Project-706/726 Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Project

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147967156634005.png
Project Manpower

• 2,000 PhDs & Masters Professionals[1][2][3]
• 120,000—130,000[4]
Nuclear Warheads 140—150 (2018)[5]
Yearly Military Budget $9.6 billion dollars (2018)[6]
No. of Wars with India Partial win (1947),[n. 1] Stalemate (1965),[n. 2] Loss (1971)
MIRV Capability Yes (Attained in 2018)[7][8]
Estimated HEU Stockpile (Kg) 3,400 kg (As of 2016)[5]
Estimated Plutonium Stockpile (Kg) 280 kg (As of 2016)[5]
First Complete Nuclear Device Created On 1977 (started in 1972)
First Nuclear Test

• 1977 (PAEC Design)—Test Postponed Indefinitely
• 1998 (CHIC-4 Design)—Two (Operations Chaghai)
Father of the Pakistani Atomic Bomb

• 1977 (PAEC Design)—Riazuddin (1930—2013)
• 1998 (CHIC-4 Design)—A. Q. Khan (1936—Present)
Nuclear Triad? Yes (As of 2017)[9]
Annual Maintenance Costs $1.1 billion dollars (2016)[10]
Total Lifetime Budget $500 million—$625 million dollars (25 Years)[11]

Hall of Fame; Distinguished Contributors To The Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Programme

  • Approximately 2,000 degree educated professionals work on the nuclear programme.[1][2][3] There are 120,000—130,000 people involved in the nuclear and missiles programme overall.[4]

Scientific Qualifications of Key People Involved In the Project

  • Zulfikar A. Bhutto (1928—1979[23]); B.A.(Hons.); M.Sc.(Hons.); L.L.B.; L.L.M.;—University of Southern California (1949[24]); University of California, Berkeley (1950[24]); University of Oxford (1952[25]); Lincoln's Inn (1953[25])
  • Ishrat H. Usmani (1917—1992[26]); B.Sc.(Hons.); M.Sc.(Hons.); Ph.D.;—Aligarh Muslim University (1936[27]); University of Mumbai (née Bombay; 1937[27]); Imperial College, University of London (1939[27])
  • Abdus Salam (1926—1996[28]); B.Sc.(Hons.); M.Sc.(Hons.); Ph.D.; Nobel Prize (1979[29][30]);— Government College, University of Punjab (1946[31][32]); University of Cambridge, St. John's College (1949,[32] 1951[32])
  • Munir A. Khan (1926—1999[21]); B.Sc.(Hons.); M.Sc.(Hons.); Ph.D.;—Government College University, Lahore (1946,[33] 1949[33]); North Carolina State University (1951[33]); Illinois Institute of Technology (1957)
  • Riaz Uddin (1930—2013[34]); B.Sc.(Hons.); M.Sc.(Hons.); Ph.D.;—University of Punjab (1951,[35] 1953[35]); University of Cambridge (1959[35])
  • Samar Mubarakmand (1942—Present[36]); B.Sc.(Hons.); M.Sc.(Hons.); Ph.D.;—Government College University, Lahore (1962[21]); University of Oxford (1966[21])
  • Abdul Q. Khan (1936—Present[37]); B.Sc.(Hons.); M.Sc.(Hons.); Ph.D.;—University of Karachi (1960[38]); Delft University of Technology (1967[38]); Catholic University of Leuven (1971[38])

Indigenous Production Facilities and 1998 Nuclear Test Photos

Designing a Nuclear Weapon

Scientific Terminology, Level of Difficulty, Centrifuges and Chemicals

Plutonium is synthetically prepared from uranium, and allows for nuclear miniaturisation.
In order to understand and appreciate the complexity of the level of difficulty involved in designing an atomic bomb, it is imperative to understand the basic features of such a device.[40] The production process is both intensively mentally demanding, expensive, and physically labourious.[40] It involves five key steps, which includes the production of fissile material, experimental testing, mechanical weapon design, construction and building a prototype, and carrying out nuclear tests.[40] Nuclear weapons work by sustaining uncontrollable chain reactions, triggered by sub-atomic particles called "neutrons".[40] This chain reaction releases tremendous amounts of energy (the highest ever recorded is the Soviet Union's 50 megaton;[41] 210 petajoules[42] or 50,191,204 tonnes of explosive TNT, which was so large that it created a mini sun five miles in diameter and a 28 mile diameter trail of absolute destruction;[43] originally intended to be 100 megatons[44]), as the explosion reaches uncontrollable levels very rapidly.[45] Prior to Pakistan developing it's capabilities no one had used the centrifuge method to produce weapons grade uranium.[40] This innovation was brought about because it was the cheapest method, given the lack of resources. Pakistan's annual GDP at the time was only $9.3 billion dollars (1972),[46] whereas the "Manhatten Project" alone cost $26 billion dollars.[47] The fissile material alone does not constitute a bomb.[40] To produce a self-sustaining chain reaction, enough fissile nuclei must be close enough together for more than one of the released neutrons to interact with another nucleus.[40] This can be achieved with a large enough mass (critical or supercritical mass) or by compressing a subcritical mass to a density where it reaches criticality.[40]
Uranium (U) and Plutonium (Pu) are the two isotopes used in atomic bombs.[48] Both are derived from natural uranium mineral.[49][50] Uranium extract from uranium ore, is known as "yellow cake" (U3O8[51]). Natural uranium contains a very small amount of the isotope U235 (0.7%),[52] which is used in weaponry (99.3% of the leftover, U238[53]—which doesn't undergo nuclear fission, hence being useless[54]). Purifying this small isotope is difficult, and takes a significant amount of time to separate. However, once separated, it is said to be enriched; "Low Enriched Uranium" (LEU) has a purity of ≤20%,[55] whereas "Highly Enriched Uranium" (HEU) is ≥20%.[56] In order to produce a nuclear weapon, a purity of 93% is required (although much lower values can be sufficient[57]). In order to accomplish this, natural uranium is compounded with fluorine to create UF6 through UF4 (green salt); and is then spun around in a centrifuge which separates U238 from U235.[58][59] The difficulty in this process is that UF6 is extremely corrosive,[60] and so requires highly specialised resistant metal throughout.[61] As a result, this stage is the most difficult,[40] and prone to failure. Once enriched however, the uranium is returned to it's solid state (this too is a very difficult step, as the furnaces required for shaping and sizing the isotope need to be highly specialised).[40] Enriching the first 20% is also far more difficult than enrichment from 20%—93%.[40] The measurement of how difficult it is to separate the isotopes is known as a "separative work unit" (SWU).[40] Typically, to produce 1 kg of weapons grade uranium, 200 SWUs is needed.[40] The Pakistani centrifuge designs, the P-1 and P-2, output between 5—6 SWUs per year.[40] The more advanced Pakistani designs, P-3 and P-4, output 12—21 SWUs.[40]
Uranium metal.
Plutonium is synthetically prepared from uranium, and allows for nuclear miniaturisation.
In order to understand and appreciate the complexity of the level of difficulty involved in designing an atomic bomb, it is imperative to understand the basic features of such a device.[40] The production process is both intensively mentally demanding, expensive, and physically labourious.[40] It involves five key steps, which includes the production of fissile material, experimental testing, mechanical weapon design, construction and building a prototype, and carrying out nuclear tests.[40] Nuclear weapons work by sustaining uncontrollable chain reactions, triggered by sub-atomic particles called "neutrons".[40] This chain reaction releases tremendous amounts of energy (the highest ever recorded is the Soviet Union's 50 megaton;[41] 210 petajoules[42] or 50,191,204 tonnes of explosive TNT, which was so large that it created a mini sun five miles in diameter and a 28 mile diameter trail of absolute destruction;[43] originally intended to be 100 megatons[44]), as the explosion reaches uncontrollable levels very rapidly.[45] Prior to Pakistan developing it's capabilities no one had used the centrifuge method to produce weapons grade uranium.[40] This innovation was brought about because it was the cheapest method, given the lack of resources. Pakistan's annual GDP at the time was only $9.3 billion dollars (1972),[46] whereas the "Manhatten Project" alone cost $26 billion dollars.[47] The fissile material alone does not constitute a bomb.[40] To produce a self-sustaining chain reaction, enough fissile nuclei must be close enough together for more than one of the released neutrons to interact with another nucleus.[40] This can be achieved with a large enough mass (critical or supercritical mass) or by compressing a subcritical mass to a density where it reaches criticality.[40]
Uranium metal.
Uranium (U) and Plutonium (Pu) are the two isotopes used in atomic bombs.[62] Both are derived from natural uranium mineral.[49][50] Uranium extract from uranium ore, is known as "yellow cake" (U3O8[51]). Natural uranium contains a very small amount of the isotope U235 (0.7%),[52] which is used in weaponry (99.3% of the leftover, U238[53]—which doesn't undergo nuclear fission, hence being useless[54]). Purifying this small isotope is difficult, and takes a significant amount of time to separate. However, once separated, it is said to be enriched; "Low Enriched Uranium" (LEU) has a purity of ≤20%,[55] whereas "Highly Enriched Uranium" (HEU) is ≥20%.[56] In order to produce a nuclear weapon, a purity of 93% is required (although much lower values can be sufficient[57]). In order to accomplish this, natural uranium is compounded with fluorine to create UF6 through UF4 (green salt); and is then spun around in a centrifuge which separates U238 from U235.[58][59] The difficulty in this process is that UF6 is extremely corrosive,[60] and so requires highly specialised resistant metal throughout.[61] As a result, this stage is the most difficult,[40] and prone to failure. Once enriched however, the uranium is returned to it's solid state (this too is a very difficult step, as the furnaces required for shaping and sizing the isotope need to be highly specialised).[40] Enriching the first 20% is also far more difficult than enrichment from 20%—93%.[40] The measurement of how difficult it is to separate the isotopes is known as a "separative work unit" (SWU).[40] Typically, to produce 1 kg of weapons grade uranium, 200 SWUs is needed.[40] The Pakistani centrifuge designs, the P-1 and P-2, output between 5—6 SWUs per year.[40] The more advanced Pakistani designs, P-3 and P-4, output 12—21 SWUs.[40]

[1947—1971] Nuclear Infrastructure, The First Two Indo-Pak Wars & The Indian Threat to the East

Pakistan Atomic Energy Comission, PAEC (Est. 1956).
The history of Pakistan's nuclear weapons development programme started surprisingly early in the 1950's;[63] soon after it's independence on August 14th, 1947,[64] from both the British Empire, India and the Sikhs (the latter of whom were responsible for much of the ensuing partition violence[65]). The Pakistani government initiated it's nuclear research programme by commissioning the creation of the "Atomic Energy Committee" in 1955 ([P]AEC in 1956);[66] which was comprised of a council of 12[67] public-body members headed by Nazir Ahmed (1898–1973[68]).[63] The AEC was subjected with the task of preparing plans for the peaceful use of atomic energy.[63] It did this by sending it's own roster of talented scientists to Western Europe, Canada and the US for the purposes of further training and education;[63] the latter of which ran an "Atoms for Peace" programme.[63] Throughout this period Pakistan's nuclear research remained very peaceful, and it had no intention of weaponizing any stockpiles of nuclear fuel. However, by 1964, things took to a dramatic turn when India publicly announced it's intentions of pursuing nuclear weapons.[63] By the end of the year, it had already began working on nuclear explosion technology, which rang alarm bells across Pakistan;[63] it could not tolerate having a nuclear power on it's doorstep, especially one so aggressive and Islamophobic[69] as India (the latter of whom lost 40%[70]—60%[71] of Kashmir in a war with Pakistan in 1948, and another, which it also lost with China in 1962[72][73]). Panic set in within Pakistan so deep that by 1965, Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto (1928–1979[74]) publicly announced that Pakistan would rather be left eating grass than be left powerless under the auspices and mercy of the Indian bomb.[63] By 1965 India and Pakistan fought another war, which ended in stalemate.[n. 4]
The AEC itself was established in 1955 in order to analyse the feasbility of atomic energy in Pakistan, but also to "survey the radioactive minerals...[and] to plan the establishment of an authority for handling nuclear energy".[66] This committee became known as the "Pakistan Atomic Energy Comission" (PAEC) in 1956.[66] By 1958, PAEC began planning for the construction of a nuclear research reactor, and several research and development centres focusing on nuclear medicine and agriculture.[66] Between 1960—1965, the organisation was given a budget of Rs. 46.5 million rupees ($15.5 million dollars; or $132.2 million dollars in 2018) to further develop the industry, where the budget would be spent on training scientists, engineers and exploring natural deposits of radioactive minerals.[66] Between 1955 and 1963, PAEC began further expanding its research and development into non-energy based nuclear science.[66] By 1965 it had built eight medical and agricultural centres and managed to train 350 scientists and engineers; of which between 1960 and 1967, Ishrat H. Usmani (1917—1992[26]) ran a foreign nuclear technical training programme, selecting 600 students, of whom 106[n. 5] came back with PhDs.[66] The most important of these centres, the "Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology" (PINSTECH) was created in 1963 (founded by Usmani[26]), and contained Pakistan's first research reactor (the 5 MW PARR-I reactor—secured by Abdus Salaam[75] (1926—1996[28])—which was US made, and could enrich weapons grade uranium, and which became operational in 1965).[66] By 1969, the first reactor school, called the "Centre for Nuclear Studies" (CNS) was built, capable of indigineously training 100 engineers annually.[66]
PINSTECH Laboratories (Est. 1963) with neo-Mughal architecture is spread of 400 acres of land.[75]
Pakistan Atomic Energy Comission, PAEC (Est. 1956).
The history of Pakistan's nuclear weapons development programme started surprisingly early in the 1950's;[63] soon after it's independence on August 14th, 1947,[64] from both the British Empire, India and the Sikhs (the latter of whom were responsible for much of the ensuing partition violence[65]). The Pakistani government initiated it's nuclear research programme by commissioning the creation of the "Atomic Energy Committee" in 1955 ([P]AEC in 1956);[66] which was comprised of a council of 12[67] public-body members headed by Nazir Ahmed (1898–1973[76]).[63] The AEC was subjected with the task of preparing plans for the peaceful use of atomic energy.[63] It did this by sending it's own roster of talented scientists to Western Europe, Canada and the US for the purposes of further training and education;[63] the latter of which ran an "Atoms for Peace" programme.[63] Throughout this period Pakistan's nuclear research remained very peaceful, and it had no intention of weaponizing any stockpiles of nuclear fuel. However, by 1964, things took to a dramatic turn when India publicly announced it's intentions of pursuing nuclear weapons.[63] By the end of the year, it had already began working on nuclear explosion technology, which rang alarm bells across Pakistan;[63] it could not tolerate having a nuclear power on it's doorstep, especially one so aggressive and Islamophobic[69] as India (the latter of whom lost 40%[70]—60%[71] of Kashmir in a war with Pakistan in 1948, and another, which it also lost with China in 1962[72][73]). Panic set in within Pakistan so deep that by 1965, Prime Minister Z. A. Bhutto (1928–1979[74]) publicly announced that Pakistan would rather be left eating grass than be left powerless under the auspices and mercy of the Indian bomb.[63] By 1965 India and Pakistan fought another war, which ended in stalemate.[n. 6]
PINSTECH Laboratories (Est. 1963) with neo-Mughal architecture is spread of 400 acres of land.[75]
The AEC itself was established in 1955 in order to analyse the feasbility of atomic energy in Pakistan, but also to "survey the radioactive minerals...[and] to plan the establishment of an authority for handling nuclear energy".[66] This committee became known as the "Pakistan Atomic Energy Comission" (PAEC) in 1956.[66] By 1958, PAEC began planning for the construction of a nuclear research reactor, and several research and development centres focusing on nuclear medicine and agriculture.[66] Between 1960—1965, the organisation was given a budget of Rs. 46.5 million rupees ($15.5 million dollars; or $132.2 million dollars in 2018) to further develop the industry, where the budget would be spent on training scientists, engineers and exploring natural deposits of radioactive minerals.[66] Between 1955 and 1963, PAEC began further expanding its research and development into non-energy based nuclear science.[66] By 1965 it had built eight medical and agricultural centres and managed to train 350 scientists and engineers; of which between 1960 and 1967, Ishrat H. Usmani (1917—1992[26]) ran a foreign nuclear technical training programme, selecting 600 students, of whom 106[n. 7] came back with PhDs.[66] The most important of these centres, the "Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology" (PINSTECH) was created in 1963 (founded by Usmani[26]), and contained Pakistan's first research reactor (the 5 MW PARR-I reactor—secured by Abdus Salaam[75] (1926—1996[28])—which was US made, and could enrich weapons grade uranium, and which became operational in 1965).[66] By 1969, the first reactor school, called the "Centre for Nuclear Studies" (CNS) was built, capable of indigineously training 100 engineers annually.[66]

[1971—1977] The Pakistani Civil War, Multan Meeting & The First Indigenously Designed Nuclear Weapon

