country virtually turned to dust overnight. Pakistan also reciprocated in kind by signing a $4 billion—$5 billion dollar[5] deal of 8 Yuan-Class S20 nuclear[n. 9] armed submarines.[6] The initial announcement was said to have covered 1,800 miles;[2] from the tip of Pakistan to the southern, outermost gates of the Gwader Port. The opportunity represents significant inroads for Pakistan and China, in that Pakistan gains a lot of foreign investment (larger than the combined foreign direct investment made in the country between 2008 and 2015), and perhaps more tantamount, access to the lucrative markets of the Middle-east for China.[2] It dwarfed the $5 billion dollar US-deal from 2010.[2] Total investment is expected to exceed $75 billion dollars up to 2020.[1]

Importance

CPEC will give China direct access to the straits of Hormuz, and Pakistan access to Chinese markets and the central Asian states.[1]

Importance:— The advantages for China are immensely significant for it's geopolitical aims. The economy of China relies heavily on the straits of Malacca for 80% of it's energy needs, which covers a distance of 16,000 km with cargo taking two to three months to arrive at Shanghai.[1] Such a choke point has threatened China ever since the US initiated their "pivot to Asia".[7][n. 10] China likely feels threatened by the US (and also by extension India), which are attempting to contain[n. 11] it's influence.[8] Oil taken through the CPEC corridor will cut the road journey from 12,000 km to only 2,395 km, "act[ing] as a bridge for the new Maritime Silk Route".[1] Similarly the economic benefits to Pakistan will give them increasingly optimised access to Chinese markets and the central Asian states. Additionally 700,000 jobs will be created between 2015 and 2030,[1] with CPEC also expected to add 2.5% to the Pakistani economy every year[1] (which currently stands at a non-CPEC level of some 4%).[9] Additionally China's concentration on energy projects will feed the voracious Pakistani appetite for energy, which the nation has regularly been starved of (a problem it's ally the US has never adequately helped with despite Pakistan also losing more than 80,000 people for it's so-called "war on terror",[10][n. 12] it having cost the economy more than $118.3 billion dollars).[11] Approximately 10,400 MW of energy projects are expected to be completed by the end of 2020 (energy shortages currently amount to a shortfall of 4,500 MW—6,000 MW).[1][n. 13]

A map of the $33.7 billion dollar energy infrastructure project locations.

Energy Projects:— The Gaddani Power Park (1,320 MW) is the most expensive project costing $3.96 billion dollars (with additional costs of $1.2 billion dollars).[12] The others are the Kohala Hydel (1,100 MW; $2.4 billion dollars), the Engro Thar (1,320 MW; $2.0 billion dollars), the SSRL (1,320 MW; $2.0 billion dollars), PQEC (1,320 MW; $1.98 billion dollars), Suki Kinari Hydro (870 MW; $1.80 billion dollars), Sahiwal (1,320 MW; $1.6 billion dollars), the Rahimyar Khan (1,320 MW; $1.6 billion dollars), Muzaffargarh (1,320 MW; $1.6 billion dollars), Karot Hydro (720 MW; $1.42 billion dollars), Quaid-e-Azam Solar Park (1,000 MW; $1.35 billion dollars), the Thar Mine Mouth Oracle (1,320 MW; $1.3 billion dollars), HUBCO Coal Power Plant I (660 MW; $0.97 billion dollars), HUBCO Coal Power Plant II (660 MW; $0.97 billion dollars), Gwadar Coal/LNG/Oil (300 MW; $0.60 billion dollars), Gas Power (525 MW; $0.55 billion dollars), UEP Wind Farm (100 MW; $0.25 billion dollars), Pakistan Wind Farm II (100 MW; $0.15 billion dollars), Sachal Wind Farm (50 MW; $0.134 billion dollars), and the Dawood Wind Farm (50 MW; $0.125 billion dollars).[12] Additionally, several transmission lines for transporting electricity are also in active construction, which are the Matiari—Lahore ($1.5 billion dollars) and the Matiari—Faisalabad ($1.5 billion dollars).[12] Projects which have an unknown generation capacity are the SSRL Thar Coal Plant Block I ($1.3 billion dollars) and the the Surface Mine Thar Coal Plant ($1.47 billion dollars).[12]

An 820 km fibre optic cable line has been approved costing $44 million dollars.

Other Projects:— A grand total of 21 energy projects, worth $33.8 billion dollars will form the majority of CPEC, followed by transport infrastructure ($9.78 billion dollars), and the Gwadar Port itself will be the focus of eight Chinese investment projects, worth $793 million dollars.[13] The four infrastructure projects will cover a total distance of 2,246 km (1,395.6 miles), and will cost in total $7.84 billion dollars.[14] Broken down by each construction plan, it consists of the KKH Phase II section which will cover a road from Thakot to Havelian (118 km), costing $1.31 billion dollars and the Peshawar—Karachi Motorway covering roads between Multan and Sukkur Section (392 km), costing $2.85 billion dollars.[14] The last two are rail projects which will consist of expanding and reconstructing the aged ML-1 line, which covers a distance of 1,736 km and which will cost $3.65 billion dollars and the Havelian Dry Port which will cost $40 million dollars (and cover an unknown amount of distance).[14] There's also a $44 million dollar fibre optic cable line, that will stretch a total distance of 820 km (2.2% of it will be laid in the capital Islamabad, 56.7% in Gilgit-Baltistan, 35.1% in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and 5.8% in the Punjab) from Khunjrab to Rawalpindi (with an additional project dubbed Digital Terrestrial Multimedia Broadcast (or DTMB), costing an unknown amount of money and covering an unknown amount of distance).[15] Outside of CPEC, there are also other massive infrastructure projects being built.[16]

India

India probably doesn't want to join CPEC because of the Kashmir issue. Pictured is a Kashmiri stamp.

India:— The Indian government views CPEC as a threat, despite it's media having been won over.[17] The Pakistan military offered to extend an "olive branch" to India, but it has never responded.[18][19] One of the largest English language daily newspapers in India, "The Hindu", stated that "[w]hile there can be little expectation of any room for India in CPEC at present, there is space for India to step back and see where China and Pakistan want to go with it".[17] The Modi government probably doesn't want to join it because it passes through liberated Kashmir, which India, rather humourously, calls "Pakistan occupied" (Modi also views Muslims with disdain, contempt and has even participated in terrorism and genocide against them in his home state of Gujurat). The Indian website, "The Economic Times, India" stated that Indian analysts had always seen a future Pakistan either as India's Canada or India's Mexico, but that CPEC had changed this, and forces India to rethink it's policy on Pakistan; "[i]ndeed, CPEC is rewriting the economic geography and regional integrity of the subcontinent in a manner that will require more than a tactical, episodic response".[20] Other Indian media reports have said that India joining CPEC would threaten and "hurt" it's "sovereignty".[21] The way India deals with things has lead China to sometimes come out and criticise it openly (it has previously called India a "spoilt" child for getting "carried away by the lofty crown of being 'the biggest democracy in the world'").[22]

China and Pakistan require protection from anti-CPEC and separatist movements.

Combating Threats:— The Pakistani government has even set up a force to combat any forms of sabotage or anti-CPEC activity from both foreign and domestic sources.[23] The announcement was made on December 27th, 2016 at Peking University, where it was also announced that $30 billion dollars worth of projects were also implemented.[23] This special force is called the Special Security Division (SSD), and consists of over 17,000 armed personnel.[24] This new force has been allocated an annual budget of over Rs. 22.6 billion rupees, and currently protects over 8,800 Chinese workers.[25] However, according to other sources, the SSD consists of 15,000 men (9,000 army personnel and 6,000 paramilitary troops) with set up fees amounting to a total of Rs. 5 billion rupees.[26] Any form of conflict has also been alleviated within the country, particularly with the Balochistan province, who's worries have always been that Punjab gets far more attention from the government than itself. However, the Pakistani government and China have allocated the energy projects as fairly as possible. Both Balochistan (excluding Gwadar) and Punjab receive an allocation of approximately $7 billion dollars each, with the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Gilgit-Baltistan receiving over $11 billion dollars each.[1] Balochistan has always been a concern for Pakistan, as Indian terrorism is rife in the region, with it also being the largest (800,000 km2) and most impoverished state of the country.[27] It is also the least populated region.[28]

India wants to circumvent China and Pakistan, rather than work with them.

Indian Equivalent:— The Indians have tried to rival China's investment in Pakistan, albeit on a much, much more smaller scale. Prime minister Modi announced a $500 million dollar investment for the port of Chabahar, close to the border of Pakistan, in Iran.[29] This port is hoped to open a route into Afghanistan without having to go through Pakistani territory.[29] India wants to use this route as a way of circumventing it's enemies, whilst at the same time expanding the Indian export economy into Central Asia.[29] Indian ambitions also hope to transport gas and oil mined from the Central Asian republics to itself.[29] Perhaps more significantly, it would make it far easier for the Hindu country to also step-up it's terror operations in Balochistan and liberated Kashmir as per it's terrorism policy.[30][31][32][33] However, how serious the Indians are in financing the port is not certain. The country has previously reneged on agreements with Iran in the past. One Persian newspaper was quick to point this out, stressing "[w]e should raise our complaints...and ask them [India] to be more honest in their trade with Iran, and to fulfil their obligations more seriously".[29] Such turn-arounds have included the fact that India supported the (hypocritical) American-lead resolution condemning Tehran's nuclear programme in 2009,[29] and also participated in sanctioning it[34] by reducing it's oil imports from the country.[29] Analysts have also cast doubt as to whether the project can be effective given India's unstable nature, and Iran's own interests.[35]

The port rivalry between Pakistan, Iran, China and India.