Muslim territories in South Asia (green and pink).
In 1971 the Pakistani Civil War erupted;[77] which eventually resulted in Pakistan giving Bangladesh it's independence[63] (Pakistan never[78] actually surrendered to India). India had aided Bangladesh,[79] which Pakistan did not take too kindly to. Bangladesh in reality wasn't so much of a strategic loss (it was after all already a separate entity, well over a 1,000 miles away from West Pakistan[80]), but who's loss still stung the pride of the nation.[81] However, by supporting the Bengali insurgency, India had shown it's true intentions of wanting to sever Pakistan at the cost of the nations sovereignty and freedom.[81] This, coupled with India's considerably larger population,[82] larger army[83] and larger weapons/ammunition caches[83] had made India a severe danger. Post-1971, Pakistani public opinion was rife across the country that it should respond to these aggression's as vigorously as it could, as both India's bellicose behaviour and it's nuclear weapons programme was destabilising the region.[63] Pressured by these developments, Bhutto immediately took to organising a clandestine nuclear proliferation programme, and set up a private council one night to initiate such an endeavour.[63] Although he had publicly announced Pakistan's intention of developing nuclear weapons back in 1964, he still wanted to keep this secret for fear of a global backlash.[63] He knew what would occur if Pakistan's nuclear ambitions were revealed to the non-Muslim world powers; biting sanctions, political and economic isolation, and perhaps all out war in order to prevent it from coming into fruition. Pakistan certainly feared India, but it also feared it's isolation (China had proved this point; which although was allied to Pakistan, had never directly supported it). The entire plan was thus shrouded in secrecy; and so "Project-706" was born in 1974.[63]
In this clandestine meeting—held in Multan—Bhutto declared his intentions, appealing to Pakistan's most pre-eminent scientists, government officials and top bureaucrats to help him realise this dream.[63] Thankfully there was already the foundational infrastructure in place to support his endeavour. Multiple peacetime nuclear facilities had already been built and were already in operation.[63] The country didn't necessarily require itself to also build it's own non-research nuclear reactor as well; a US$60 million dollar deal with Canada in 1972 saw a 137 MW heavy-water CANDU reactor already installed.[63][84] Pakistan was to later also install 20 more nuclear power plants, each with a capability of generating more than 1,000 megawatts from twenty 1,000 megawatt powered reactors (although this latter ambition never actually materialised).[63] By May 1974, India launched "Operation Smiling Bhudda",[85] where it publicly tested out a nuclear explosion barely 100 miles[86] from Pakistan's border—clearly meant as a provocation.[63] This test was later revealed to have failed however.[87][88] Pakistan by now had moved onto it's own nuclear explosive design and development ordinance and research work; and much like India, declared this to have been for the purposes of "peaceful" research.[63] Initially plans were drawn in order to develop weapons based on plutonium fissile material.[63] However, this required a large processing plant in order to gather spent plutonium fuel, and so Pakistan struck a deal with France to build such a plant.[63] However the French abandoned it in 1978; leaving the "Chashma" plant partially[n. 8] built.[63] In the meanwhile Pakistan continued to develop other technical aspects of their nuclear research and atomic bomb designs, whilst it looked for alternative routes of faster uranium and plutonium production.
Z. A. Bhutto initiated Project-706.
Theoretical Physicist, Riazuddin (1930—2013) and Theoretical Physicist, Abdus Salaam (1926—1996).
Pakistan's early nuclear weapons designs were indigenous in nature, and lead by theoretical physicist, Riazuddin (1930—2013[34]), who was brought into the project under the auspices of Abdus Salaam and Munir A. Khan (1926—1999[89]). The latter invited Riazuddin to his offices at the "International Centre for Theoretical Physics" (1964—Present) in Italy, and gave him the job of designing the atomic bombs.[90][n. 9] He also directed him to create a group of scientists to carry out the bombs design (later termed the "Theoretical Physics Group"—which was made up of two other scientists, Masud Ahmed and Tufail Naseem, and who had a total budget of $1,000 to carry out this research[91]). This would involve "the conceptual design for a nuclear device, calculation of the critical size of the fissile core, working out of a triggering mechanism, and finding the explosive yield for a variety of theoretical designs".[90][n. 10] Riazuddin found a way to directly access declassified information from the United States's "Manhatten Project", frequently visiting the States and bringing these documents to Pakistan, where "in 1973, he patiently studied [them] at the Library of Congress, and purchased photocopies of a substantial number of unclassified or declassified reports from the Technical Information Service in Virginia".[90] One of these was an important lecture given in 1965 on the aspects of the atomic primer.[90] These documents were not a blueprint[92] for creating an atomic bomb—in fact they were quite useless—but they did help to lay the foundations scientists had to concentrate on.[90] In 1973 Riazuddin was posted at the Quaid-e-Azam University (née Islamabad University), where he carried out further research, where Pervez Hoodbhoy (1950—Present[93]) also served as a junior faculty member.[90][n. 11]
With the theoretical group came many others who worked independently of one another in different areas of technologies. Aside from the "Theoretical Physics Group", there also existed the "Wah Group", the "Fast Neutron Physics Group", the "Diagnostics Group", the "High Explosive/HMX Group", the "High Speed Electronics Group" and the "High Precision Mechanical Group".[94] All of these groups were assigned under a central authority, who overall, was in charge of developing the practical applications of research and development.[94] These project groups were lead by Munir A. Khan, who lead a sub-group, called the "Directorate of Technical Development" (DTD), which was responsible for integrating their work by developing "the implosion design, trigger mechanism, physics calculations, high speed electronics, high-precision chemical and mechanical components [and] high explosive lenses".[95] As a result, the DTD had developed it's first nuclear implosion design by 1978 (earlier in 1977 according to future PM Benazir Bhutto), and which was later improved, and cold tested on March 11th, 1983 in "Operation Kirana-I".[95][96] PAEC further carried out a total of 24 more cold tests between 1983 and 1990.[95] The DTD also first successfully minaturized it's weapon designs by 1987, allowing it for the first time to carried it by the Pakistani Air Force.[95] The existence of the DTD was kept secret for decades until it was revealed in 1998.[94] Between 1978 and 1979, the Indian authories caught on to Pakistan's nuclear programme.[97] Indian scientists however didn't believe Pakistan had the capabilities to produce a nuclear weapon (they believed it wouldn't ever have the ability to enrich uranium).[97] As a result Indian ministers didn't believe it was a credible threat.[97] Later in the 1980s, India took this seriously and sent spies to Pakistan, but accidentally got all of them killed.[98][99]
Munir A. Khan.
Pakistan researched two separate designs for their nukes, one indigenous (by PAEC) and the other Chinese (by KRL).
As a result of the work lead by these indigenous scientists, Pakistan created it's first workable nuclear device just before 1977/1978—although, like India's 1974 test, it was likely not of an appreciable yield.[100] This information was kept secret until at least 2005, when Benazir Bhutto revealed to the "Voice of America" news group that preparations for a nuclear test were underway in the 1970s; due to be tested as soon as August 1977. However this was delayed until December, but this too wasn't carried out, and because of the political turmoil,[101] the tests were delayed indefinitely. Bhutto directly stated "I remember [my father saying he] expected Pakistan to have its first nuclear test in 1976 - sorry, in August, 1977. I was in his conduit to the person who was actually running the nuclear program who is no longer alive now. His name was Mr. Munir and he was chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. He told us that the nuclear test had been delayed to December 1977, and then he told us the nuclear test had been indefinitely delayed".[102][103] Precisely why the programme was actually delayed has never been revealed. Bhutto herself died two years after making this statement known to the public (although her death wasn't actually ever connected to the nuclear programme). However, what is known is that the late 1970s were a particularly traumatic time. The region was surrounded by the unstable countries of Iran, Afghanistan and India. Iran would later go on to have an Islamic Revolution (1979),[104] and would be subsequently viciously attacked by Iraq and the West (1980—1988)[105] under Saddam Hussein (1937—2006[106]). Afghanistan would be rocked by a brutal invasion by the Soviet Union (1979—1989[107]), and India was already wracked with anti-Muslim and anti-Sikh violence.
Muslim territories in South Asia (green and pink).
In 1971 the Pakistani Civil War erupted;[77] which eventually resulted in Pakistan giving Bangladesh it's independence[63] (Pakistan never[78] actually surrendered to India). India had aided Bangladesh,[79] which Pakistan did not take too kindly to. Bangladesh in reality wasn't so much of a strategic loss (it was after all already a separate entity, well over a 1,000 miles away from West Pakistan[80]), but who's loss still stung the pride of the nation.[81] However, by supporting the Bengali insurgency, India had shown it's true intentions of wanting to sever Pakistan at the cost of the nations sovereignty and freedom.[81] This, coupled with India's considerably larger population,[82] larger army[83] and larger weapons/ammunition caches[83] had made India a severe danger. Post-1971, Pakistani public opinion was rife across the country that it should respond to these aggression's as vigorously as it could, as both India's bellicose behaviour and it's nuclear weapons programme was destabilising the region.[63] Pressured by these developments, Bhutto immediately took to organising a clandestine nuclear proliferation programme, and set up a private council one night to initiate such an endeavour.[63] Although he had publicly announced Pakistan's intention of developing nuclear weapons back in 1964, he still wanted to keep this secret for fear of a global backlash.[63] He knew what would occur if Pakistan's nuclear ambitions were revealed to the non-Muslim world powers; biting sanctions, political and economic isolation, and perhaps all out war in order to prevent it from coming into fruition. Pakistan certainly feared India, but it also feared it's isolation (China had proved this point; which although was allied to Pakistan, had never directly supported it). The entire plan was thus shrouded in secrecy; and so "Project-706" was born in 1974.[63]
Z. A. Bhutto initiated Project-706.
In this clandestine meeting—held in Multan—Bhutto declared his intentions, appealing to Pakistan's most pre-eminent scientists, government officials and top bureaucrats to help him realise this dream.[63] Thankfully there was already the foundational infrastructure in place to support his endeavour. Multiple peacetime nuclear facilities had already been built and were already in operation.[63] The country didn't necessarily require itself to also build it's own non-research nuclear reactor as well; a US$60 million dollar deal with Canada in 1972 saw a 137 MW heavy-water CANDU reactor already installed.[63][84] Pakistan was to later also install 20 more nuclear power plants, each with a capability of generating more than 1,000 megawatts from twenty 1,000 megawatt powered reactors (although this latter ambition never actually materialised).[63] By May 1974, India launched "Operation Smiling Bhudda",[85] where it publicly tested out a nuclear explosion barely 100 miles[86] from Pakistan's border—clearly meant as a provocation.[63] This test was later revealed to have failed however.[87][88] Pakistan by now had moved onto it's own nuclear explosive design and development ordinance and research work; and much like India, declared this to have been for the purposes of "peaceful" research.[63] Initially plans were drawn in order to develop weapons based on plutonium fissile material.[63] However, this required a large processing plant in order to gather spent plutonium fuel, and so Pakistan struck a deal with France to build such a plant.[63] However the French abandoned it in 1978; leaving the "Chashma" plant partially[n. 12] built.[63] In the meanwhile Pakistan continued to develop other technical aspects of their nuclear research and atomic bomb designs, whilst it looked for alternative routes of faster uranium and plutonium production.
Theoretical Physicist, Riazuddin (1930—2013) and Theoretical Physicist, Abdus Salaam (1926—1996).
Pakistan's early nuclear weapons designs were indigenous in nature, and lead by theoretical physicist, Riazuddin (1930—2013[34]), who was brought into the project under the auspices of Abdus Salaam and Munir A. Khan (1926—1999[89]). The latter invited Riazuddin to his offices at the "International Centre for Theoretical Physics" (1964—Present) in Italy, and gave him the job of designing the atomic bombs.[90][n. 13] He also directed him to create a group of scientists to carry out the bombs design (later termed the "Theoretical Physics Group"—which was made up of two other scientists, Masud Ahmed and Tufail Naseem, and who had a total budget of $1,000 to carry out this research[91]). This would involve "the conceptual design for a nuclear device, calculation of the critical size of the fissile core, working out of a triggering mechanism, and finding the explosive yield for a variety of theoretical designs".[90][n. 14] Riazuddin found a way to directly access declassified information from the United States's "Manhatten Project", frequently visiting the States and bringing these documents to Pakistan, where "in 1973, he patiently studied [them] at the Library of Congress, and purchased photocopies of a substantial number of unclassified or declassified reports from the Technical Information Service in Virginia".[90] One of these was an important lecture given in 1965 on the aspects of the atomic primer.[90] These documents were not a blueprint[92] for creating an atomic bomb—in fact they were quite useless—but they did help to lay the foundations scientists had to concentrate on.[90] In 1973 Riazuddin was posted at the Quaid-e-Azam University (née Islamabad University), where he carried out further research, where Pervez Hoodbhoy (1950—Present[93]) also served as a junior faculty member.[90][n. 15]
Munir A. Khan.
With the theoretical group came many others who worked independently of one another in different areas of technologies. Aside from the "Theoretical Physics Group", there also existed the "Wah Group", the "Fast Neutron Physics Group", the "Diagnostics Group", the "High Explosive/HMX Group", the "High Speed Electronics Group" and the "High Precision Mechanical Group".[94] All of these groups were assigned under a central authority, who overall, was in charge of developing the practical applications of research and development.[94] These project groups were lead by Munir A. Khan, who lead a sub-group, called the "Directorate of Technical Development" (DTD), which was responsible for integrating their work by developing "the implosion design, trigger mechanism, physics calculations, high speed electronics, high-precision chemical and mechanical components [and] high explosive lenses".[95] As a result, the DTD had developed it's first nuclear implosion design by 1978 (earlier in 1977 according to future PM Benazir Bhutto), and which was later improved, and cold tested on March 11th, 1983 in "Operation Kirana-I".[95][96] PAEC further carried out a total of 24 more cold tests between 1983 and 1990.[95] The DTD also first successfully minaturized it's weapon designs by 1987, allowing it for the first time to carried it by the Pakistani Air Force.[95] The existence of the DTD was kept secret for decades until it was revealed in 1998.[94] Between 1978 and 1979, the Indian authories caught on to Pakistan's nuclear programme.[97] Indian scientists however didn't believe Pakistan had the capabilities to produce a nuclear weapon (they believed it wouldn't ever have the ability to enrich uranium).[97] As a result Indian ministers didn't believe it was a credible threat.[97] Later in the 1980s, India took this seriously and sent spies to Pakistan, but accidentally got all of them killed.[98][108]
Pakistan researched two separate designs for their nukes, one indigenous (by PAEC) and the other Chinese (by KRL).
As a result of the work lead by these indigenous scientists, Pakistan created it's first workable nuclear device just before 1977/1978—although, like India's 1974 test, it was likely not of an appreciable yield.[100] This information was kept secret until at least 2005, when Benazir Bhutto revealed to the "Voice of America" news group that preparations for a nuclear test were underway in the 1970s; due to be tested as soon as August 1977. However this was delayed until December, but this too wasn't carried out, and because of the political turmoil,[101] the tests were delayed indefinitely. Bhutto directly stated "I remember [my father saying he] expected Pakistan to have its first nuclear test in 1976 - sorry, in August, 1977. I was in his conduit to the person who was actually running the nuclear program who is no longer alive now. His name was Mr. Munir and he was chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. He told us that the nuclear test had been delayed to December 1977, and then he told us the nuclear test had been indefinitely delayed".[102][103] Precisely why the programme was actually delayed has never been revealed. Bhutto herself died two years after making this statement known to the public (although her death wasn't actually ever connected to the nuclear programme). However, what is known is that the late 1970s were a particularly traumatic time. The region was surrounded by the unstable countries of Iran, Afghanistan and India. Iran would later go on to have an Islamic Revolution (1979),[104] and would be subsequently viciously attacked by Iraq and the West (1980—1988)[105] under Saddam Hussein (1937—2006[106]). Afghanistan would be rocked by a brutal invasion by the Soviet Union (1979—1989[107]), and India was already wracked with anti-Muslim and anti-Sikh violence.

[1976—1982] A. Q. Khan, Pakistani Training of Chinese Scientists & Extent of Chinese Cooperation

In 1975, Pakistan started engaging in the process of researching how to enrich uranium rather than plutonium, as the latter proved rather difficult.[63] Serendipitously however, it managed to secretly obtain blueprints on how to construct ultra-high speed centrifuges from a highly unlikely source.[63] A Pakistani scientist—initially unconnected to the project[109]—Abdul Q. Khan (1936—Present), secretly smuggled advanced 4M centrifuge blueprints out of the Netherlands; later improving them by indigenous modification.[110][111][112] In 1976, Khan was formally inducted into the program and went on to build 14,000 of these centrifuges by 1986.[113] Khan was a highly skilled operative, fluent in Urdu,[114] English,[114][115] Dutch[116] French,[116] and German,[116] and many of his colleagues were oblivious that he had turned into a nuclear spy. Many thought he would settle in Europe, made stronger by the fact that he was married to a Dutch woman,[116][117] but he was actively working for the betterment of his ancestral homeland. His enrichment processes later took place at the "Engineering Research Laboratory" (ERL), which was later renamed to the "Khan Research Laboratory" (KRL) in honour of his contributions.[63] A pilot of this plant was built in 1978, construction began in 1979; and the plant was situated near Kahuta, at the foothills of the Himalaya's, North of Islamabad.[63] Pakistan was now amongst only five countries in the world which possessed a working knowledge of uranium enrichment directly from natural uranium ore.[63] It was fortunate as well that there are six ways of enriching the element; one of which is through gas centrifuges; with the others being gaseous diffusion, jet nozzle, rotating hot plasma, gas chromatography and laser technology.[63] Pakistan went with the first option (although PAEC had been using lasers).[63]
A. Q. Khan.
Pakistan developed it's own centrifuges, and did not simply copy designs (image[118]).
Contrary to the reports that have been made over the years, the blueprints of the centrifuges that A. Q. Khan stole from the Netherlands were not directly copied, but modified.[109] Indeed, modified Pakistani designs were innovated in order to suit Pakistan's needs, and there are some clear differences between the European and Pakistani models. The P-1 is originally adapted from the dutch SNOR and CNOR designs (and is also known as G-1, which betrays it's German origins), and were used in the SP1 Urenco Plant.[119] The original design used six rotors, but the P-1 uses four.[119] It also uses aluminium rotors (allowing a rotational speed of 350 m/s), whereas future designs would use maraging steel bellows which gave superior performance.[119] The P-2 is also a modified version of the G-2 centrifuge from Germany, which is twice as long as the P-1.[119] It was used in the SP2 plant, and had a top speed of 500 m/s.[119] The P-3 centrifuge is more advanced, and is adapted from the 4-M centrifuges, which were then still under development in the Netherlands.[119] Pakistani scientists presumably finished off the designs themselves, and hence built the P-3 models.[119] It is about twice as powerful as the P-2 model.[119] Pakistan then later also developed the P-4 centrifuges, which take their inspiration from the SLM/TC-10 designs.[119] These are the only known models in Pakistan's possession, but the country has likely made strides in the development of more indigenous designs given that there already exist far more advanced centrifuges elsewhere in the world (although the efficiency of each successive generation tends to diminish).[119] Some of designs (P-1 and P-2) were later shared with the Iranians, Chinese, Libyans and North Koreans.[119] Iran itself was found only with a P-1 design (and called the IR-1).[119]
Having these modified centrifuges proved highly beneficial for the Pakistan—China relationship. The two countries had first formally signed a nuclear cooperation agreement in mid-1976, when Mao Zedong (1893—1976) and Bhutto together pledged support for one another.[120] Zedong died on September 9th, and was taken over by other Chinese officials.[120] Khan and several other Pakistani officials then hammered out the details with the Chinese after Zedong's funeral.[120] It was here that Pakistan first began to help the Chinese with their centrifuges.[120] Chinese nuclear weapons designers Liu Wei, Li Jue and Jiang Shengjie, were all taught how the centrifuges were constructed.[120] At the time, China's uranium enrichment programme was underdeveloped, and so naturally they wanted to obtain Pakistan's more advanced designs.[120] Pakistani scientists then travelled to China to construct these centrifuges, as well as having built a plant for them in order for Chinese engineers to gain expertise.[120] Additionally, as a result A. Q. Khan's network of extensive contacts, Pakistan sent China "machines, inverters, valves, flow meters, pressure gauges" and other modern equipment, taking a grand total of 135 flights from Pakistan to China.[120] Chinese scientists also travelled to Pakistan to learn about the centrifuges.[120] In return China sent feedstocks of UF6, which Pakistan was having difficulty in producing.[120] Khan was also able to get help from some of the other nuclear challenges Pakistan was having.[120] It should be stressed here that the KRL were still indigenously designing their nuke up to this point.[120] As India and Israel's threats grew, Pakistan asked the Chinese for a temporary stockpile of HEU in mid-1982, just in case Pakistan had to retaliate.[120]
Mae Zedong and Zulfikar Bhutto (c. 1976).
The A. Q. Khan Network and it's extensive secret contacts and smuggling operations.
In 1982, China did something incredibly unprecedented.[121] It transferred the first pieces of it's own nuclear technology. According to the Washington Post, in 1982 "a Pakistani military C-130 left the western Chinese city of Urumqi with a highly unusual cargo...enough weapons-grade uranium for two atomic bombs".[121] The new Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping (1904—1997), had responded to Pakistan's call for help against Israel and India, and ordered the Chinese military to pack "small uranium bricks into lead-lined boxes, 10 single-kilogram ingots to a box, for the flight to Islamabad, Pakistan's capital".[120] This was simply a loan, and not intended to used unless absolutely necessary. The Chinese also gave Pakistan a nuclear weapons blueprint; providing a separate[122][n. 16] nuclear bomb design lead by a team under the direction of A. Q. Khan—the other design had been under the direction of PAEC[122]).[123][124] Khan's centrifuge blueprints, which he had smuggled from the Netherlands, was what the Chinese had wanted, and they were willing to barter information for such secrets (the Chinese provided a blueprint for one of their designs in 1982 (tested in 1966),[125][n. 17] with Pakistan improving[92][n. 18] upon it until 1998).[126][n. 19] This gave rise to the idea in the West and India, that China "gave Pakistan nuclear weapons" (as if Pakistanis were incapable of designing their own). The US was completely oblivious to anything that was happening between Pakistan and China, although it was suspicious.[127] In 1979, three years after Zedong and Bhutto had cemented their nuclear cooperation deal, the US came out and said as far as they knew, China is "not in favor of a Pakistani nuclear explosive program, and [we] don't think they are doing anything to help it".[127]
A. Q. Khan.
In 1975, Pakistan started engaging in the process of researching how to enrich uranium rather than plutonium, as the latter proved rather difficult.[63] Serendipitously however, it managed to secretly obtain blueprints on how to construct ultra-high speed centrifuges from a highly unlikely source.[63] A Pakistani scientist—initially unconnected to the project[109]—Abdul Q. Khan (1936—Present), secretly smuggled advanced 4M centrifuge blueprints out of the Netherlands; later improving them by indigenous modification.[110][128][129] In 1976, Khan was formally inducted into the program and went on to build 14,000 of these centrifuges by 1986.[130] Khan was a highly skilled operative, fluent in Urdu,[114] English,[114][115] Dutch[116] French,[116] and German,[116] and many of his colleagues were oblivious that he had turned into a nuclear spy. Many thought he would settle in Europe, made stronger by the fact that he was married to a Dutch woman,[116][131] but he was actively working for the betterment of his ancestral homeland. His enrichment processes later took place at the "Engineering Research Laboratory" (ERL), which was later renamed to the "Khan Research Laboratory" (KRL) in honour of his contributions.[63] A pilot of this plant was built in 1978, construction began in 1979; and the plant was situated near Kahuta, at the foothills of the Himalaya's, North of Islamabad.[63] Pakistan was now amongst only five countries in the world which possessed a working knowledge of uranium enrichment directly from natural uranium ore.[63] It was fortunate as well that there are six ways of enriching the element; one of which is through gas centrifuges; with the others being gaseous diffusion, jet nozzle, rotating hot plasma, gas chromatography and laser technology.[63] Pakistan went with the first option (although PAEC had been using lasers).[63]
Pakistan developed it's own centrifuges, and did not simply copy designs (image[118]).
Contrary to the reports that have been made over the years, the blueprints of the centrifuges that A. Q. Khan stole from the Netherlands were not directly copied, but modified.[109] Indeed, modified Pakistani designs were innovated in order to suit Pakistan's needs, and there are some clear differences between the European and Pakistani models. The P-1 is originally adapted from the dutch SNOR and CNOR designs (and is also known as G-1, which betrays it's German origins), and were used in the SP1 Urenco Plant.[119] The original design used six rotors, but the P-1 uses four.[119] It also uses aluminium rotors (allowing a rotational speed of 350 m/s), whereas future designs would use maraging steel bellows which gave superior performance.[119] The P-2 is also a modified version of the G-2 centrifuge from Germany, which is twice as long as the P-1.[119] It was used in the SP2 plant, and had a top speed of 500 m/s.[119] The P-3 centrifuge is more advanced, and is adapted from the 4-M centrifuges, which were then still under development in the Netherlands.[119] Pakistani scientists presumably finished off the designs themselves, and hence built the P-3 models.[119] It is about twice as powerful as the P-2 model.[119] Pakistan then later also developed the P-4 centrifuges, which take their inspiration from the SLM/TC-10 designs.[119] These are the only known models in Pakistan's possession, but the country has likely made strides in the development of more indigenous designs given that there already exist far more advanced centrifuges elsewhere in the world (although the efficiency of each successive generation tends to diminish).[119] Some of designs (P-1 and P-2) were later shared with the Iranians, Chinese, Libyans and North Koreans.[119] Iran itself was found only with a P-1 design (and called the IR-1).[119]
Mae Zedong and Zulfikar Bhutto (c. 1976).
Having these modified centrifuges proved highly beneficial for the Pakistan—China relationship. The two countries had first formally signed a nuclear cooperation agreement in mid-1976, when Mao Zedong (1893—1976) and Bhutto together pledged support for one another.[120] Zedong died on September 9th, and was taken over by other Chinese officials.[120] Khan and several other Pakistani officials then hammered out the details with the Chinese after Zedong's funeral.[120] It was here that Pakistan first began to help the Chinese with their centrifuges.[120] Chinese nuclear weapons designers Liu Wei, Li Jue and Jiang Shengjie, were all taught how the centrifuges were constructed.[120] At the time, China's uranium enrichment programme was underdeveloped, and so naturally they wanted to obtain Pakistan's more advanced designs.[120] Pakistani scientists then travelled to China to construct these centrifuges, as well as having built a plant for them in order for Chinese engineers to gain expertise.[120] Additionally, as a result A. Q. Khan's network of extensive contacts, Pakistan sent China "machines, inverters, valves, flow meters, pressure gauges" and other modern equipment, taking a grand total of 135 flights from Pakistan to China.[120] Chinese scientists also travelled to Pakistan to learn about the centrifuges.[120] In return China sent feedstocks of UF6, which Pakistan was having difficulty in producing.[120] Khan was also able to get help from some of the other nuclear challenges Pakistan was having.[120] It should be stressed here that the KRL were still indigenously designing their nuke up to this point.[120] As India and Israel's threats grew, Pakistan asked the Chinese for a temporary stockpile of HEU in mid-1982, just in case Pakistan had to retaliate.[120]
The A. Q. Khan Network and it's extensive secret contacts and smuggling operations.
In 1982, China did something incredibly unprecedented.[121] It transferred the first pieces of it's own nuclear technology. According to the Washington Post, in 1982 "a Pakistani military C-130 left the western Chinese city of Urumqi with a highly unusual cargo...enough weapons-grade uranium for two atomic bombs".[121] The new Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping (1904—1997), had responded to Pakistan's call for help against Israel and India, and ordered the Chinese military to pack "small uranium bricks into lead-lined boxes, 10 single-kilogram ingots to a box, for the flight to Islamabad, Pakistan's capital".[120] This was simply a loan, and not intended to used unless absolutely necessary. The Chinese also gave Pakistan a nuclear weapons blueprint; providing a separate[122][n. 20] nuclear bomb design lead by a team under the direction of A. Q. Khan—the other design had been under the direction of PAEC[122]).[123][124] Khan's centrifuge blueprints, which he had smuggled from the Netherlands, was what the Chinese had wanted, and they were willing to barter information for such secrets (the Chinese provided a blueprint for one of their designs in 1982 (tested in 1966),[132][n. 21] with Pakistan improving[92][n. 22] upon it until 1998).[126][n. 23] This gave rise to the idea in the West and India, that China "gave Pakistan nuclear weapons" (as if Pakistanis were incapable of designing their own). The US was completely oblivious to anything that was happening between Pakistan and China, although it was suspicious.[127] In 1979, three years after Zedong and Bhutto had cemented their nuclear cooperation deal, the US came out and said as far as they knew, China is "not in favor of a Pakistani nuclear explosive program, and [we] don't think they are doing anything to help it".[127]