India's Mistake:— The port of Gwadar, ironically, was even offered to India when it became independent.[36] Oman originally owned it, and which was given as a gift from a Muslim sultan.[36] Prior to 1947, Oman had owned the port for approximately 200 years, having been given it by the Khan of Kalat in 1783.[36] Between 1863 and 1947,[43] it was administered by the British.[36] India even took charge of the port at one point, directly from Oman.[36] India in not accepting the offer, rode out one of the biggest blunders in it's history, according to journalists within the country.[36] It would have given direct access to Pakistan, and restricted it's maritime freedom; not to mention the vast military applications the port would have had had they accepted the offer. After declining, the Omanians sold it to Pakistan for $3 million dollars[38] on September 8th, 1958.[36][39][40] The initial offer to India has no historical record, but it is believed that it was offered verbally.[36] It is unknown precisely why India did not decide to pursue it,[36] given the straits of Hormuz are right next to it, where 20% of the worlds crude oil passes through,[41] making it one of the most important strategic locations in the world.[n. 14] Gwadar worries India so much now that Indian "navy veterans...sense concern...[i]f Pakistan and China were to actually operationalize Gwadar Port within the timeline, it will not only bring massive economic benefits to Pakistan, it will become the primary hub of oil trade...the Indian armed forces consider it as a strong lever of blockade".[42]