[1981—1989] Greater Breakthroughs, Operation Brasstacks, Indian Threats of Invasion & Israeli Aggression

In 1982, Pakistan began construction of a new laboratory[133] at the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology (PINSTECH) near Rawalpindi.[63] The lab was designed after a French model, with multiple suppliers from multiple countries supplying the equipment.[63] This facility in particular was designed to enrich plutonium but it also allowed for expanding construction into uranium enrichment.[63] After Z. A. Bhutto was unjustly removed from power in a military coup lead by General Zia-ul-Haq (1924–1988[134]), Haq assumed control of the nuclear deterrent programme. Bhutto in the meanwhile was executed on April 4th, 1979 after a trial,[135] in which the supreme court had handed down his sentence. On December 6th, 1981, Haq gave an interview to an Indian magazine; making it public that Pakistan was researching nuclear technology.[63] He stated that Pakistan had been successful in establishing a uranium enrichment facility, and it was extracting uranium from Khyber Patunkhwa for processing and refinement on a local scale.[63] By 1984, the KRL was in full operation at Kahuta, and which successfully began producing enriched uranium in sufficient quantities.[63] Things progressed so rapidly that Pakistan was now ahead of India in uranium enrichment technology.[63] It was not however until 1985 that Pakistan crossed the internationally set red line of 5% enriched uranium[136] (any more and it was suspected the country was developing nuclear weapons).[63] US intelligence agencies by now were closely watching Pakistan.[63] Khan and Haq however publicly maintained that enrichment levels were actually much lower than internationally agreed standards, maintaining a false sense of innocence.[63]
Zia-ul-Haq took over from Bhutto after his execution. Haq set back Pakistan's economy for a decade.
Kahuta uranium enrichment plant.
Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, Pakistan was for the most throughout the better part of a decade running a sophisticated smuggling operation from some of the most secure countries on the planet.[63][n. 24] Sensitive nuclear electronic parts, heavy duty and complex components, as well as certain types of equipment were directly smuggled across the world, beyond the reach of foreign intelligence agencies such as the United States,[63] Germany,[63] Switzerland,[63] China,[63] Japan, France,[137] Malaysia and Turkey.[137] By September 15th, 1986, Pakistan also signed official agreements, one of which was an agreement with China which declared that both countries would design, construct and obtain nuclear power reactors from each other.[63] In 1982 the apartheid state of Israel, which is widely acknowledged to have nuclear weapons itself,[n. 25] even actively planned an attack on Pakistan at the behest of India in an effort to prevent Pakistan from becoming the first independent Muslim country to acquire nuclear weapons,[138] fearing an attack[138] in revenge for the continued genocide of the Palestinian people. However India decided against it[138] and this was probably owed to the fact that Islamabad was already known as a de-facto nuclear power by the 1980's and was already suspected of having a nuclear weapon in it's possession.[139] Another reason could have been down to America threatening India. Coupled with it's secrecy, the country was able to become the first Muslim nation,[140][141] the third official non-White country, and the 7th nation[140][142][143] in the entire world to successfully test their program in 1998. In 2004, Pakistan's 2,000km[139][144]—2,500km[144][145] (Hatf-6) Shaheen-II missile was tested,[139] which could reach all of Israel.[139]
In 1986, alarming reports began to emerge in Pakistan of drastic Indian movements across the border state of Rajasthan in India,[146] the very place where the Indians provocatively tested their first nuclear device in 1974. This operation was collectively termed "Operation Brasstacks", and was organised by Gen. Krishnaswamy Sundarji (1930—1999), in an effort to provoke a deliberate 4th war with Pakistan.[146] According to Indian media sources, the plan was to split Pakistan into four parts,[147] and as per intelligence reports filtering into to Pakistan, it was to begin in 1986 and end in 1987.[146] It involved 600,000[146]—800,000[148] troops, a naval blockade,[148] large movements of modern and advanced equipment[149] and large stores of ammunition.[146] It was later described as one of the biggest military exercises to have been conducted since WWII.[146] Although India denied that it's true purpose was to invade Pakistan (with Sundarji claiming "This was, is and always has been a training exercise...I can't answer why there have been misperceptions about it in some quarters"[149]), it later came to light in the memoirs of Lt. Gen. P.N. Hoon (1929—Present), the operation "was a plan to build up the situation for a fourth war with Pakistan", which according to one international observer (Robert Art), "would provide India with an excuse to implement existing contingency plans to go on an offensive against Pakistan and take out its nuclear bomb projects in a preventive strike".[146] Fortunately, Pakistan had been prepared for any attack ever since Israel attacked Iraq's nuclear reactor, the Osirak, in 1981 (however Iran had first successfully damaged in in 1980, in "Operation Scorch Sword"[150]), which forced Zia "to realize that the nuclear program was vulnerable".[140]
Air Chief Marshal Anwar Shamim (1931—2013) helped procure F-16 jets to keep India and Israel at bay.
Air Chief Marshal Anwar Shamim (1931—2013) helped procure F-16 jets to keep India and Israel at bay.
Also, as has already been said, worrying for Pakistan was Israel, which was actively trying to find ways to attack it through India throughout the 1980s, including during "Brasstacks".[151] In the early 1980s, 1991, 1995 and 1998 it planned but failed to carry out the attacks.[151] Perhaps more alarming was that just before the nuclear tests occurred in 1998, Israeli F-16 jets were sighted twice within Pakistani airspace.[151] Fortunately for Pakistan, it had previously managed to successfully acquire F-16 fighter jets of it's own from America in 1983 (signed in 1981[152][153]), thanks to the efforts of Air Chief Marshal Anwar Shamim (1931—2013[154]).[146] He had previously noted how, because of the proximity of the Kahuta enrichment plant was to the Indian border, the "Indian aircraft can reach [Kahuta] in three minutes whereas PAF can reach it in eight minutes, thereby allowing the Indians to attack the facility and return before the PAF could defend it".[146] Perhaps one of the reasons why the Israelis and Indians not did not attack Pakistan or invade it was that Pakistan was already publicly known to have a workable nuclear device by 1982 (with the earliest workable bomb made in 1977[n. 26]).[155] In January 1987, both India and Pakistan faced off with each other on the Rajasthan border.[146] Pakistan's foreign office immediately summoned the Indian ambassador, S. K. Singh (1932—2009[156]) at midnight in order to meet the Foreign Affairs Minister, Zain Noorani (????—????).[146] The latter relayed Haqs messages, by suggesting subtly, Pakistan had the capability to completely level Mumbai (née Bombay).[146] The Indians took heed of this message and gradually backed off.[146] Thus, Pakistan successfully avoided a well prepared Indian invasion, the latter of whom's plan utterly failed.[n. 27]
Zia-ul-Haq took over from Bhutto after his execution. Haq set back Pakistan's economy for a decade.
In 1982, Pakistan began construction of a new laboratory[133] at the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology (PINSTECH) near Rawalpindi.[63] The lab was designed after a French model, with multiple suppliers from multiple countries supplying the equipment.[63] This facility in particular was designed to enrich plutonium but it also allowed for expanding construction into uranium enrichment.[63] After Z. A. Bhutto was unjustly removed from power in a military coup lead by General Zia-ul-Haq (1924–1988[134]), Haq assumed control of the nuclear deterrent programme. Bhutto in the meanwhile was executed on April 4th, 1979 after a trial,[135] in which the supreme court had handed down his sentence. On December 6th, 1981, Haq gave an interview to an Indian magazine; making it public that Pakistan was researching nuclear technology.[63] He stated that Pakistan had been successful in establishing a uranium enrichment facility, and it was extracting uranium from Khyber Patunkhwa for processing and refinement on a local scale.[63] By 1984, the KRL was in full operation at Kahuta, and which successfully began producing enriched uranium in sufficient quantities.[63] Things progressed so rapidly that Pakistan was now ahead of India in uranium enrichment technology.[63] It was not however until 1985 that Pakistan crossed the internationally set red line of 5% enriched uranium[136] (any more and it was suspected the country was developing nuclear weapons).[63] US intelligence agencies by now were closely watching Pakistan.[63] Khan and Haq however publicly maintained that enrichment levels were actually much lower than internationally agreed standards, maintaining a false sense of innocence.[63]
Kahuta uranium enrichment plant.
Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, Pakistan was for the most throughout the better part of a decade running a sophisticated smuggling operation from some of the most secure countries on the planet.[63][n. 28] Sensitive nuclear electronic parts, heavy duty and complex components, as well as certain types of equipment were directly smuggled across the world, beyond the reach of foreign intelligence agencies such as the United States,[63] Germany,[63] Switzerland,[63] China,[63] Japan, France,[137] Malaysia and Turkey.[137] By September 15th, 1986, Pakistan also signed official agreements, one of which was an agreement with China which declared that both countries would design, construct and obtain nuclear power reactors from each other.[63] In 1982 the apartheid state of Israel, which is widely acknowledged to have nuclear weapons itself,[n. 29] even actively planned an attack on Pakistan at the behest of India in an effort to prevent Pakistan from becoming the first independent Muslim country to acquire nuclear weapons,[138] fearing an attack[138] in revenge for the continued genocide of the Palestinian people. However India decided against it[138] and this was probably owed to the fact that Islamabad was already known as a de-facto nuclear power by the 1980's and was already suspected of having a nuclear weapon in it's possession.[139] Another reason could have been down to America threatening India. Coupled with it's secrecy, the country was able to become the first Muslim nation,[140][141] the third official non-White country, and the 7th nation[140][142][143] in the entire world to successfully test their program in 1998. In 2004, Pakistan's 2,000km[139][144]—2,500km[144][145] (Hatf-6) Shaheen-II missile was tested,[139] which could reach all of Israel.[139]
Air Chief Marshal Anwar Shamim (1931—2013) helped procure F-16 jets to keep India and Israel at bay.
In 1986, alarming reports began to emerge in Pakistan of drastic Indian movements across the border state of Rajasthan in India,[146] the very place where the Indians provocatively tested their first nuclear device in 1974. This operation was collectively termed "Operation Brasstacks", and was organised by Gen. Krishnaswamy Sundarji (1930—1999), in an effort to provoke a deliberate 4th war with Pakistan.[146] According to Indian media sources, the plan was to split Pakistan into four parts,[147] and as per intelligence reports filtering into to Pakistan, it was to begin in 1986 and end in 1987.[146] It involved 600,000[146]—800,000[148] troops, a naval blockade,[148] large movements of modern and advanced equipment[149] and large stores of ammunition.[146] It was later described as one of the biggest military exercises to have been conducted since WWII.[146] Although India denied that it's true purpose was to invade Pakistan (with Sundarji claiming "This was, is and always has been a training exercise...I can't answer why there have been misperceptions about it in some quarters"[149]), it later came to light in the memoirs of Lt. Gen. P.N. Hoon (1929—Present), the operation "was a plan to build up the situation for a fourth war with Pakistan", which according to one international observer (Robert Art), "would provide India with an excuse to implement existing contingency plans to go on an offensive against Pakistan and take out its nuclear bomb projects in a preventive strike".[146] Fortunately, Pakistan had been prepared for any attack ever since Israel attacked Iraq's nuclear reactor, the Osirak, in 1981 (however Iran had first successfully damaged in in 1980, in "Operation Scorch Sword"[150]), which forced Zia "to realize that the nuclear program was vulnerable".[140]
Air Chief Marshal Anwar Shamim (1931—2013) helped procure F-16 jets to keep India and Israel at bay.
Also, as has already been said, worrying for Pakistan was Israel, which was actively trying to find ways to attack it through India throughout the 1980s, including during "Brasstacks".[151] In the early 1980s, 1991, 1995 and 1998 it planned but failed to carry out the attacks.[151] Perhaps more alarming was that just before the nuclear tests occurred in 1998, Israeli F-16 jets were sighted twice within Pakistani airspace.[151] Fortunately for Pakistan, it had previously managed to successfully acquire F-16 fighter jets of it's own from America in 1983 (signed in 1981[152][153]), thanks to the efforts of Air Chief Marshal Anwar Shamim (1931—2013[154]).[146] He had previously noted how, because of the proximity of the Kahuta enrichment plant was to the Indian border, the "Indian aircraft can reach [Kahuta] in three minutes whereas PAF can reach it in eight minutes, thereby allowing the Indians to attack the facility and return before the PAF could defend it".[146] Perhaps one of the reasons why the Israelis and Indians not did not attack Pakistan or invade it was that Pakistan was already publicly known to have a workable nuclear device by 1982 (with the earliest workable bomb made in 1977[n. 30]).[155] In January 1987, both India and Pakistan faced off with each other on the Rajasthan border.[146] Pakistan's foreign office immediately summoned the Indian ambassador, S. K. Singh (1932—2009[156]) at midnight in order to meet the Foreign Affairs Minister, Zain Noorani (????—????).[146] The latter relayed Haqs messages, by suggesting subtly, Pakistan had the capability to completely level Mumbai (née Bombay).[146] The Indians took heed of this message and gradually backed off.[146] Thus, Pakistan successfully avoided a well prepared Indian invasion, the latter of whom's plan utterly failed.[n. 31]

[1988—1998] Growing Confidence, Fooling the West, Sanctions, Nuclear Tests, Aftermath & Fallout

By 1987,[157] Haq was even more confident of Pakistan's abilities to produce nuclear warheads at a moments notice, disclosing as much to the public that Pakistan could build the bomb whenever it wished.[63] In July 1988, for the the first time, he directly mentioned the words "nuclear deterrent", and claimed to have stated that South Asia had achieved a nuclear balance.[63] In that same year, he declared Pakistan a defacto nuclear power; with the "The New York Times" reporting that Pakistan was now capable of at least producing between 4—6 nuclear weapons already (in reality, it was able to produce 2—3 nuclear weapons, and this on a per year basis, at the Kahuta plant alone).[63] Again, in that same year, Pakistan became successful in developing weapons grade Plutonium (a significant achievement given that the plutonium route is fraught with complexities[158][159] compared to the easier uranium route,[160][161] which can bypass many of it's problems).[63] This angered the Americans, who began piling pressure on Pakistan in attempts to derail the programme.[63] They were temporarily successful when Pakistani Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto (1953—2007[162])—having replaced Haq in 1988—suspended all uranium enrichment activity in June 1989[163]—something for which she and her party were heavily criticised for across Pakistan.[63] Khan later noted how the international community was unfairly responding to Pakistan's developments by implementing harsh restrictions.[63] In a talk at the Government College of Lahore, he stated the "Kahuta plant was designed by us and we kept it secret. The international community had put restriction[s] on the export of all kinds of equipment to Pakistan. But within next two years we will be able to manufacture those instruments".[63]
Benazir Bhutto reassuring the US Congress about not pursuing nuclear weapons.
The PARR-II reactor was Pakistan's first indogenously built reactor.
Political pressure by the United States (a supposed ally[n. 32]), did not derail the programme however,[164] despite America considering bombing Pakistan.[n. 33] In 1989, Pakistan constructed it's own domestically built 27 kilowatt "Parr-II" reactor for the purposes of research.[63] China also agreed to supply Pakistan with a 300 megawatt power plant in November of that same year.[63] In 1990, the French also involved themselves and agreed to provide a 950 megawatt power plant.[63] These two nuclear installations were placed under the IAEA's watch.[63] By now the US was actively holding hearings in order to determine what Pakistan's nuclear capabilities were, and also to analyse the threat Pakistan posed to the US hegemony in the region.[63] The director of the CIA, William Webster (1924—Present[165]), directly testified before a Senate Committee hearing on May 18th, 1989, where he questioned the amount of aid Pakistan was getting from the US.[63] Pakistan itself didn't care about the US position; as far as it was concerned, it was none of the US's business.[63] Pakistan was far more concerned with the pressing need to deny its use of its non-peaceful nuclear weapon's research programme to the world,[n. 34] so that the world powers did not interfere.[63] Benazir Bhutto even went as far as to visit the US in 1989 where she directly told the US Congress that "Speaking for Pakistan, I can declare that we do not possess, nor we intend to make a nuclear device".[63] This directly contradicted other public statements made by other officials at the time such as the Army Chief of Staff, Mirza A. Beg (1931—Present[166]) who in that same year also stated that "both the nuclear option and the missiles (that Pakistan is developing) act as a deterrence and these in turn contribute to the fighting ability of the army".[63]
The American's behaviour did not go unnoticed in Pakistan; and in fact Pakistan was extremely suspicious of the motivations of the US, and it's interference in it's programme. Although they were supposed to be allies, the British and the US had found Pakistan's nuclear ambitions troublesome for themselves in the 1970s, and imposed embargoes on nuclear-related imports to the country in order to prevent them from obtaining the necessary parts they required.[167] Things became so frustrating that A. Q. Khan stated that "[t]he Britishers are stalling it more than before. They are even stopping nails and screws [from being exported to us]... All our material has been stopped, everywhere they are delaying it. Now we will have to do some work ourselves".[167] By the 1980s, Pakistan had managed to circumvent the embargoes almost totally, and acquired exactly what it had been searching for for it's programme.[167] Not forgetting Britain or the United States treacherous behavior, Pakistan deliberately rubbed it into their noses that Pakistani scientists were capable of constructing exactly what they wanted and how they wanted.[167] Pakistan regularly published it's knowledge on its self-sufficiency in the international arena by "boasting and displaying" it's expertise.[167] One particular paper it later published became the only study ever to layout the construction of a very sensitive nuclear part, called maraging steel bellows (this obviously angered the West even further, as it was considered so sensitive it was worthy of a state secret).[167] These were joints that were placed between rotor tubes in centrifuges and were extremely difficult to produce.[167] International experts were cleary impressed by Pakistan's advances, going as far as to call them "relatively competent".[167]
Centrifuge bottom, detailing how oil is pumped up through a cup.
Operation Chagai-I (May 28th, 1998). The nuclear blast cracked open a 3km high mountain, and caused controversy in the Indian parliament.[n. 35].
By 1998, both India and Pakistan were ready for nuclear tests. As has been mentioned, India first tested a nuclear device in 1974 (in "Operation Smiling Buddha").[139][n. 36] The test ultimately proved to yield an unknown amount of power[168] At the same time Pakistan maintained "a policy of deliberate nuclear ambiguity"[n. 37] well into the next decade; but did eventually reveal their own domestic built nuclear device in 1982.[139] It is notable that the first Indian test was secretly considered a failure.[139] India launched a second test on May 11th 1998,[169] Pakistan followed suit a fortnight later (on May 28th[169]) in "Operation Chaghai" in the Kharan Desert.[170] A second test, "Operation Chaghai-II" became active on May 30th[169]. Both were successful and yielded between 13—16 kt[169] from two[169] nuclear devices (claimed 40—45 kt[169][171] in a total of seven[169] tests) whilst India's totalled 15 kt[169] from three[169] nuclear devices (claimed 55[171]—60[169] kt in a total of five tests[169]). An independent study revealed that both countries had greatly exaggerated their nuclear capabilities;[169] where "a consortium of 90 research universities that operates a global network of 100 seismic monitoring stations endorsed" the "study's conclusions" that both claims were grossly exaggerated by a "factor of four".[169] On average this meant Pakistan had developed a stronger deterrence (6.5—8.0 kt) than India's (5.0 kt) by the late 1990's.[169] The tests infuriated the Western powers[172][n. 38] who even tried to bribe Pakistan by offering an economic package worth $15 billion dollars to restrain it (but curiously not to India).[173]
After the nuclear tests were carried out, Pakistan declared May 28th "Youm-e-Takbir" day (or the "Day of Greatness"). However, not everyone was happy at this outcome. Indeed Balochistan was divided on the issue (Sana Ullah Zehri (1961—Present[174]) of the "Balochistan National Party" celebrated it, whereas the "Baloch Student Organization" condemned them).[175] Baloch nationalists have since mourned the detonations, and labelled May 28th as a "black day".[175] This is as a result of major health complications brought to a minority of Baloch people.[175] Approximately 4,000 individuals were affected by the explosions in the regions of Chagai, Nushki and Kharan.[175] About 50% of the Chaghai population alone developed hepatitis, and every third death in the region was attributed to cancer.[175] Some have also developed thalassemia.[175] Compensation has still not been meted out to these individuals by the government (though the government did not promise any when they conducted the tests).[175] Some Balochis were apparently not happy even when the tests were being planned.[175] A Baloch terrorist group (the "Baluchistan Students' Federation") highjacked "PIA Flight-554" (thought to be helped by India's R&AW agency[175]) on May 25th, 1998 and may have been motivated by "objecting to any plans to carry out nuclear tests in the region".[176] The flight initially departed from Quetta, Baluchistan, and was intended to land in Karachi.[176] The Pakistan Air Force intercepted the flight, and forced it to land in Hyderabad Airport.[176] The hijackers were tricked into believing they had actually landed in Rajasthan, when Zarar Commandos surged the plane, captured the terrorists without casualties and freed the hostages.[176] India sponsors terrorism in Balochistan[177] and may have done so to prevent Pakistan from carrying out it's nuclear tests.[175]
A Zarar SSG Commando.
Benazir Bhutto reassuring the US Congress about not pursuing nuclear weapons.
By 1987,[157] Haq was even more confident of Pakistan's abilities to produce nuclear warheads at a moments notice, disclosing as much to the public that Pakistan could build the bomb whenever it wished.[63] In July 1988, for the the first time, he directly mentioned the words "nuclear deterrent", and claimed to have stated that South Asia had achieved a nuclear balance.[63] In that same year, he declared Pakistan a defacto nuclear power; with the "The New York Times" reporting that Pakistan was now capable of at least producing between 4—6 nuclear weapons already (in reality, it was able to produce 2—3 nuclear weapons, and this on a per year basis, at the Kahuta plant alone).[63] Again, in that same year, Pakistan became successful in developing weapons grade Plutonium (a significant achievement given that the plutonium route is fraught with complexities[158][159] compared to the easier uranium route,[160][178] which can bypass many of it's problems).[63] This angered the Americans, who began piling pressure on Pakistan in attempts to derail the programme.[63] They were temporarily successful when Pakistani Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto (1953—2007[162])—having replaced Haq in 1988—suspended all uranium enrichment activity in June 1989[179]—something for which she and her party were heavily criticised for across Pakistan.[63] Khan later noted how the international community was unfairly responding to Pakistan's developments by implementing harsh restrictions.[63] In a talk at the Government College of Lahore, he stated the "Kahuta plant was designed by us and we kept it secret. The international community had put restriction[s] on the export of all kinds of equipment to Pakistan. But within next two years we will be able to manufacture those instruments".[63]
The PARR-II reactor was Pakistan's first indogenously built reactor.
Political pressure by the United States (a supposed ally[n. 39]), did not derail the programme however,[164] despite America considering bombing Pakistan.[n. 40] In 1989, Pakistan constructed it's own domestically built 27 kilowatt "Parr-II" reactor for the purposes of research.[63] China also agreed to supply Pakistan with a 300 megawatt power plant in November of that same year.[63] In 1990, the French also involved themselves and agreed to provide a 950 megawatt power plant.[63] These two nuclear installations were placed under the IAEA's watch.[63] By now the US was actively holding hearings in order to determine what Pakistan's nuclear capabilities were, and also to analyse the threat Pakistan posed to the US hegemony in the region.[63] The director of the CIA, William Webster (1924—Present[165]), directly testified before a Senate Committee hearing on May 18th, 1989, where he questioned the amount of aid Pakistan was getting from the US.[63] Pakistan itself didn't care about the US position; as far as it was concerned, it was none of the US's business.[63] Pakistan was far more concerned with the pressing need to deny its use of its non-peaceful nuclear weapon's research programme to the world,[n. 41] so that the world powers did not interfere.[63] Benazir Bhutto even went as far as to visit the US in 1989 where she directly told the US Congress that "Speaking for Pakistan, I can declare that we do not possess, nor we intend to make a nuclear device".[63] This directly contradicted other public statements made by other officials at the time such as the Army Chief of Staff, Mirza A. Beg (1931—Present[166]) who in that same year also stated that "both the nuclear option and the missiles (that Pakistan is developing) act as a deterrence and these in turn contribute to the fighting ability of the army".[63]
Centrifuge bottom, detailing how oil is pumped up through a cup.
The American's behaviour did not go unnoticed in Pakistan; and in fact Pakistan was extremely suspicious of the motivations of the US, and it's interference in it's programme. Although they were supposed to be allies, the British and the US had found Pakistan's nuclear ambitions troublesome for themselves in the 1970s, and imposed embargoes on nuclear-related imports to the country in order to prevent them from obtaining the necessary parts they required.[167] Things became so frustrating that A. Q. Khan stated that "[t]he Britishers are stalling it more than before. They are even stopping nails and screws [from being exported to us]... All our material has been stopped, everywhere they are delaying it. Now we will have to do some work ourselves".[167] By the 1980s, Pakistan had managed to circumvent the embargoes almost totally, and acquired exactly what it had been searching for for it's programme.[167] Not forgetting Britain or the United States treacherous behavior, Pakistan deliberately rubbed it into their noses that Pakistani scientists were capable of constructing exactly what they wanted and how they wanted.[167] Pakistan regularly published it's knowledge on its self-sufficiency in the international arena by "boasting and displaying" it's expertise.[167] One particular paper it later published became the only study ever to layout the construction of a very sensitive nuclear part, called maraging steel bellows (this obviously angered the West even further, as it was considered so sensitive it was worthy of a state secret).[167] These were joints that were placed between rotor tubes in centrifuges and were extremely difficult to produce.[167] International experts were cleary impressed by Pakistan's advances, going as far as to call them "relatively competent".[167]
Operation Chagai-I (May 28th, 1998). The nuclear blast cracked open a 3km high mountain, and caused controversy in the Indian parliament.[n. 42].
By 1998, both India and Pakistan were ready for nuclear tests. As has been mentioned, India first tested a nuclear device in 1974 (in "Operation Smiling Buddha").[139][n. 43] The test ultimately proved to yield an unknown amount of power[168] At the same time Pakistan maintained "a policy of deliberate nuclear ambiguity"[n. 44] well into the next decade; but did eventually reveal their own domestic built nuclear device in 1982.[139] It is notable that the first Indian test was secretly considered a failure.[139] India launched a second test on May 11th 1998,[169] Pakistan followed suit a fortnight later (on May 28th[169]) in "Operation Chaghai" in the Kharan Desert.[170] A second test, "Operation Chaghai-II" became active on May 30th[169]. Both were successful and yielded between 13—16 kt[169] from two[169] nuclear devices (claimed 40—45 kt[169][171] in a total of seven[169] tests) whilst India's totalled 15 kt[169] from three[169] nuclear devices (claimed 55[171]—60[169] kt in a total of five tests[169]). An independent study revealed that both countries had greatly exaggerated their nuclear capabilities;[169] where "a consortium of 90 research universities that operates a global network of 100 seismic monitoring stations endorsed" the "study's conclusions" that both claims were grossly exaggerated by a "factor of four".[169] On average this meant Pakistan had developed a stronger deterrence (6.5—8.0 kt) than India's (5.0 kt) by the late 1990's.[169] The tests infuriated the Western powers[172][n. 45] who even tried to bribe Pakistan by offering an economic package worth $15 billion dollars to restrain it (but curiously not to India).[173]
A Zarar SSG Commando.
After the nuclear tests were carried out, Pakistan declared May 28th "Youm-e-Takbir" day (or the "Day of Greatness"). However, not everyone was happy at this outcome. Indeed Balochistan was divided on the issue (Sana Ullah Zehri (1961—Present[174]) of the "Balochistan National Party" celebrated it, whereas the "Baloch Student Organization" condemned them).[175] Baloch nationalists have since mourned the detonations, and labelled May 28th as a "black day".[175] This is as a result of major health complications brought to a minority of Baloch people.[175] Approximately 4,000 individuals were affected by the explosions in the regions of Chagai, Nushki and Kharan.[175] About 50% of the Chaghai population alone developed hepatitis, and every third death in the region was attributed to cancer.[175] Some have also developed thalassemia.[175] Compensation has still not been meted out to these individuals by the government (though the government did not promise any when they conducted the tests).[175] Some Balochis were apparently not happy even when the tests were being planned.[175] A Baloch terrorist group (the "Baluchistan Students' Federation") highjacked "PIA Flight-554" (thought to be helped by India's R&AW agency[175]) on May 25th, 1998 and may have been motivated by "objecting to any plans to carry out nuclear tests in the region".[176] The flight initially departed from Quetta, Baluchistan, and was intended to land in Karachi.[176] The Pakistan Air Force intercepted the flight, and forced it to land in Hyderabad Airport.[176] The hijackers were tricked into believing they had actually landed in Rajasthan, when Zarar Commandos surged the plane, captured the terrorists without casualties and freed the hostages.[176] India sponsors terrorism in Balochistan[177] and may have done so to prevent Pakistan from carrying out it's nuclear tests.[175]

Nuclear Armed Triad, Second Strike Capability & MIRV Capability

JF-17X Stealth fight jet. Developed jointly by Pakistan and China (designed in 2003).
Pakistan has multiple different fighter jet squadrons capable of delivering singular (potentially dual) nuclear payloads.[5] The jets in question include F-16-A/Bs (developed in 1978[180]), F-16-C/Ds (1984[181]), Mirage-IIIs (1956[182]), Mirage-Vs (1966[183]) and JF-17s (2003[184]).[5] Forty F-16 A/Bs were delivered by the US between 1983 and 1987, and under contract, Pakistan agreed it wouldn't make these nuclear capable (however, it had no intention of compromising on it's national security).[5] As soon as the delivery was complete, it began to install advanced computer equipment it had developed in order to fit its nuclear weapons on it's newly acquired aircraft.[5] According to West German intelligence, "Pakistan had already developed sophisticated computer and electronic technology to outfit the US F-16s with nuclear weapons".[5] The US was livid, and delayed delivering the newer F-16 C/D versions in the 1990s, but George W. Bush's administration (2000—2008[185]) reversed this policy.[5] The F-16-A/B's are operated by the "9th Griffin's Squadron" and the "11th Arrows Squadron", and have a range of 1,600 km, with the distance extendable if the jets are equipped with drop tanks (additional fuel tanks).[5] The F-16-C/Ds are operated by the "5th Falcons Squadron", and have a similar range (which is also extendable).[5] There are also five Mirage squadrons which are also nuclear capable.[5] These are the "7th Bandits Squadron", "8th Haiders Squadron", "22nd Ghazis Squadron", "15th Cobras Squadron" and the "27th Zarras Squadron".[5] The JF-17s are not known to have been equipped with nuclear carrying capabilities just yet, but it is believed this option is open (and which may be dual capable), based on the US sanctioning the sale of further F-16s (and their parts) in the future.[5]
Pakistan currently has six ballistic missiles it uses on the battlefield, which are the Abdali (200 km; 124 miles), Ghaznavi (300 km; 186 miles), Shaheen-I (750 km; 466 miles), NASR (70 km; 43 miles), Ghauri (1,300 km; 807 miles) and Shaheen-II (2,000 km; 1,243 miles). It also possess the Shaheen-IA (900 km; 560 miles), Shaheen-III (2,750 km; 1,709 miles) and the MIRV capable Ababeel (2,200 km; 1,367 miles). These are all carried by eight or nine units, four to five which are posted along the Pakistan-Indian border with short range missiles, and three to four units positioned inland carrying the medium range missiles. The Ababeel is the first MIRV capable missile to have been developed in South Asia (before India even had); and was kept secret until 2017. This was because during the time of it's development, India was developing a ballistic missile shield (and currently still is). One way of combating this shield is to use a MIRV which can launch multiple nuclear warheads in different directions, thereby rendering the ballistic missile shield vulnerable. Pakistan currently has two types of cruise missiles. The first of which is the ground launched cruise missile (GLCM) Babur (700 km; 435 miles) and is equivalent to the US Tomahawk missile, and the air launched cruise missile (ALCM) Ra'ad (350 km; 218 miles). Pakistan has developed variants of the missiles in the form of Babur-2 (700 km; 435 miles)—also known as the Babur-1(B)—and the Ra'ad 2 (550 km; 341 miles). Both of these have significant improvements, such as stealth capability, pinpoint accuracy, low-altitude, terrain-hugging and high maneuverability. Interestingly the design of these cruise missiles shows that they are much more slimmer than it's other missiles, which heavily indicates "success with warhead miniaturization".[5]
Ra'ad-2 cruise missiles can fly 550 km; or 341 miles further when launched.
The Pakistan Navy possesses a second strike nuclear capability cruise missile, called the Babur-3.
Pakistan has also developed a sea-launched stealth cruise missile called the Babur-3 (450 km; 279 miles)[5] with a top speed of 550 mph. The missile is capable of being launched from an underwater mobile platform.[5] It is "capable of delivering various types of payloads...[that]...will provide Pakistan with a Credible Second Strike Capability, augmenting deterrence".[5] It is thought Pakistan will deploy these missiles on the French-made Agosta-class diesel-electric Submarines[5] (developed in 1977,[186] and still used by the Spanish[187] and Malaysian Navies[188]). The Babur-3 missiles have completed Pakistan's ambitions of holding a nuclear triad[189] with MIRV capability.[5] The missiles were developed to match India’s ambitions of having a nuclear triad and the "nuclearization of [the] Indian Ocean Region".[5] The missile is also useful for combating India's ballistic missile shield.[5] India too is developing cruise missiles to attach to it's navy, with the most prominent being the BrahMos missile[190] (jointly developed by India and Russia,[191] which has an operational range of 450 km; or 280 miles).[5] This missile is touted as the "world's fastest cruise missile", with a top speed of between 1,400[192]–2,148 mph.[193] In 2018, Pakistan's spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), managed to hack into and steal highly classified blueprints[n. 46] regarding the missile from the computers of senior system engineer, Nishant Agarwal, at the "BrahMos Aerospace" company,[194] where "critical components for the BrahMos missile" are made.[195] Pakistan will likely incorporate this data into their own missiles or build a replica (China similarly stole blueprints of the US F-35 stealth fighter jet in 2009,[196] and developed their own (superior[197]) replica, called the FC-31 in 2012[198]).
JF-17X Stealth fight jet. Developed jointly by Pakistan and China (designed in 2003).
Pakistan has multiple different fighter jet squadrons capable of delivering singular (potentially dual) nuclear payloads.[5] The jets in question include F-16-A/Bs (developed in 1978[199]), F-16-C/Ds (1984[200]), Mirage-IIIs (1956[182]), Mirage-Vs (1966[183]) and JF-17s (2003[184]).[5] Forty F-16 A/Bs were delivered by the US between 1983 and 1987, and under contract, Pakistan agreed it wouldn't make these nuclear capable (however, it had no intention of compromising on it's national security).[5] As soon as the delivery was complete, it began to install advanced computer equipment it had developed in order to fit its nuclear weapons on it's newly acquired aircraft.[5] According to West German intelligence, "Pakistan had already developed sophisticated computer and electronic technology to outfit the US F-16s with nuclear weapons".[5] The US was livid, and delayed delivering the newer F-16 C/D versions in the 1990s, but George W. Bush's administration (2000—2008[185]) reversed this policy.[5] The F-16-A/B's are operated by the "9th Griffin's Squadron" and the "11th Arrows Squadron", and have a range of 1,600 km, with the distance extendable if the jets are equipped with drop tanks (additional fuel tanks).[5] The F-16-C/Ds are operated by the "5th Falcons Squadron", and have a similar range (which is also extendable).[5] There are also five Mirage squadrons which are also nuclear capable.[5] These are the "7th Bandits Squadron", "8th Haiders Squadron", "22nd Ghazis Squadron", "15th Cobras Squadron" and the "27th Zarras Squadron".[5] The JF-17s are not known to have been equipped with nuclear carrying capabilities just yet, but it is believed this option is open (and which may be dual capable), based on the US sanctioning the sale of further F-16s (and their parts) in the future.[5]
Ra'ad-2 cruise missiles can fly 550 km; or 341 miles further when launched.
Pakistan currently has six ballistic missiles it uses on the battlefield, which are the Abdali (200 km; 124 miles), Ghaznavi (300 km; 186 miles), Shaheen-I (750 km; 466 miles), NASR (70 km; 43 miles), Ghauri (1,300 km; 807 miles) and Shaheen-II (2,000 km; 1,243 miles). It also possess the Shaheen-IA (900 km; 560 miles), Shaheen-III (2,750 km; 1,709 miles) and the MIRV capable Ababeel (2,200 km; 1,367 miles). These are all carried by eight or nine units, four to five which are posted along the Pakistan-Indian border with short range missiles, and three to four units positioned inland carrying the medium range missiles. The Ababeel is the first MIRV capable missile to have been developed in South Asia (before India even had); and was kept secret until 2017. This was because during the time of it's development, India was developing a ballistic missile shield (and currently still is). One way of combating this shield is to use a MIRV which can launch multiple nuclear warheads in different directions, thereby rendering the ballistic missile shield vulnerable. Pakistan currently has two types of cruise missiles. The first of which is the ground launched cruise missile (GLCM) Babur (700 km; 435 miles) and is equivalent to the US Tomahawk missile, and the air launched cruise missile (ALCM) Ra'ad (350 km; 218 miles). Pakistan has developed variants of the missiles in the form of Babur-2 (700 km; 435 miles)—also known as the Babur-1(B)—and the Ra'ad 2 (550 km; 341 miles). Both of these have significant improvements, such as stealth capability, pinpoint accuracy, low-altitude, terrain-hugging and high maneuverability. Interestingly the design of these cruise missiles shows that they are much more slimmer than it's other missiles, which heavily indicates "success with warhead miniaturization".[5]
The Pakistan Navy possesses a second strike nuclear capability cruise missile, called the Babur-3.
Pakistan has also developed a sea-launched stealth cruise missile called the Babur-3 (450 km; 279 miles)[5] with a top speed of 550 mph. The missile is capable of being launched from an underwater mobile platform.[5] It is "capable of delivering various types of payloads...[that]...will provide Pakistan with a Credible Second Strike Capability, augmenting deterrence".[5] It is thought Pakistan will deploy these missiles on the French-made Agosta-class diesel-electric Submarines[5] (developed in 1977,[186] and still used by the Spanish[187] and Malaysian Navies[188]). The Babur-3 missiles have completed Pakistan's ambitions of holding a nuclear triad[189] with MIRV capability.[5] The missiles were developed to match India’s ambitions of having a nuclear triad and the "nuclearization of [the] Indian Ocean Region".[5] The missile is also useful for combating India's ballistic missile shield.[5] India too is developing cruise missiles to attach to it's navy, with the most prominent being the BrahMos missile[190] (jointly developed by India and Russia,[191] which has an operational range of 450 km; or 280 miles).[5] This missile is touted as the "world's fastest cruise missile", with a top speed of between 1,400[192]–2,148 mph.[193] In 2018, Pakistan's spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), managed to hack into and steal highly classified blueprints[n. 47] regarding the missile from the computers of senior system engineer, Nishant Agarwal, at the "BrahMos Aerospace" company,[194] where "critical components for the BrahMos missile" are made.[195] Pakistan will likely incorporate this data into their own missiles or build a replica (China similarly stole blueprints of the US F-35 stealth fighter jet in 2009,[196] and developed their own (superior[197]) replica, called the FC-31 in 2012[198]).