Sources

Footnotes

  1. ^ Bilateral trade between Pakistan and China is already at $16 billion dollars for the fiscal year of 2014—2015.
    1. Saira Nasir (June 21st, 2016). How will CPEC boost Pakistan economy?. p. 5. Deloitte. Retrieved January 2nd, 2017.
  2. ^ They are widely suspected to be able to carry nuclear weapons as part of Pakistan's second strike capability development.
    1. PAKISTAN WILL START RECEIVING ITS NEW SUBMARINES FROM 2022. August 27th, 2016. Quwa: Defence News & Analysis Group. Retrieved January 2nd, 2017.
  3. ^ Even though the Trump administration is expected not to develop this relationship further and take the US in a more isolated direction, it really is unknown whether Trump will continue with the pivot to Asia or leave it, as Trump so regularly changes his mind based on his own whims.
    1. Carrie Gracie (November 10th, 2016). US election 2016: China eyes chance to weaken US power. BBC News. January 2nd, 2017.
    2. Carrie Gracie (November 22nd, 2016). US leaving TPP: A great news day for China. BBC News. January 2nd, 2017.
    3. Ruairí Arrieta-kenna (November 22nd, 2016). 15 Trump Flip-Flops in 15 Days. Politico Magazine. Retrieved January 2nd, 2017.
  4. ^ The US has been attempting to contain China ever since the end of World War II.
    1. William Duiker (1 July 1994). U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina. Stanford University Press. p. 2. ISBN 978-0-8047-6581-7.
  5. ^ The US and Europe's war on the Middle-east and Islam has cost the lives of up to 4 million Muslim citizens between 1990 and 2015. This is of genocidal proportions. In perspective, another European civilisation, the Nazis; their war on Jews cost the lives of up to 6 million during World War II.
    1. Nafeez Ahmed (April 8th, 2015). Unworthy victims: Western wars have killed four million Muslims since 1990 #HumanRights. Middle-east Eye. Retrieved January 2nd, 2017.
  6. ^ The Sharif Administration has seen dividends from increasing energy production, reducing the amount of load shedding hours from 12 to 6 hours per day. In other words, cities that were suffering from power outages of 12 hours a day, now only have to deal with power losses for up to 6 hours per day. With Chinese involvement surpluses of energy are expected to be created by 2018. According to Reuters, "[t]he drive to boost generation above 17,000 megawatts (MW) and plug a 6,000 MW deficit has already yielded some results. Shortages in big cities, which two years ago went without power for 12 hours a day, are down to about six hours. Sharif vowed last month that all scheduled outages would end before the next election, likely to be in May, 2018. His office said generation would hit 26,000 MW, a 3,000 MW surplus."
    1. Drazen Jorgic (October 10th, 2016.). Pakistan PM rushes to end energy shortages ahead of 2018 poll. Reuters. Retrieved January 2nd, 2017.
  7. ^ The straits are so important that the US has spent $8 trillion dollars trying to protect it for itself since 1976 up to 2013.
    1. James Burgess (May 9th, 2013). The U.S. has Spent $8 Trillion Protecting the Straits of Hormuz. Oil Price. Retrieved January 3rd, 2017.
    The straits are mainly important for the Asian markets, where the 17 million barrels of crude oil pass to. Approximately 90% of Japan's oil imports come from this region and represent a significant choke hold on Japan's entire economy.
    1. James Burgess (May 9th, 2013). The U.S. has Spent $8 Trillion Protecting the Straits of Hormuz. Oil Price. Retrieved January 3rd, 2017.
    2. Rouhollah K. Ramazani (1979-02-10). The Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Brill Archive. p. 13. ISBN 90-286-0069-8.
  8. ^ Bilateral trade between Pakistan and China is already at $16 billion dollars for the fiscal year of 2014—2015.
    1. Saira Nasir (June 21st, 2016). How will CPEC boost Pakistan economy?. p. 5. Deloitte. Retrieved January 2nd, 2017.
  9. ^ They are widely suspected to be able to carry nuclear weapons as part of Pakistan's second strike capability development.
    1. PAKISTAN WILL START RECEIVING ITS NEW SUBMARINES FROM 2022. August 27th, 2016. Quwa: Defence News & Analysis Group. Retrieved January 2nd, 2017.
  10. ^ Even though the Trump administration is expected not to develop this relationship further and take the US in a more isolated direction, it really is unknown whether Trump will continue with the pivot to Asia or leave it, as Trump so regularly changes his mind based on his own whims.
    1. Carrie Gracie (November 10th, 2016). US election 2016: China eyes chance to weaken US power. BBC News. January 2nd, 2017.
    2. Carrie Gracie (November 22nd, 2016). US leaving TPP: A great news day for China. BBC News. January 2nd, 2017.
    3. Ruairí Arrieta-kenna (November 22nd, 2016). 15 Trump Flip-Flops in 15 Days. Politico Magazine. Retrieved January 2nd, 2017.
  11. ^ The US has been attempting to contain China ever since the end of World War II.
    1. William Duiker (1 July 1994). U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina. Stanford University Press. p. 2. ISBN 978-0-8047-6581-7.
  12. ^ The US and Europe's war on the Middle-east and Islam has cost the lives of up to 4 million Muslim citizens between 1990 and 2015. This is of genocidal proportions. In perspective, another European civilisation, the Nazis; their war on Jews cost the lives of up to 6 million during World War II.
    1. Nafeez Ahmed (April 8th, 2015). Unworthy victims: Western wars have killed four million Muslims since 1990 #HumanRights. Middle-east Eye. Retrieved January 2nd, 2017.
  13. ^ The Sharif Administration has seen dividends from increasing energy production, reducing the amount of load shedding hours from 12 to 6 hours per day. In other words, cities that were suffering from power outages of 12 hours a day, now only have to deal with power losses for up to 6 hours per day. With Chinese involvement surpluses of energy are expected to be created by 2018. According to Reuters, "[t]he drive to boost generation above 17,000 megawatts (MW) and plug a 6,000 MW deficit has already yielded some results. Shortages in big cities, which two years ago went without power for 12 hours a day, are down to about six hours. Sharif vowed last month that all scheduled outages would end before the next election, likely to be in May, 2018. His office said generation would hit 26,000 MW, a 3,000 MW surplus."
    1. Drazen Jorgic (October 10th, 2016.). Pakistan PM rushes to end energy shortages ahead of 2018 poll. Reuters. Retrieved January 2nd, 2017.
  14. ^ The straits are so important that the US has spent $8 trillion dollars trying to protect it for itself since 1976 up to 2013.
    1. James Burgess (May 9th, 2013). The U.S. has Spent $8 Trillion Protecting the Straits of Hormuz. Oil Price. Retrieved January 3rd, 2017.
    The straits are mainly important for the Asian markets, where the 17 million barrels of crude oil pass to. Approximately 90% of Japan's oil imports come from this region and represent a significant choke hold on Japan's entire economy.
    1. James Burgess (May 9th, 2013). The U.S. has Spent $8 Trillion Protecting the Straits of Hormuz. Oil Price. Retrieved January 3rd, 2017.
    2. Rouhollah K. Ramazani (1979-02-10). The Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Brill Archive. p. 13. ISBN 90-286-0069-8.

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