List of Nuclear Armed Ballistic & Cruise Missiles

Type MISSILE[5] BALLISTIC MISSILE NAME[5] Launchers[5] Deployed[5] Range (km)[5] Warhead Yield[201] No. of Warheads[5]
Air To Air F-16 A/B VARIOUS 24 1998 1,600 CLASSIFIED 24
Mirage III/V VARIOUS 12 1998 2,100 CLASSIFIED 12
Surface To Air Hatf-2 ABDALI 10 2015 200 CLASSIFIED 10
Hatf-3 GHAZNAVI 16 2004 300 CLASSIFIED 16
Hatf-4 SHAHEEN-I 16 2003 750 CLASSIFIED 16
Hatf-4 SHAHEEN-IA CLASSIFIED 2018 900 CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED
Hatf-6 SHAHEEN-II 12 2014 1,500 CLASSIFIED 12
Hatf-6 SHAHEEN-III CLASSIFIED 2018 2,750 CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED
Hatf-5 GHAURI 24 2003 1,250 CLASSIFIED 24
Hatf-9 NASR 24 2013 70 CLASSIFIED 24
Hatf-? ABABEEL CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED 2,200 CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED
Sea To Air Hatf-? BABUR-III SLCM CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED 450 CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED
Cruise Missile Hatf-7 BABUR GLCM 12 2014 350 CLASSIFIED 12
Hatf-? BABUR-II/1(B) GLCM CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED 700 CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED
Hatf-8 RA'AD ALCM CLASSIFIED 2017 350 CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED
Hatf-? RA'AD-II ALCM CLASSIFIED 2018 350 CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED
TOTAL NUKES 150
PakistanMissiles1-12.jpg
PakistanMissiles1-12.jpg
Type MISSILE[5] BALLISTIC MISSILE NAME[5] Launchers[5] Deployed[5] Range (km)[5] Warhead Yield[201] No. of Warheads[5]
Air To Air F-16 A/B VARIOUS 24 1998 1,600 CLASSIFIED 24
Mirage III/V VARIOUS 12 1998 2,100 CLASSIFIED 12
Surface To Air Hatf-2 ABDALI 10 2015 200 CLASSIFIED 10
Hatf-3 GHAZNAVI 16 2004 300 CLASSIFIED 16
Hatf-4 SHAHEEN-I 16 2003 750 CLASSIFIED 16
Hatf-4 SHAHEEN-IA CLASSIFIED 2018 900 CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED
Hatf-6 SHAHEEN-II 12 2014 1,500 CLASSIFIED 12
Hatf-6 SHAHEEN-III CLASSIFIED 2018 2,750 CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED
Hatf-5 GHAURI 24 2003 1,250 CLASSIFIED 24
Hatf-9 NASR 24 2013 70 CLASSIFIED 24
Hatf-? ABABEEL CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED 2,200 CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED
Sea To Air Hatf-? BABUR-III SLCM CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED 450 CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED
Cruise Missile Hatf-7 BABUR GLCM 12 2014 350 CLASSIFIED 12
Hatf-? BABUR-II/1(B) GLCM CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED 700 CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED
Hatf-8 RA'AD ALCM CLASSIFIED 2017 350 CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED
Hatf-? RA'AD-II ALCM CLASSIFIED 2018 350 CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED
TOTAL NUKES 150

Reason's Against Disarmament

Hindu/Saffron Terrorism, Pogroms & Genocides Against Muslims in India

Further Information Hindu Terrorism Against Muslims in India (1947—Present)
The far-right,[202] genocidal,[n. 48] pro-Hindutva "Bharatiya Janata Party" (BJP) are extremely Islamophobic,[203] and anti-Pakistani.[204] Under their tenure since 2014, they have increasingly been militarising India,[205] testing ballistic missiles and persecuted Muslims;[206] issues which Pakistan isn't able to ignore. Muslims in India have always been bearing the brunt of extremist Hindu hatred, who routinely treat Muslims like the Jews of Nazi Germany.[206] There have been numerous state sanctioned government genocides against Muslims for decades,[207] including mass lynching sprees.[208] Hindus have also even been seen openly protesting in favour[n. 49] of rapists who have raped Muslim children[209] (such as the 8 year old Kashmiri girl, Asifa Bano, who was gang-raped to death in a Hindu temple for weeks in 2018[210]). In addition, Kashmir—the only Muslim-majority state in India[211]—suffers terribly under Indian rule;[212] and all because the residents are Muslim. Horrific abuses ranging from mass rape[213] to forced disappearances routinely occur,[214] and are actively covered up and hidden[215] by the Indian government.[216] Tens of thousands of Muslim children have also been kidnapped by Hindus and sold into sexual slavery all over India. The Hindu public however continues to remain uncaring at best, but viscerally violent at worst (although there are some dissenting voices from moderate Hindus, but most continue voting for the BJP). Given that the situation is extremely dangerous for Muslims, Pakistan cannot afford to be complacent (the last time India threatened to invade was in 2008,[217] when it scapegoated Pakistan for it's own failure in preventing militants from killing 166 of its citizens;[218][n. 50] it also threatened to invade between 2001—2002.[219]
Sanjiv Bhatt (1963—Present) bravely testified against the Hindutva terrorist, and Indian PM, Narendra Modi.
Hindutva's believe non-Hindus should be forcefully converted over to Islam by the sword, Pakistan especially.
What makes the Hindutva even more dangerous is their culture of violence against Muslim[220][n. 51] and Dalit women. This culture is highly indicative of the power imbalance happening amongst Indian society, caused by a abortive preference for males (50—60 million girls have gone missing in India this way[221][222]); with its consequences directly affecting the entire region, likely explaining[223][n. 52] the rise of India's hyper-aggressiveness towards Muslims over the decades (or anything that represents Muslims—such as the Pakistani state[224]). Naturally this has lead to a surge in the imbalance of Hindu males, leaving many without the prospect of marriage, thereby exponentially increasing their sexual frustration and anger which conveniently manifests itself in the hatred of the most powerless in Indian society (Muslims and Dalits; who's women often bear the brunt of their sexual aggression). This problem is made worse by the extreme interpretations of Hinduism itself, where many misogynistic scriptures can be found. In one instance these scriptures claim women are inferior to men, both prior to, and after birth (found in the "Rig Veda" (8:33:17); where it claims "[t]he mind of woman brooks not discipline" and her "intellect hath little weight").[225] Similarly, in the "Rig Veda" (10:95:15), females are referred to as heartless creatures where the "hearts of hyenas are the hearts of women".[226] In the "Yajur Veda" (6:5:2), it calls women weak, and who have no right to inheritance,[227] and in the "Atharva Veda" (6:11:3) it bemoans the fact that the "[a]lmighty God" has "created this womb" where "sons should be born" but not women.[228] Given this sexism, it likely explains why India treats women so horrifically (especially Muslim women when Hindutvas organise genocidal pogroms[206]).
There have been at least 27 major anti-Muslim pogroms in India between 1947—1986.[229] In the period of 1986—2011 this dramatically rose to at least 46 major anti-Muslim pogroms across the country, which has culimated in the deaths of tens of thousands (possibly hundreds of thousands) of Muslims.[229] Despite all of these attacks being caused by Hindus against Muslims, statisticians have however noted that obtaining data for the number of Muslims murdered is next to impossible to quantify since "statistics are dependent on police records", which are dependent on "the corruption of the local police; the perceived power of those who initiated [the pogrom]...whether policemen were injured or fired their weapons; and the level of financial compensation offered to...victims by the state or central government". Many Indian police departments have been known to actively participate in the organisation and participation of these pogroms.[230] Therefore "[a]lmost always, the official death-count figures are much lower than the actual figures".[229] Common triggers of these pogroms is often jealousy relating to differences in income (earning more money in other words),[229] having greater wealth, but also inter-religious love[229] often when a Hindu women falls in love with a Muslim man, which reinforces the"global love jihad" conspiracy amongst Hindus.[231] The multi-award winning Muslim actor Aamir Khan (1965—Present[232]) have even been accused of promoting this in his films.[233] It should however be noted that Muslims in India are generally very peaceful people.[234] Most of them descend from either Hinduism or Buddhism,[235] but are are viewed with a high degree of suspicion, treated as foreigners,[236][237] or worse, as traitors,[238] by both extremist and moderate Hindus.
Burned victims (Muslim); Gujurat Genocide (2002).[239]
Sanjiv Bhatt (1963—Present) bravely testified against the Hindutva terrorist, and Indian PM, Narendra Modi.
The far-right,[202] genocidal,[n. 53] pro-Hindutva "Bharatiya Janata Party" (BJP) are extremely Islamophobic,[203] and anti-Pakistani.[204] Under their tenure since 2014, they have increasingly been militarising India,[205] testing ballistic missiles and persecuted Muslims;[206] issues which Pakistan isn't able to ignore. Muslims in India have always been bearing the brunt of extremist Hindu hatred, who routinely treat Muslims like the Jews of Nazi Germany.[206] There have been numerous state sanctioned government genocides against Muslims for decades,[207] including mass lynching sprees.[208] Hindus have also even been seen openly protesting in favour[n. 54] of rapists who have raped Muslim children[209] (such as the 8 year old Kashmiri girl, Asifa Bano, who was gang-raped to death in a Hindu temple for weeks in 2018[210]). In addition, Kashmir—the only Muslim-majority state in India[211]—suffers terribly under Indian rule;[212] and all because the residents are Muslim. Horrific abuses ranging from mass rape[213] to forced disappearances routinely occur,[214] and are actively covered up and hidden[215] by the Indian government.[216] Tens of thousands of Muslim children have also been kidnapped by Hindus and sold into sexual slavery all over India. The Hindu public however continues to remain uncaring at best, but viscerally violent at worst (although there are some dissenting voices from moderate Hindus, but most continue voting for the BJP). Given that the situation is extremely dangerous for Muslims, Pakistan cannot afford to be complacent (the last time India threatened to invade was in 2008,[217] when it scapegoated Pakistan for it's own failure in preventing militants from killing 166 of its citizens;[218][n. 55] it also threatened to invade between 2001—2002.[219]
Hindutva's believe non-Hindus should be forcefully converted over to Islam by the sword, Pakistan especially.
What makes the Hindutva even more dangerous is their culture of violence against Muslim[220][n. 56] and Dalit women. This culture is highly indicative of the power imbalance happening amongst Indian society, caused by a abortive preference for males (50—60 million girls have gone missing in India this way[221][222]); with its consequences directly affecting the entire region, likely explaining[223][n. 57] the rise of India's hyper-aggressiveness towards Muslims over the decades (or anything that represents Muslims—such as the Pakistani state[224]). Naturally this has lead to a surge in the imbalance of Hindu males, leaving many without the prospect of marriage, thereby exponentially increasing their sexual frustration and anger which conveniently manifests itself in the hatred of the most powerless in Indian society (Muslims and Dalits; who's women often bear the brunt of their sexual aggression). This problem is made worse by the extreme interpretations of Hinduism itself, where many misogynistic scriptures can be found. In one instance these scriptures claim women are inferior to men, both prior to, and after birth (found in the "Rig Veda" (8:33:17); where it claims "[t]he mind of woman brooks not discipline" and her "intellect hath little weight").[225] Similarly, in the "Rig Veda" (10:95:15), females are referred to as heartless creatures where the "hearts of hyenas are the hearts of women".[226] In the "Yajur Veda" (6:5:2), it calls women weak, and who have no right to inheritance,[227] and in the "Atharva Veda" (6:11:3) it bemoans the fact that the "[a]lmighty God" has "created this womb" where "sons should be born" but not women.[228] Given this sexism, it likely explains why India treats women so horrifically (especially Muslim women when Hindutvas organise genocidal pogroms[206]).
Burned victims (Muslim); Gujurat Genocide (2002).[239]
There have been at least 27 major anti-Muslim pogroms in India between 1947—1986.[229] In the period of 1986—2011 this dramatically rose to at least 46 major anti-Muslim pogroms across the country, which has culimated in the deaths of tens of thousands (possibly hundreds of thousands) of Muslims.[229] Despite all of these attacks being caused by Hindus against Muslims, statisticians have however noted that obtaining data for the number of Muslims murdered is next to impossible to quantify since "statistics are dependent on police records", which are dependent on "the corruption of the local police; the perceived power of those who initiated [the pogrom]...whether policemen were injured or fired their weapons; and the level of financial compensation offered to...victims by the state or central government". Many Indian police departments have been known to actively participate in the organisation and participation of these pogroms.[230] Therefore "[a]lmost always, the official death-count figures are much lower than the actual figures".[229] Common triggers of these pogroms is often jealousy relating to differences in income (earning more money in other words),[229] having greater wealth, but also inter-religious love[229] often when a Hindu women falls in love with a Muslim man, which reinforces the"global love jihad" conspiracy amongst Hindus.[231] The multi-award winning Muslim actor Aamir Khan (1965—Present[232]) have even been accused of promoting this in his films.[233] It should however be noted that Muslims in India are generally very peaceful people.[234] Most of them descend from either Hinduism or Buddhism,[235] but are are viewed with a high degree of suspicion, treated as foreigners,[236][237] or worse, as traitors,[238] by both extremist and moderate Hindus.

India's Muslim Nuclear Father & The Indian Possession of Nuclear Weapons

Abdul Kalam designed all of India's missiles.
India's development of nuclear weapons is primarily down to a single distinguished Muslim[240] scientist A. P. J Abdul Kalam, who is known as the father of Indian missile technology,[241] the father of India's integrated guided missle development programme,[242] and as the father of the Indian nuclear bomb.[243][n. 58] He is often cited as the key figure in the development of India's nuclear capability.[244] Kalam's earliest work was on Project SLV-III for ISRO, serving as director[245]; prior to this he worked for the DRDO.[246] In 1982, this time serving as Chief of the DRDO,[247], he penned the designs of a number of successful nuclear ballistic missiles (including work on India's signatory[248] Agni Class[245]),[246] earning him the name of "missile man";[246] This feat includes designs for the Prithvi, Akash, Trishul and Nag classes.[241] He designed the Agni rocket using the SLV-III solid fuel first-stage and a liquid second-stage from the Prithvi missile class.[245] Despite working for a country which vehemently treats Muslims as second -class citizens[249][n. 59] and has hatred for Pakistan, Kalam does not cite security concerns for the development of his missiles.[250] Kalam was born on October 15th, 1931 and graduated with a B.Sc. from St. Josephs College Tiruchirapalli.[251] He studied aeronautical engineering at the Madras Institute of Technology.[251] He died on July 27th, 2015,[243] and was given a state funeral,[252] attended by the "butcher of [Muslim] Gujurat" Narendra Modi.[253] Kalam was a fervent believer in the philosophy of "strength respecting strength". This is very true, especially considering that Israel (who Kalaam himself collaborated with[254]) does not respect Palestinians because they are militarily and scientifically weak. This is why Israel is problematic.
Abdul Kalam designed all of India's missiles.
India's development of nuclear weapons is primarily down to a single distinguished Muslim[240] scientist A. P. J Abdul Kalam, who is known as the father of Indian missile technology,[241] the father of India's integrated guided missle development programme,[242] and as the father of the Indian nuclear bomb.[243][n. 60] He is often cited as the key figure in the development of India's nuclear capability.[244] Kalam's earliest work was on Project SLV-III for ISRO, serving as director[245]; prior to this he worked for the DRDO.[246] In 1982, this time serving as Chief of the DRDO,[247], he penned the designs of a number of successful nuclear ballistic missiles (including work on India's signatory[248] Agni Class[245]),[246] earning him the name of "missile man";[246] This feat includes designs for the Prithvi, Akash, Trishul and Nag classes.[241] He designed the Agni rocket using the SLV-III solid fuel first-stage and a liquid second-stage from the Prithvi missile class.[245] Despite working for a country which vehemently treats Muslims as second -class citizens[249][n. 61] and has hatred for Pakistan, Kalam does not cite security concerns for the development of his missiles.[250] Kalam was born on October 15th, 1931 and graduated with a B.Sc. from St. Josephs College Tiruchirapalli.[251] He studied aeronautical engineering at the Madras Institute of Technology.[251] He died on July 27th, 2015,[243] and was given a state funeral,[252] attended by the "butcher of [Muslim] Gujurat" Narendra Modi.[253] Kalam was a fervent believer in the philosophy of "strength respecting strength". This is very true, especially considering that Israel (who Kalaam himself collaborated with[254]) does not respect Palestinians because they are militarily and scientifically weak. This is why Israel is problematic.

Sources

Footnotes

  1. ^ India claims Kashmir as part of their territory; and India lost between 40%—60% of Kashmir during the first Indo-Pakistani War.
    1. Alexander Mikaberidze (31 July 2011). Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World: A Historical Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO. p. 394. ISBN 978-1-59884-336-1.
    2. Bruce O. Riedel (29 January 2013). Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back. Brookings Institution Press. p. 49. ISBN 0-8157-2409-8.
  2. ^ Most European historians agree that the 1965 Indo-Pak War resulted in a stalemate for both sides.
    1. Peter Lyon (2008). Conflict Between India and Pakistan: An Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO. p. 81. ISBN 978-1-57607-712-2.
    2. David Albright (2010). Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America's Enemie. Simon and Schuster. p. 15. ISBN 978-1-4391-7159-2.
    3. Richard Sisson; Leo E. Rose (1991). War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh. University of California Press. p. 8. ISBN 978-0-520-07665-5.
    4. Stephen P. Cohen; Sunil Dasgupta (2013). Arming without Aiming: India's Military Modernization. Brookings Institution Press. p. 29. ISBN 978-0-8157-2492-6.
    5. Ravi Rikhye (August 6th, 2015). How India can still learn from 1965 war with Pakistan. Daily Yo. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved November 2nd, 2018.
      1. Quote: "Still, the 1965 stalemate became the basis for the 1971 victory against East Pakistan. Western analysts have heavily criticised India's "failures" in 1965...".
    Most neutral Indian historians agree the 1965 Indo-Pak War resulted in a stalemate.
    1. Shivam Vij (August 27th, 2015). Why neither India nor Pakistan won the 1965 war. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved November 2nd, 2018.
      1. Quote: "Independent historians, however, are clear that it was a military stalemate and neither side won. Not every match has a winner or a loser, some end in a draw. It is perhaps apt that both India and Pakistan say they won this war, showing up each other's nationalism for what it is. India's own official history of the war, published only two years ago, is scathing in its review of how poorly the Indian army and air force performed. The Indian armed forces are now rewriting the history to show that it was a clear victory".
    2. Rahul Bedi (June 8th, 2005). Search for Indian officer who 'sold' war plan to Pakistan. Irish Times. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved November 2nd, 2018.
    3. P. M. Kamath (1987). Indo-US Relations, Dynamics of Change. South Asian Publishers. p. 84. ISBN 978-81-7003-081-2.
    4. India Today International. Living Media India Limited. 1999. Volume 24. p. 227.
    5. Ganguly, Sumit (1990). Deterrence failure revisited: The Indo‐Pakistani war of 1965. Journal of Strategic Studies. Volume 13 (4): 77–93. pg. 91. doi:10.1080/01402399008437432. ISSN 0140-2390.
    6. Lachhman Singh Lehl (1997). Missed opportunities Indo-Pak war 1965. Natraj Publishers. p. 336.
    7. India Quarterly. Indian Council of World Affairs. 1974. Volume 30. p. 297.
    8. Sushant Singh , Nirupama Subramanian (June 29th, 2015). Pakistan bristles at India’s 1965 war ‘commemorative carnival’. The Indian Express. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved November 2nd, 2018.
    9. Manoj Joshi (September 6th, 2015). Looking Back at the 1965 War, With a More Objective Eye. The Wire. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved November 2nd, 2018.
    10. Bahadur, K. (2003). Book Reviews: J.N. DIXIT, India-Pakistan in War and Peace. New Delhi: Books Today, 2002, pp. 501. South Asian Survey, 10(1), 177–179. doi:10.1177/097152310301000112.
    In 2015, the Indian government (run by extremist Hindutva radicals) whitewashed it's history, despite decades of Indian scholars and academia noting the 1965 Indo-Pak War was a clear stalemate.
    1. Rajat Pandit (August 24th, 2015). India 'won' 1965 war with Pakistan: New Army book. Times of India. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved November 2nd, 2018.
      1. Quote: "India was always more realistic, with its official war history recording that the 1965 war was more of a stalemate than anything else".
    2. Shivam Vij (August 27th, 2015). Why neither India nor Pakistan won the 1965 war. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved November 2nd, 2018.
      1. Quote: "Independent historians, however, are clear that it was a military stalemate and neither side won. Not every match has a winner or a loser, some end in a draw. It is perhaps apt that both India and Pakistan say they won this war, showing up each other's nationalism for what it is. India's own official history of the war, published only two years ago, is scathing in its review of how poorly the Indian army and air force performed. The Indian armed forces are now rewriting the history to show that it was a clear victory".
  3. ^
    1. First Picture. International Space Station. Archive.is Link. Retrieved November 17th, 2018.
    2. Second Picture. International Space Station. Archive.is Link. Retrieved November 17th, 2018.
    3. Third Picture. International Space Station. Archive.is Link. Retrieved November 17th, 2018.
    4. Fourth Picture. International Space Station. Archive.is Link. Retrieved November 17th, 2018.
  4. ^ Most European historians agree that the 1965 Indo-Pak War resulted in a stalemate for both sides.
    1. Peter Lyon (2008). Conflict Between India and Pakistan: An Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO. p. 81. ISBN 978-1-57607-712-2.
    2. David Albright (2010). Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America's Enemie. Simon and Schuster. p. 15. ISBN 978-1-4391-7159-2.
    3. Richard Sisson; Leo E. Rose (1991). War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh. University of California Press. p. 8. ISBN 978-0-520-07665-5.
    4. Stephen P. Cohen; Sunil Dasgupta (2013). Arming without Aiming: India's Military Modernization. Brookings Institution Press. p. 29. ISBN 978-0-8157-2492-6.
    5. Ravi Rikhye (August 6th, 2015). How India can still learn from 1965 war with Pakistan. Daily Yo. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved November 2nd, 2018.
      1. Quote: "Still, the 1965 stalemate became the basis for the 1971 victory against East Pakistan. Western analysts have heavily criticised India's "failures" in 1965...".
    Most neutral Indian historians agree the 1965 Indo-Pak War resulted in a stalemate.
    1. Shivam Vij (August 27th, 2015). Why neither India nor Pakistan won the 1965 war. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved November 2nd, 2018.
      1. Quote: "Independent historians, however, are clear that it was a military stalemate and neither side won. Not every match has a winner or a loser, some end in a draw. It is perhaps apt that both India and Pakistan say they won this war, showing up each other's nationalism for what it is. India's own official history of the war, published only two years ago, is scathing in its review of how poorly the Indian army and air force performed. The Indian armed forces are now rewriting the history to show that it was a clear victory".
    2. Rahul Bedi (June 8th, 2005). Search for Indian officer who 'sold' war plan to Pakistan. Irish Times. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved November 2nd, 2018.
    3. P. M. Kamath (1987). Indo-US Relations, Dynamics of Change. South Asian Publishers. p. 84. ISBN 978-81-7003-081-2.
    4. India Today International. Living Media India Limited. 1999. Volume 24. p. 227.
    5. Ganguly, Sumit (1990). Deterrence failure revisited: The Indo‐Pakistani war of 1965. Journal of Strategic Studies. Volume 13 (4): 77–93. pg. 91. doi:10.1080/01402399008437432. ISSN 0140-2390.
    6. Lachhman Singh Lehl (1997). Missed opportunities Indo-Pak war 1965. Natraj Publishers. p. 336.
    7. India Quarterly. Indian Council of World Affairs. 1974. Volume 30. p. 297.
    8. Sushant Singh , Nirupama Subramanian (June 29th, 2015). Pakistan bristles at India’s 1965 war ‘commemorative carnival’. The Indian Express. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved November 2nd, 2018.
    9. Manoj Joshi (September 6th, 2015). Looking Back at the 1965 War, With a More Objective Eye. The Wire. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved November 2nd, 2018.
    10. Bahadur, K. (2003). Book Reviews: J.N. DIXIT, India-Pakistan in War and Peace. New Delhi: Books Today, 2002, pp. 501. South Asian Survey, 10(1), 177–179. doi:10.1177/097152310301000112.
    In 2015, the Indian government (run by extremist Hindutva radicals) whitewashed it's history, despite decades of Indian scholars and academia noting the 1965 Indo-Pak War was a clear stalemate.
    1. Rajat Pandit (August 24th, 2015). India 'won' 1965 war with Pakistan: New Army book. Times of India. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved November 2nd, 2018.
      1. Quote: "India was always more realistic, with its official war history recording that the 1965 war was more of a stalemate than anything else".
    2. Shivam Vij (August 27th, 2015). Why neither India nor Pakistan won the 1965 war. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved November 2nd, 2018.
      1. Quote: "Independent historians, however, are clear that it was a military stalemate and neither side won. Not every match has a winner or a loser, some end in a draw. It is perhaps apt that both India and Pakistan say they won this war, showing up each other's nationalism for what it is. India's own official history of the war, published only two years ago, is scathing in its review of how poorly the Indian army and air force performed. The Indian armed forces are now rewriting the history to show that it was a clear victory".
  5. ^ Quote: "In 1960 Dr. Ishrat H. Usmani was appointed Chairman of the PAEC. Usmani would be responsible for setting in motion many of the critical programs and institutions that would later give Pakistan nuclear weapons. Usmani started Pinstech (full name variously given as the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Sciences and Technology, and the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology) and the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant. One of Usmani's most momentous achievement is said to be the training program under which brilliant young Pakistanis were selected and sent for training abroad. Between 1960 and 1967 some six hundred were selected of whom 106 eventually returned with doctorate degrees".
    1. Carey Sublette (January 2nd, 2002). Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program The Beginning. Nuclear Weapon Archive. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved September 6th, 2018.
  6. ^ Most European historians agree that the 1965 Indo-Pak War resulted in a stalemate for both sides.
    1. Peter Lyon (2008). Conflict Between India and Pakistan: An Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO. p. 81. ISBN 978-1-57607-712-2.
    2. David Albright (2010). Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arms America's Enemie. Simon and Schuster. p. 15. ISBN 978-1-4391-7159-2.
    3. Richard Sisson; Leo E. Rose (1991). War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the Creation of Bangladesh. University of California Press. p. 8. ISBN 978-0-520-07665-5.
    4. Stephen P. Cohen; Sunil Dasgupta (2013). Arming without Aiming: India's Military Modernization. Brookings Institution Press. p. 29. ISBN 978-0-8157-2492-6.
    5. Ravi Rikhye (August 6th, 2015). How India can still learn from 1965 war with Pakistan. Daily Yo. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved November 2nd, 2018.
      1. Quote: "Still, the 1965 stalemate became the basis for the 1971 victory against East Pakistan. Western analysts have heavily criticised India's "failures" in 1965...".
    Most neutral Indian historians agree the 1965 Indo-Pak War resulted in a stalemate.
    1. Shivam Vij (August 27th, 2015). Why neither India nor Pakistan won the 1965 war. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved November 2nd, 2018.
      1. Quote: "Independent historians, however, are clear that it was a military stalemate and neither side won. Not every match has a winner or a loser, some end in a draw. It is perhaps apt that both India and Pakistan say they won this war, showing up each other's nationalism for what it is. India's own official history of the war, published only two years ago, is scathing in its review of how poorly the Indian army and air force performed. The Indian armed forces are now rewriting the history to show that it was a clear victory".
    2. Rahul Bedi (June 8th, 2005). Search for Indian officer who 'sold' war plan to Pakistan. Irish Times. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved November 2nd, 2018.
    3. P. M. Kamath (1987). Indo-US Relations, Dynamics of Change. South Asian Publishers. p. 84. ISBN 978-81-7003-081-2.
    4. India Today International. Living Media India Limited. 1999. Volume 24. p. 227.
    5. Ganguly, Sumit (1990). Deterrence failure revisited: The Indo‐Pakistani war of 1965. Journal of Strategic Studies. Volume 13 (4): 77–93. pg. 91. doi:10.1080/01402399008437432. ISSN 0140-2390.
    6. Lachhman Singh Lehl (1997). Missed opportunities Indo-Pak war 1965. Natraj Publishers. p. 336.
    7. India Quarterly. Indian Council of World Affairs. 1974. Volume 30. p. 297.
    8. Sushant Singh , Nirupama Subramanian (June 29th, 2015). Pakistan bristles at India’s 1965 war ‘commemorative carnival’. The Indian Express. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved November 2nd, 2018.
    9. Manoj Joshi (September 6th, 2015). Looking Back at the 1965 War, With a More Objective Eye. The Wire. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved November 2nd, 2018.
    10. Bahadur, K. (2003). Book Reviews: J.N. DIXIT, India-Pakistan in War and Peace. New Delhi: Books Today, 2002, pp. 501. South Asian Survey, 10(1), 177–179. doi:10.1177/097152310301000112.
    In 2015, the Indian government (run by extremist Hindutva radicals) whitewashed it's history, despite decades of Indian scholars and academia noting the 1965 Indo-Pak War was a clear stalemate.
    1. Rajat Pandit (August 24th, 2015). India 'won' 1965 war with Pakistan: New Army book. Times of India. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved November 2nd, 2018.
      1. Quote: "India was always more realistic, with its official war history recording that the 1965 war was more of a stalemate than anything else".
    2. Shivam Vij (August 27th, 2015). Why neither India nor Pakistan won the 1965 war. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved November 2nd, 2018.
      1. Quote: "Independent historians, however, are clear that it was a military stalemate and neither side won. Not every match has a winner or a loser, some end in a draw. It is perhaps apt that both India and Pakistan say they won this war, showing up each other's nationalism for what it is. India's own official history of the war, published only two years ago, is scathing in its review of how poorly the Indian army and air force performed. The Indian armed forces are now rewriting the history to show that it was a clear victory".
  7. ^ Quote: "In 1960 Dr. Ishrat H. Usmani was appointed Chairman of the PAEC. Usmani would be responsible for setting in motion many of the critical programs and institutions that would later give Pakistan nuclear weapons. Usmani started Pinstech (full name variously given as the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Sciences and Technology, and the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology) and the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant. One of Usmani's most momentous achievement is said to be the training program under which brilliant young Pakistanis were selected and sent for training abroad. Between 1960 and 1967 some six hundred were selected of whom 106 eventually returned with doctorate degrees".
    1. Carey Sublette (January 2nd, 2002). Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program The Beginning. Nuclear Weapon Archive. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved September 6th, 2018.
  8. ^ However, Pakistan already had 95% of the design plans in their possession, and even when the French cancelled the deal, French engineers still continued with the civil construction of the plant. The French contractor, SGN, continued to export equipment to Pakistan, with the last SGN technician leaving in June 1979.
    1. Mark Fitzpatrick (M.P.P.) (2007). Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks: a Net Assessment. IISS. p. 21. ISBN 978-0-86079-201-7.
      1. Quote: "When the French withdrew in 1978, Pakistan already had 95% of the design plans and, even after cancellation, French engineers continued with civil construction, and SGN (the French contractor) continued to export equipment to Pakistan, the last SGN technician leaving the site in June 1979".
  9. ^ Quote: "Dr. Riazuddin recalls, "We were the designers of the bomb, like the tailor who tells you how much materia is required to stitch a suit. We had to identigy the fissile materia, whether to use plutonium or enriched uranium, which method of detonation, which explosive, what type of tampers and lenses to use, how the material will be compressed, how shock waves will be created, what would be the yield"."
    1. Feroz Khan (7 November 2012). Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb. Stanford University Press. p. 178. ISBN 978-0-8047-8480-1.
  10. ^ Quote: "From Riazuddin’s group, even those physicists who were in the know slowly dropped out. Fayyazuddin was not interested but Masud Ahmad, who had just obtained his Ph.D. in physics under the twins, became the second member of Riazuddin’s team. He went on to head a much bigger group eventually and was decorated with the Hilal-e-Imtiaz after the 1998 nuclear tests. The third member was Tufail Naseem, who assisted in programming the huge IBM360 located in the mathematics building...The calculations Riazuddin carried out were tedious and complex. The plutonium route had been closed for now and Munir Ahmad Khan had tasked him with the following problem: his bomb must use the absolute minimum amount of highly-enriched uranium, and certainly no more than 20 kilograms. As a particle physicist he had a reasonable understanding of nuclear physics, but knew no hydrodynamics or how matter behaved under extreme compression. This knowledge is crucial for designing an implosion bomb because the high explosive surrounding the bomb’s core creates a shockwave that makes jelly out of even the toughest metal. These unfamiliar things had to be learned from books and papers. Like any good theoretical physicist, Riazuddin refused to accept what the computer churned out until he could verify it by using some clever analytical techniques."
    1. Pervez Hoodbhoy (November 30th, 2013). THE MAN WHO DESIGNED PAKISTAN’S BOMB. Newsweek Pakistan. Archive.is Link. Retrieved November 8th, 2018.
  11. ^ Hoodbhoy was kept in the dark about Project-706's true purpose, but had suspicions he was working on the construction of atomic bombs and on the procurement of illegal equipment.
    1. Pervez Hoodbhoy (November 30th, 2013). THE MAN WHO DESIGNED PAKISTAN’S BOMB. Newsweek Pakistan. Archive.is Link. Retrieved November 8th, 2018.
  12. ^ However, Pakistan already had 95% of the design plans in their possession, and even when the French cancelled the deal, French engineers still continued with the civil construction of the plant. The French contractor, SGN, continued to export equipment to Pakistan, with the last SGN technician leaving in June 1979.
    1. Mark Fitzpatrick (M.P.P.) (2007). Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks: a Net Assessment. IISS. p. 21. ISBN 978-0-86079-201-7.
      1. Quote: "When the French withdrew in 1978, Pakistan already had 95% of the design plans and, even after cancellation, French engineers continued with civil construction, and SGN (the French contractor) continued to export equipment to Pakistan, the last SGN technician leaving the site in June 1979".
  13. ^ Quote: "Dr. Riazuddin recalls, "We were the designers of the bomb, like the tailor who tells you how much materia is required to stitch a suit. We had to identigy the fissile materia, whether to use plutonium or enriched uranium, which method of detonation, which explosive, what type of tampers and lenses to use, how the material will be compressed, how shock waves will be created, what would be the yield"."
    1. Feroz Khan (7 November 2012). Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb. Stanford University Press. p. 178. ISBN 978-0-8047-8480-1.
  14. ^ Quote: "From Riazuddin’s group, even those physicists who were in the know slowly dropped out. Fayyazuddin was not interested but Masud Ahmad, who had just obtained his Ph.D. in physics under the twins, became the second member of Riazuddin’s team. He went on to head a much bigger group eventually and was decorated with the Hilal-e-Imtiaz after the 1998 nuclear tests. The third member was Tufail Naseem, who assisted in programming the huge IBM360 located in the mathematics building...The calculations Riazuddin carried out were tedious and complex. The plutonium route had been closed for now and Munir Ahmad Khan had tasked him with the following problem: his bomb must use the absolute minimum amount of highly-enriched uranium, and certainly no more than 20 kilograms. As a particle physicist he had a reasonable understanding of nuclear physics, but knew no hydrodynamics or how matter behaved under extreme compression. This knowledge is crucial for designing an implosion bomb because the high explosive surrounding the bomb’s core creates a shockwave that makes jelly out of even the toughest metal. These unfamiliar things had to be learned from books and papers. Like any good theoretical physicist, Riazuddin refused to accept what the computer churned out until he could verify it by using some clever analytical techniques."
    1. Pervez Hoodbhoy (November 30th, 2013). THE MAN WHO DESIGNED PAKISTAN’S BOMB. Newsweek Pakistan. Archive.is Link. Retrieved November 8th, 2018.
  15. ^ Hoodbhoy was kept in the dark about Project-706's true purpose, but had suspicions he was working on the construction of atomic bombs and on the procurement of illegal equipment.
    1. Pervez Hoodbhoy (November 30th, 2013). THE MAN WHO DESIGNED PAKISTAN’S BOMB. Newsweek Pakistan. Archive.is Link. Retrieved November 8th, 2018.
  16. ^ Quote: "Zia-ul-Haq then requested General Syed Zamin Naqvi and A. Q. Khan to request bomb-grade fissile material and bomb designs. Their visit bore fruit as Pakistan then recieved the Chinese CHIC-4 weapon design along with fifty kilograms of HEU in 1981, material sufficient for two bomb. A. Q. Khan confirmed in a purported 2004 letter to his wife, "The Chinese gave us drawings of the nuclear weapon, gave 50 kg of enriched uranium, gave us 10 tons of UF6 (natural) and 5 tons of UF6 (3%)".
    1. Feroz Khan (7 November 2012). Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb. Stanford University Press. p. 188. ISBN 978-0-8047-8480-1.
  17. ^ Quote: "Arguably, the Chinese bomb design that Pakistan received sometime in the 1980s—and which the Americans say had been passed on by Dr. A. Q. Khan to the Libyans and Iranians—made the work easier. I do not think the Americans are lying when they say they confiscated the detailed bomb drawings in 2004 together with other nuclear materials from the ship BBC Cargo. In fact, around 1994 or 1995, Munir Ahmad Khan whispered to me confidentially, while we sipped tea in his drawing room, that the Americans had angrily told him that Pakistan possessed detailed Chinese blueprints and drawings. But even these drawings would have been nearly useless without a sound understanding of the underlying theory. The Libyans, given the same drawings, could do nothing with them. Moreover, tuning weapons for different yields or exploring different warhead options without sound theoretical physics would have been impossible".
    1. Pervez Hoodbhoy (November 30th, 2013). THE MAN WHO DESIGNED PAKISTAN’S BOMB. Newsweek Pakistan. Archive.is Link. Retrieved November 8th, 2018.
  18. ^ Quote: "I paid a visit to Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad to see Pervez Hoodbhoy, who is knowledgeable about Pakistan's nuclear arms. "The basic design for the bomb came from China, and in fact, in 1995, or '96, the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Munir Ahmad Khan, told me this," he said. The professor asked the chairman to elaborate, and the chairman told him that the basic design did come from China, although Pakistan then improved upon it. Through Pakistan's independent efforts, it was able to improve on the designs."
    1. Haruyuki Aikawa (10 November 2017). Nuclear Focus: A Behind-the-Scenes Glimpse of the Atomic Ambitions of Pakistan, Iran and Wartime Japan (English Edition. Mainichi Shimbun Publishing In . PHP研究所. p. 28. PKEY:56900000210083220000.
  19. ^ Quote: "According to A. Q. Khan's accounts, the Chinese nuclear materia was kept in storage until 1985. When Pakistan acquired its own uranium enrichment capability and wanted to return the fissile material, China responded that "the HEU loaned earlier was now to be considered as a gift...in gratitude" for Pakistan's help with Chinese centrifuges. It was then that KRL "promptly fabricated hemispheres for two weapons and added them to Pakistan's arsenal. The bomb design controversy is shrouded in claims and counterclaims with KRL and PAEC claiming credit [for the bombs design]".
    1. Feroz Khan (7 November 2012). Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb. Stanford University Press. p. 188. ISBN 978-0-8047-8480-1.
  20. ^ Quote: "Zia-ul-Haq then requested General Syed Zamin Naqvi and A. Q. Khan to request bomb-grade fissile material and bomb designs. Their visit bore fruit as Pakistan then recieved the Chinese CHIC-4 weapon design along with fifty kilograms of HEU in 1981, material sufficient for two bomb. A. Q. Khan confirmed in a purported 2004 letter to his wife, "The Chinese gave us drawings of the nuclear weapon, gave 50 kg of enriched uranium, gave us 10 tons of UF6 (natural) and 5 tons of UF6 (3%)".
    1. Feroz Khan (7 November 2012). Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb. Stanford University Press. p. 188. ISBN 978-0-8047-8480-1.
  21. ^ Quote: "Arguably, the Chinese bomb design that Pakistan received sometime in the 1980s—and which the Americans say had been passed on by Dr. A. Q. Khan to the Libyans and Iranians—made the work easier. I do not think the Americans are lying when they say they confiscated the detailed bomb drawings in 2004 together with other nuclear materials from the ship BBC Cargo. In fact, around 1994 or 1995, Munir Ahmad Khan whispered to me confidentially, while we sipped tea in his drawing room, that the Americans had angrily told him that Pakistan possessed detailed Chinese blueprints and drawings. But even these drawings would have been nearly useless without a sound understanding of the underlying theory. The Libyans, given the same drawings, could do nothing with them. Moreover, tuning weapons for different yields or exploring different warhead options without sound theoretical physics would have been impossible".
    1. Pervez Hoodbhoy (November 30th, 2013). THE MAN WHO DESIGNED PAKISTAN’S BOMB. Newsweek Pakistan. Archive.is Link. Retrieved November 8th, 2018.
  22. ^ Quote: "I paid a visit to Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad to see Pervez Hoodbhoy, who is knowledgeable about Pakistan's nuclear arms. "The basic design for the bomb came from China, and in fact, in 1995, or '96, the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Munir Ahmad Khan, told me this," he said. The professor asked the chairman to elaborate, and the chairman told him that the basic design did come from China, although Pakistan then improved upon it. Through Pakistan's independent efforts, it was able to improve on the designs."
    1. Haruyuki Aikawa (10 November 2017). Nuclear Focus: A Behind-the-Scenes Glimpse of the Atomic Ambitions of Pakistan, Iran and Wartime Japan (English Edition. Mainichi Shimbun Publishing In . PHP研究所. p. 28. PKEY:56900000210083220000.
  23. ^ Quote: "According to A. Q. Khan's accounts, the Chinese nuclear materia was kept in storage until 1985. When Pakistan acquired its own uranium enrichment capability and wanted to return the fissile material, China responded that "the HEU loaned earlier was now to be considered as a gift...in gratitude" for Pakistan's help with Chinese centrifuges. It was then that KRL "promptly fabricated hemispheres for two weapons and added them to Pakistan's arsenal. The bomb design controversy is shrouded in claims and counterclaims with KRL and PAEC claiming credit [for the bombs design]".
    1. Feroz Khan (7 November 2012). Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb. Stanford University Press. p. 188. ISBN 978-0-8047-8480-1.
  24. ^ The A. Q. Khan Network involved obtaining equipment from countries and through different countries, and had operations occurring in Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Netherlands, Britain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Turkey, South Africa, Malaysia, United States, South Korea and Japan. These smuggling operations were kept secret for at least 20 years from Western intelligence agencies.
    1. MacCalman, Molly (2016). A.Q. Khan Nuclear Smuggling Network. Journal of Strategic Security. 9 (1): 104–118. doi:10.5038/1944-0472.9.1.1506. ISSN 1944-0464.
  25. ^ (as of yet "officially" untested)
  26. ^ Quote: "In March 2005 Benazir Bhutto said Pakistan may have had a nuclear weapon long before that. She said her father, former prime minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, had told her from his prison cell that preparations for a nuclear test had been made in 1977. "... he expected Pakistan to have its first nuclear test in ... in August 1977. I was in his conduit to the person who was actually running the nuclear program who is no longer alive now. His name was Mr. Munir and he was chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. He told us that the nuclear test had been delayed to December 1977, and then he told us the nuclear test had been indefinitely delayed".
    1. Pakistan Nuclear Weapons. Global Security. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved November 5th, 2018.
  27. ^ Quote: "After all, Brasstacks did not achieve much-other than nearly starting a war and reportedly precipitating the "weaponization" of Pakistan's nuclear program".
    1. Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, Inc. (January 1996). Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, Inc. pp. 57. ISSN 00963402.
    Quote: "One of the central goals of Exercise Brasstacks, an end to Pakistani support to the Sikh insurgents, however, remained unfulfilled. The compellent element of Brasstacks failed as Indian decisions-makers developed deep misgivings about the dangers of escalation to a wider and more protracted conflict".
    1. Sumit Ganguly; Devin T. Hagerty (1 January 2012). Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons. University of Washington Press. p. 78. ISBN 978-0-295-80119-3.
  28. ^ The A. Q. Khan Network involved obtaining equipment from countries and through different countries, and had operations occurring in Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Netherlands, Britain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Turkey, South Africa, Malaysia, United States, South Korea and Japan. These smuggling operations were kept secret for at least 20 years from Western intelligence agencies.
    1. MacCalman, Molly (2016). A.Q. Khan Nuclear Smuggling Network. Journal of Strategic Security. 9 (1): 104–118. doi:10.5038/1944-0472.9.1.1506. ISSN 1944-0464.
  29. ^ (as of yet "officially" untested)
  30. ^ Quote: "In March 2005 Benazir Bhutto said Pakistan may have had a nuclear weapon long before that. She said her father, former prime minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, had told her from his prison cell that preparations for a nuclear test had been made in 1977. "... he expected Pakistan to have its first nuclear test in ... in August 1977. I was in his conduit to the person who was actually running the nuclear program who is no longer alive now. His name was Mr. Munir and he was chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. He told us that the nuclear test had been delayed to December 1977, and then he told us the nuclear test had been indefinitely delayed".
    1. Pakistan Nuclear Weapons. Global Security. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved November 5th, 2018.
  31. ^ Quote: "After all, Brasstacks did not achieve much-other than nearly starting a war and reportedly precipitating the "weaponization" of Pakistan's nuclear program".
    1. Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, Inc. (January 1996). Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, Inc. pp. 57. ISSN 00963402.
    Quote: "One of the central goals of Exercise Brasstacks, an end to Pakistani support to the Sikh insurgents, however, remained unfulfilled. The compellent element of Brasstacks failed as Indian decisions-makers developed deep misgivings about the dangers of escalation to a wider and more protracted conflict".
    1. Sumit Ganguly; Devin T. Hagerty (1 January 2012). Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons. University of Washington Press. p. 78. ISBN 978-0-295-80119-3.
  32. ^ The US has always been an unreliable ally to Pakistan, and has even endangered it's very existence during its hour of need.
    Quote: "The United States suspended military assistance during and after the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971."
    1. Elizabeth Gould; Paul Fitzgerald (22 February 2011). Crossing Zero: The AfPak War at the Turning Point of American Empire. City Lights Books. p. 85. ISBN 978-0-87286-569-3.
  33. ^ Quote: "As the Carter administration explored ways to derail Pakistan's nuclear program, an interagency group led by arms-controls expert Gerard Smith found few promising avenues. When the New York Times reported that the Smith group had considered, along with other possibilities, the option of destroying Pakistan's nuclear capability by an attack on the Kahuta uranium-enrichment facility, the story caused an uproar in Islamabad. A categorical State Department denial failed to calm the waters".
    1. Dennis Kux (5 June 2001). The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Woodrow Wilson Center Press. p. 240. ISBN 978-0-8018-6572-5.
    Pakistan was the only country where the US had a problem of owning nuclear weapons and threatened to attack. Despite Israel and South Africa pursuing nuclear weapons as well, the US didn't even think of bombing them (this was highly likely because both countries were ruled by Whites). The US clearly could not stand a non-White country having nuclear weapons.
    Quote: "In the Pakistani case, even rumours of a planned American attack Pakistani nuclear facilities in 1979 were not enough to derail the native nuclear programme. Pakistan was unique in this respect. As opposed to Israel and South Africa, who only had to consider in the context of the bilateral relations with Washington a possible withdrawal of assistance and cooperation in the form of financial, economic, or military ties, it was the only one which had to contend with rumours of a possible attack".
    1. Or Rabinowitz (April 2014). Bargaining on Nuclear Tests: Washington and Its Cold War Deals. OUP Oxford. p. 21. ISBN 978-0-19-870293-1.
    Pakistan took its nuclear security extremely seriously, and even went a far to beat up senior French diplomats who tried to get close to the Kahuta uranium enrichment facility.
    Quote: "Two months earlier, in June 1979, Pakistan's extreme sensitivity about the Kahuta facility had caused an embarrassing diplomatic incident. Two diplomats from the French embassy in Islamabad, the ambassador and the first secretary, were driving in the vicinity of Kahuta after a meeting of European Community envoys. Although their car was traveling on a public road and was not in a restricted area, two vehicles suddenly blocked their path. Six Pakistanis then pulled the diplomats from their car and beat them severely. The first secretary, Jean Forlot, told the U.S. embassy that he assumed the Pakistani government organized the attack to scare people away from the area around the nuclear facility".
    1. Dennis Kux (5 June 2001). The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Woodrow Wilson Center Press. p. 240. ISBN 978-0-8018-6572-5.
  34. ^ One of the ways in which Pakistan did this was to say; Quote: ""...Pakistan is not in a position to make a bomb and has no intention of making a bomb"...The president claimed tha the enriched uranium program was designed to produce nuclear fuel for electric power. "If we do not get an alternative source of energy," Zia stated, "Pakistan will choke in the next few years"."
    1. Dennis Kux (5 June 2001). The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Woodrow Wilson Center Press. p. 240. ISBN 978-0-8018-6572-5.
  35. ^ This was followed by Operation Chagai-II (May 30, 1998). Some in the Indian Parliament was left furious as they saw this as the beginning of a nuclear arms race caused by India.
    Quote: "When the first shouted word of Pakistan's tests has heard in the Indian Parliament, a Communist leader, Somnath Chatterjee, interrupted a speech condemning India's tests and addressed himself directly to Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the Hindu nationalist leader who approved the Indian tests. "You have started a nuclear arms race in this region," he said. Mr. Vajpayee left the chamber to check with other officials, returning quickly to make a statement. "If this is true, then India's policy has been vindicated," he said. Later, Mr. Vajpayee rejected suggestions that India had set off a nuclear spiral, saying it had acted only because of concern about Pakistan's covert nuclear program. "In fact, Pakistan forced us to take the path of nuclear deterrence," he said.".
    1. John F. Burns (May 29th, 1998). Pakistan, Answering India, Carries Out Nuclear Tests. New York Times. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved November 5th, 2018.
  36. ^ Quote: "The yield of the PNE has also remained controversial. Although occasional press reports have given ranges all the way up to 20 kt, and as low as 2 kt, the official yield was set early on at 12 kt (post Operation Shakti claims have raised it to 13 kt). Outside seismic data, and analysis of the crater features indicates a lower figure. Analysts usually estimate the yield at 4 to 6 kt using conventional seismic magnitude-to-yield conversion formulas. In recent years both Homi Sethna and P.K. Iyengar have conceded that the official yield is an exaggeration. Iyengar has variously stated that the yield was actually 8-10 kt, that the device was designed to yield 10 kt, and that the yield was 8 kt 'exactly as predicted'. Careful analysis of hard rock cratering effects establishes a tight bound around 8 kt for the yield however".
    1. India's Nuclear Weapons Program Smiling Buddha: 1974. 8 November 2001. Nuclear Weapon Archive. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved 25 December 2013.
  37. ^ Quote: "In March 2005 Benazir Bhutto said Pakistan may have had a nuclear weapon long before that. She said her father, former prime minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, had told her from his prison cell that preparations for a nuclear test had been made in 1977. "... he expected Pakistan to have its first nuclear test in ... in August 1977. I was in his conduit to the person who was actually running the nuclear program who is no longer alive now. His name was Mr. Munir and he was chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. He told us that the nuclear test had been delayed to December 1977, and then he told us the nuclear test had been indefinitely delayed".
    1. Pakistan Nuclear Weapons. Global Security. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved November 5th, 2018.
  38. ^ Before 1998, several Western countries, all of them White, had had a global nuclear hegemony. These states, France, US, Britain and the Soviet Union, began spreading their nuclear weapons by placing them at strategically chosen locations across the world. Overall these Western countries were producing tens of thousands of nuclear warheads.
    For instance, the US actively helped spread nuclear weapons technology to Britain in what France saw as an "Anglo-Saxon" nuclear hegemony.
    1. Baum, K. (1990). Two's Company, Three's a Crowd: The Eisenhower Administration, France, and Nuclear Weapons. Presidential Studies Quarterly. Vol. 20. Issue No. 2. p. 315-328 (p. 1). Retrieved November 5th, 2018.
    The US and Soviet Union in 1976 had 10,000 nuclear weapons each, with the other powers having only a few hundred amongst themselves.
    1. Bruce Russett (10 March 2011). Hegemony and Democracy. Taylor & Francis. p. 84. ISBN 978-1-136-81887-5.
    The Western powers eventually helped France to obtain nuclear weapons, and also secretly helped the Israelis create their nuclear programme. They also ignored South Africa's nuclear test (which was ruled by Whites). Clearly these countries formed an "ideological line-up" or nuclear hegemony. China also had nuclear weapons but was not a part of this hegemony.
    1. Peter Calvert; Susan Calvert (3 June 2014). Politics and Society in the Developing World. Routledge. p. 266. ISBN 978-1-317-86594-0.
  39. ^ The US has always been an unreliable ally to Pakistan, and has even endangered it's very existence during its hour of need.
    Quote: "The United States suspended military assistance during and after the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1965 and 1971."
    1. Elizabeth Gould; Paul Fitzgerald (22 February 2011). Crossing Zero: The AfPak War at the Turning Point of American Empire. City Lights Books. p. 85. ISBN 978-0-87286-569-3.
  40. ^ Quote: "As the Carter administration explored ways to derail Pakistan's nuclear program, an interagency group led by arms-controls expert Gerard Smith found few promising avenues. When the New York Times reported that the Smith group had considered, along with other possibilities, the option of destroying Pakistan's nuclear capability by an attack on the Kahuta uranium-enrichment facility, the story caused an uproar in Islamabad. A categorical State Department denial failed to calm the waters".
    1. Dennis Kux (5 June 2001). The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Woodrow Wilson Center Press. p. 240. ISBN 978-0-8018-6572-5.
    Pakistan was the only country where the US had a problem of owning nuclear weapons and threatened to attack. Despite Israel and South Africa pursuing nuclear weapons as well, the US didn't even think of bombing them (this was highly likely because both countries were ruled by Whites). The US clearly could not stand a non-White country having nuclear weapons.
    Quote: "In the Pakistani case, even rumours of a planned American attack Pakistani nuclear facilities in 1979 were not enough to derail the native nuclear programme. Pakistan was unique in this respect. As opposed to Israel and South Africa, who only had to consider in the context of the bilateral relations with Washington a possible withdrawal of assistance and cooperation in the form of financial, economic, or military ties, it was the only one which had to contend with rumours of a possible attack".
    1. Or Rabinowitz (April 2014). Bargaining on Nuclear Tests: Washington and Its Cold War Deals. OUP Oxford. p. 21. ISBN 978-0-19-870293-1.
    Pakistan took its nuclear security extremely seriously, and even went a far to beat up senior French diplomats who tried to get close to the Kahuta uranium enrichment facility.
    Quote: "Two months earlier, in June 1979, Pakistan's extreme sensitivity about the Kahuta facility had caused an embarrassing diplomatic incident. Two diplomats from the French embassy in Islamabad, the ambassador and the first secretary, were driving in the vicinity of Kahuta after a meeting of European Community envoys. Although their car was traveling on a public road and was not in a restricted area, two vehicles suddenly blocked their path. Six Pakistanis then pulled the diplomats from their car and beat them severely. The first secretary, Jean Forlot, told the U.S. embassy that he assumed the Pakistani government organized the attack to scare people away from the area around the nuclear facility".
    1. Dennis Kux (5 June 2001). The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Woodrow Wilson Center Press. p. 240. ISBN 978-0-8018-6572-5.
  41. ^ One of the ways in which Pakistan did this was to say; Quote: ""...Pakistan is not in a position to make a bomb and has no intention of making a bomb"...The president claimed tha the enriched uranium program was designed to produce nuclear fuel for electric power. "If we do not get an alternative source of energy," Zia stated, "Pakistan will choke in the next few years"."
    1. Dennis Kux (5 June 2001). The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies. Woodrow Wilson Center Press. p. 240. ISBN 978-0-8018-6572-5.
  42. ^ This was followed by Operation Chagai-II (May 30, 1998). Some in the Indian Parliament was left furious as they saw this as the beginning of a nuclear arms race caused by India.
    Quote: "When the first shouted word of Pakistan's tests has heard in the Indian Parliament, a Communist leader, Somnath Chatterjee, interrupted a speech condemning India's tests and addressed himself directly to Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the Hindu nationalist leader who approved the Indian tests. "You have started a nuclear arms race in this region," he said. Mr. Vajpayee left the chamber to check with other officials, returning quickly to make a statement. "If this is true, then India's policy has been vindicated," he said. Later, Mr. Vajpayee rejected suggestions that India had set off a nuclear spiral, saying it had acted only because of concern about Pakistan's covert nuclear program. "In fact, Pakistan forced us to take the path of nuclear deterrence," he said.".
    1. John F. Burns (May 29th, 1998). Pakistan, Answering India, Carries Out Nuclear Tests. New York Times. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved November 5th, 2018.
  43. ^ Quote: "The yield of the PNE has also remained controversial. Although occasional press reports have given ranges all the way up to 20 kt, and as low as 2 kt, the official yield was set early on at 12 kt (post Operation Shakti claims have raised it to 13 kt). Outside seismic data, and analysis of the crater features indicates a lower figure. Analysts usually estimate the yield at 4 to 6 kt using conventional seismic magnitude-to-yield conversion formulas. In recent years both Homi Sethna and P.K. Iyengar have conceded that the official yield is an exaggeration. Iyengar has variously stated that the yield was actually 8-10 kt, that the device was designed to yield 10 kt, and that the yield was 8 kt 'exactly as predicted'. Careful analysis of hard rock cratering effects establishes a tight bound around 8 kt for the yield however".
    1. India's Nuclear Weapons Program Smiling Buddha: 1974. 8 November 2001. Nuclear Weapon Archive. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved 25 December 2013.
  44. ^ Quote: "In March 2005 Benazir Bhutto said Pakistan may have had a nuclear weapon long before that. She said her father, former prime minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, had told her from his prison cell that preparations for a nuclear test had been made in 1977. "... he expected Pakistan to have its first nuclear test in ... in August 1977. I was in his conduit to the person who was actually running the nuclear program who is no longer alive now. His name was Mr. Munir and he was chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. He told us that the nuclear test had been delayed to December 1977, and then he told us the nuclear test had been indefinitely delayed".
    1. Pakistan Nuclear Weapons. Global Security. WayBackMachine Link. Retrieved November 5th, 2018.
  45. ^ Before 1998, several Western countries, all of them White, had had a global nuclear hegemony. These states, France, US, Britain and the Soviet Union, began spreading their nuclear weapons by placing them at strategically chosen locations across the world. Overall these Western countries were producing tens of thousands of nuclear warheads.
    For instance, the US actively helped spread nuclear weapons technology to Britain in what France saw as an "Anglo-Saxon" nuclear hegemony.
    1. Baum, K. (1990). Two's Company, Three's a Crowd: The Eisenhower Administration, France, and Nuclear Weapons. Presidential Studies Quarterly. Vol. 20. Issue No. 2. p. 315-328 (p. 1). Retrieved November 5th, 2018.
    The US and Soviet Union in 1976 had 10,000 nuclear weapons each, with the other powers having only a few hundred amongst themselves.
    1. Bruce Russett (10 March 2011). Hegemony and Democracy. Taylor & Francis. p. 84. ISBN 978-1-136-81887-5.
    The Western powers eventually helped France to obtain nuclear weapons, and also secretly helped the Israelis create their nuclear programme. They also ignored South Africa's nuclear test (which was ruled by Whites). Clearly these countries formed an "ideological line-up" or nuclear hegemony. China also had nuclear weapons but was not a part of this hegemony.
    1. Peter Calvert; Susan Calvert (3 June 2014). Politics and Society in the Developing World. Routledge. p. 266. ISBN 978-1-317-86594-0.
  46. ^ Quote: "It was 5 am on a Monday when 22 men — some in uniform— showed up with a search warrant at the door of BrahMos Aerospace senior systems engineer Nishant Aggarwal in Nagpur. They took his laptop, mobile and iPad, and grilled him over the next 15 hours. By that night, Aggarwal, 27, was arrested under the Officials Secrets Act (OSA) for allegedly possessing 22 sensitive documents marked ‘secret’, relating to the manufacturing and integration of the supersonic cruise missile BrahMos. Some of the documents included missile blueprints that investigators say have made their way to an operative of Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).".
    1. Ananya Bhardwaj (November 12th, 2018). How ISI used LinkedIn to trap BrahMos engineer for secret papers on India’s new missile. The Print. Archive.is Link. Retrieved November 12th, 2018.
  47. ^ Quote: "It was 5 am on a Monday when 22 men — some in uniform— showed up with a search warrant at the door of BrahMos Aerospace senior systems engineer Nishant Aggarwal in Nagpur. They took his laptop, mobile and iPad, and grilled him over the next 15 hours. By that night, Aggarwal, 27, was arrested under the Officials Secrets Act (OSA) for allegedly possessing 22 sensitive documents marked ‘secret’, relating to the manufacturing and integration of the supersonic cruise missile BrahMos. Some of the documents included missile blueprints that investigators say have made their way to an operative of Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).".
    1. Ananya Bhardwaj (November 12th, 2018). How ISI used LinkedIn to trap BrahMos engineer for secret papers on India’s new missile. The Print. Archive.is Link. Retrieved November 12th, 2018.
  48. ^ In 2002, approximately 2,000 Muslims were murdered by Hindu terrorists in the state of Gujarat, India. During this time, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) ruled the state. Narendra Modi, leader of the BJP party in his state, was Chief Minister of the state. He directly organised steps to carry out the massacre and greenlit it against the Muslim minority. Senior police officer Sanjiv Bhatt was intimately involved in Modi's inner circle, and testified this information to the Indian Supreme Court. Modi directly told him and others that "Hindus should be allowed to vent their anger" amidst the carnage. Bhatts also testified that his information was extremely credible because "his position allowed him to come across large amounts of information and intelligence both before and during the violence, including the actions of senior administrative officials", and that on the "night before the riots Mr Modi told officials that the Muslim community needed to be taught a lesson". Furthermore, "In a sting carried out in 2007 by the weekly magazine Tehelka, politicians, businessmen, officials and policemen were caught on tape, delightedly recalling how they murdered and raped Muslims with the full imprimatur of their superiors". Modi has never been found innocent of the charges, as the trials are still ongoing, despite Modi claiming the courts have given him a "clean chit".
    1. Sanjoy Majumder (April 22nd, 2011). Narendra Modi 'allowed' Gujarat 2002 anti-Muslim riots. BBC News. Archive.is Link. Retrieved November 18th, 2018.
    2. Pankaj Mishra (March 14th, 2012). The Gujarat massacre: New India's blood rite. The Guardian. Archive.is Link. Retrieved November 18th, 2018.
    3. Aditya Chakrabortty (April 7th, 2014). Narendra Modi, a man with a massacre on his hands, is not the reasonable choice for India. The Guardian. Archive.is Link. Retrieved November 18th, 2018.
    Modi's actions have been whitewashed for years; but this is what happened;
    Quote: "On 27 February that year, a train coach carrying Hindu pilgrims caught fire in Godhra station in Gujarat. Fifty-eight people died. Within hours and without a shred of evidence, Modi declared that the Pakistani secret services had been to blame; he then had the charred bodies paraded in the main city of Ahmedabad; and let his own party support a state-wide strike for three days. What followed was mass bloodshed: 1,000 dead on official estimates, more than 2,000 by independent tallies. The vast majority of those who died were Muslim. Mobs of men dragged women and young girls out of their homes and raped them. In 2007, the investigative magazine Tehelka recorded boasts from some of the ringleaders. One, Babu Bajrangi, boasted of how he slit open the womb of a pregnant woman."
    1. Aditya Chakrabortty (April 7th, 2014). Narendra Modi, a man with a massacre on his hands, is not the reasonable choice for India. The Guardian. Archive.is Link. Retrieved November 18th, 2018.
    Many Hindus did not care at all about the discrimination, persecution and genocide that the Muslim minority suffered in Gujarat. Modi's party in 2014 won 282 of the 543 seats (52%) in the Indian Parliament. Not only did he win, but for the first time in 30 years, it was the first party to hold an absolute majority in parliament.
    1. Shaun Gregory (23 October 2015). Democratic Transition and Security in Pakistan. Routledge. p. 203. ISBN 978-1-317-55011-2.
  49. ^ The Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, a Hindutva politician, even refused to condemn the rape or even mention the word "rape" when an 8 year old Muslim girl was gangraped systematically in Kashmir by Hindu rapists.
    1. Amrit Wilson (April 18th, 2018). India is a ‘republic of fear’. The UK must keep the pressure on Modi. The Guardian. Archive.is Link. Retrieved November 20th, 2018.
  50. ^ Quote: "Both Rana and Sethi agree that the Indian accusations are more likely to be driven less by evidence than by political imperatives. India is to hold elections in the coming months, and the ruling Congress party has taken a beating over the attacks — rival parties are saying the government was poorly prepared and had not cracked down hard enough on previous terrorist activities. "Elections are coming," says Rana, "So there are internal pressures to blame someone, and to show that it is not the government's fault. Pakistan is the obvious scapegoat.""
    1. Aryn Baker (November 30th, 2008). Mumbai: The Perils of Blaming Pakistan. Time. Archive.is Link. Retrieved November 18th, 2018.
  51. ^ "One of the most spectacular forms of sadism in the recent events had been the way Muslim female bodies were made to function in the drama of Hindutva terror. There had been earlier anticipations of that. The investigations made by the AIDWA in 1992-93, especially in Surat and Bhopal, pointed out several similar features. Women were "tortured, molested, raped, and then burnt to death." Sometimes, their children were killed before their eyes. At the same time, more often than not, such atrocities were whispered about and not always confirmed openly. This time, rape victims as well as their male relatives have no inhibition about reporting rape and sexual torture; the police, however, do not admit FIRs on rape, a senior officer claims that mobs have no time for raping, and that Hindus, moreover, do not rape. Fernandes, on the other hand, says that rape is so universally prevalent that Gujarat rapes are not worth talking about. So, it has not happened, or it happens universally; in either case, it cannot or need not be mentioned. Women have been killed in very large numbers. At the mass grave that was dug on 6 March to provide burial to 96 bodies from Naroda Patiya, 46 women were buried. Bilkees Begum from the Godhra Relief camp told a tale that seemed to confirm a recurrent pattern in most places, according to survivors' accounts. She was stripped, gang-raped, her baby was killed before her, she was then beaten up, then burnt and left for dead. For variety's sake, other women also had acid thrown upon them, and then burnt in fires. A women's' fact-finding report sums up the usual procedure: " …rape, gang rape, mass rape, stripping, insertion of objects into their body, molestation… a majority of rape victims were burnt alive. " Before they were finally killed off, some were beaten up with rods and pipes for almost an hour. Before or after the killing, their vagina would be sliced, or would have iron rods pushed inside. Similarly, their bellies would be cut open or would have hard objects inserted into them. A thirteen year old girl, Farzana, had a rod pushed into her stomach, and was then burnt. A mother reported that her three year old baby girl was raped and killed in front of her, while elsewhere daughters reported on the rapes of their mothers, now dead. Kausar Bano, a young girl from Naroda Patiya was 9 month's pregnant. Several eyewitnesses testified that she was raped, tortured, her womb was slit open with a sword to disgorge the foetus which was then hacked to pieces and roasted alive with the mother. At Fatehpura, more than 50 young girls were paraded naked, and then asked to urinate. After they were rescued by a Muslim ambulance service, they travelled to the camp without a stitch on them. Other victims arrived naked at camps, too, after acid had been poured upon their clothes, which they tore off in agony from their burning and peeling bodies. Medina Mustafa Ismail Shaikh reported from Kalol camp: "My daughter was like a flower, still to experience life…The monsters tore my beloved daughter to pieces..the mob was saying, cut them to pieces, leave no evidence… I saw fires being lit. After some time, the mob started leaving. And it became quiet. " It became very quiet, for the voices of children could not be heard. A very large number of parents, especially mothers, had to see their children die in excruciating agony before they, too, were tortured and burnt. At the mass grave for 96 people, they buried a six-month old baby. Fatimabibi, who secretly came to Delhi to testify to the violence, kept repeating dementedly: " Innocent (masoom) tender babies were crying for water, they filled them up with petrol and then lit them up." At Randhikapur village, a young pregnant woman first saw her baby cut to piecs. Then she was raped and her foetus was ripped out and killed,. They beat her up and left her for dead. Four year old Asif died of 90% burns after several days' of agony. Before he died, The Hindu took a photograph of his bandaged face, out of which his large, beautiful, fully aware eyes were blazing out. One can go on narrating the ways in which babies and women were tortured and killed, but the point here is often the two acts were coupled together. The pattern of cruelty suggests three things. One, the woman's body was a site of almost inexhaustible violence, with infinitely plural and innovative forms of torture. Second, their sexual and reproductive organs were attacked with especial savagery. Third, their children, born and unborn, shared the attacks and were killed before their eyes. In readings of community violence, rape is taken to be a sign of collective dishonouring. The same patriarchal order that designates the female body as the symbol of lineage and community purity, would designate the entire collectivity as impure and polluted, once the woman is raped by an outsider. Rape, in Gujarat violence, obviously performed that function. But what, then, is the point of the elements of excess, the surplus of cruelty, and its multifarious forms? We need to remember that the Gujarati press invented the murder of 80 Hindu women on the Sabarmati Express at Godhra, who had been raped and had their breasts cut off - a complete invention, since even the Gujarat police denied the story. However, it served to justify rapes and mutilations of Muslim women within the structure of " action-reaction" discourse. The fact that revenge went far beyond that is not surprising for revenge is not revenge if it does not outstrip the original offence.. In Delhi, on 28 February, we heard RSS boys shouting: Ek Ka badla Sau me lenge. (We will avenge one death with a hundred"). Beyond Godhra are the legends that all boys in the shakhas are bred on: partition time rapes of Hindu women, rapes of Hindu queens under Muslim rule, abductions of Hindu women all through history by Muslims. There is also the perpetual fear of a more virile Muslim male body that lures away Hindu girls, a kind of penis envy and anxiety about emasculation that can only be overcome by violent deeds. Violence, for the Sangh, is maleness. In the 1990s, when communal violence had intensified, bangles were sent to localities where riots had not taken place, to taunt Hindu men with effiminacy. At Jawaharlal Nehru University, a post- Godhra procesion of the ABVP chanted: " Jis Hinduon ka khoon na khola, woh Hindu nahin, woh hijra hain". (Those Hindus whose blood does not boil, are not Hindus, they are eunuchs'). This identification between killing and masculinity, is a strong and uniquely Sangh teaching. In the Gujarat violence, mobs who raped, sometimes came dressed in khaki shorts or in saffron underwear, rape being obviously seen as a religious duty, a Sangh duty. In times of violence, Hindu male sexual organs must function as instruments of torture. There is more to it. For generations, anxieties had been whipped up about Muslim fertility rate, of their uncontrolled breeding and numerical outstripping of the Hindu majority. So coupled with anxieties of a comparatively less potent Hindu maleness, there is a fear of infertile Hindu femaleness, and a drying up of future progeny, - the longstanding image of dying Hindus. This is counterposed to that of vigorously self-multiplying Muslims. Fed on such self-invented self-doubt, Hindu mobs swooped down upon Muslim women and children with multiple but related aims. First, to possess and dishonour them and their men, second to taste what is denied to them and what, according to their understanding, explains Muslim virility. Third, to physically destroy the vagina and the womb, and, thereby, to symbolically destroy the sources of pleasure, reproduction and nurture for Muslim men, and for Muslim children. Then, by beatings, to punish the fertile female body. Then, physically destroying the children, they signified an end to Muslim growth. Then, by cutting up the foetus and burning it, a symbolic destruction of future generations, of the very future of Muslims themselves. The burning of men, women and children, as the final move, served multiple functions: it was to destroy evidence, it was to make Muslims vanish, it was also to desecrate Muslim deaths by denying them Islamic burial, and forcing a Hindu cremation upon them. There were, thus, many layers of signification, of symbolic meanings that went into the act that were repeated by different mobs at different locales, but on fairly identical lines. They can be aligned to Sangh teachings, stereotypes and fantasies. This also explains why the same female body was subjected to a series of sexual humiliation, torture, mutilation and obliteration. Conjoined with the bodies of their children, they provided a site where the entire drama of revenge was enacted in its long and complicated sequence."
    1. Sarkar, Tanika (May 2002). Ethnic Cleansing In Gujarat An Analysis of A Few Aspects. Indowindow. Archive.is Link. Retrieved November 22nd, 2018.
  52. ^ "A number of assumptions have been made about the effects of the male surplus on these men who are unable to marry. First, it has been assumed that the lack of opportunity to fulfill traditional expectations of marrying and having children will result in low self-esteem and increased susceptibility to a range of psychologic difficulties.9 It has also been assumed that a combination of psychologic vulnerability and sexual frustration may lead to aggression and violence in these men.10 There is good empirical support for this prediction: cross-cultural evidence shows that the overwhelming majority of violent crime is perpetrated by young, unmarried, low-status males.11 In China and parts of India the sheer numbers of unmated men are a further cause for concern. Because they may lack a stake in the existing social order, it is feared that they will become bound together in an outcast culture, turning to antisocial behaviour and organized crime, thereby threatening societal stability and security.9"
    1. Hesketh, T.; Lu, L.; Xing, Z. W. (2011). The consequences of son preference and sex-selective abortion in China and other Asian countries. Canadian Medical Association Journal. 183 (12): 1374–1377. doi:10.1503/cmaj.101368. ISSN 0820-3946.
  53. ^ In 2002, approximately 2,000 Muslims were murdered by Hindu terrorists in the state of Gujarat, India. During this time, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) ruled the state. Narendra Modi, leader of the BJP party in his state, was Chief Minister of the state. He directly organised steps to carry out the massacre and greenlit it against the Muslim minority. Senior police officer Sanjiv Bhatt was intimately involved in Modi's inner circle, and testified this information to the Indian Supreme Court. Modi directly told him and others that "Hindus should be allowed to vent their anger" amidst the carnage. Bhatts also testified that his information was extremely credible because "his position allowed him to come across large amounts of information and intelligence both before and during the violence, including the actions of senior administrative officials", and that on the "night before the riots Mr Modi told officials that the Muslim community needed to be taught a lesson". Furthermore, "In a sting carried out in 2007 by the weekly magazine Tehelka, politicians, businessmen, officials and policemen were caught on tape, delightedly recalling how they murdered and raped Muslims with the full imprimatur of their superiors". Modi has never been found innocent of the charges, as the trials are still ongoing, despite Modi claiming the courts have given him a "clean chit".
    1. Sanjoy Majumder (April 22nd, 2011). Narendra Modi 'allowed' Gujarat 2002 anti-Muslim riots. BBC News. Archive.is Link. Retrieved November 18th, 2018.
    2. Pankaj Mishra (March 14th, 2012). The Gujarat massacre: New India's blood rite. The Guardian. Archive.is Link. Retrieved November 18th, 2018.
    3. Aditya Chakrabortty (April 7th, 2014). Narendra Modi, a man with a massacre on his hands, is not the reasonable choice for India. The Guardian. Archive.is Link. Retrieved November 18th, 2018.
    Modi's actions have been whitewashed for years; but this is what happened;
    Quote: "On 27 February that year, a train coach carrying Hindu pilgrims caught fire in Godhra station in Gujarat. Fifty-eight people died. Within hours and without a shred of evidence, Modi declared that the Pakistani secret services had been to blame; he then had the charred bodies paraded in the main city of Ahmedabad; and let his own party support a state-wide strike for three days. What followed was mass bloodshed: 1,000 dead on official estimates, more than 2,000 by independent tallies. The vast majority of those who died were Muslim. Mobs of men dragged women and young girls out of their homes and raped them. In 2007, the investigative magazine Tehelka recorded boasts from some of the ringleaders. One, Babu Bajrangi, boasted of how he slit open the womb of a pregnant woman."
    1. Aditya Chakrabortty (April 7th, 2014). Narendra Modi, a man with a massacre on his hands, is not the reasonable choice for India. The Guardian. Archive.is Link. Retrieved November 18th, 2018.
    Many Hindus did not care at all about the discrimination, persecution and genocide that the Muslim minority suffered in Gujarat. Modi's party in 2014 won 282 of the 543 seats (52%) in the Indian Parliament. Not only did he win, but for the first time in 30 years, it was the first party to hold an absolute majority in parliament.
    1. Shaun Gregory (23 October 2015). Democratic Transition and Security in Pakistan. Routledge. p. 203. ISBN 978-1-317-55011-2.
  54. ^ The Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, a Hindutva politician, even refused to condemn the rape or even mention the word "rape" when an 8 year old Muslim girl was gangraped systematically in Kashmir by Hindu rapists.
    1. Amrit Wilson (April 18th, 2018). India is a ‘republic of fear’. The UK must keep the pressure on Modi. The Guardian. Archive.is Link. Retrieved November 20th, 2018.
  55. ^ Quote: "Both Rana and Sethi agree that the Indian accusations are more likely to be driven less by evidence than by political imperatives. India is to hold elections in the coming months, and the ruling Congress party has taken a beating over the attacks — rival parties are saying the government was poorly prepared and had not cracked down hard enough on previous terrorist activities. "Elections are coming," says Rana, "So there are internal pressures to blame someone, and to show that it is not the government's fault. Pakistan is the obvious scapegoat.""
    1. Aryn Baker (November 30th, 2008). Mumbai: The Perils of Blaming Pakistan. Time. Archive.is Link. Retrieved November 18th, 2018.
  56. ^ "One of the most spectacular forms of sadism in the recent events had been the way Muslim female bodies were made to function in the drama of Hindutva terror. There had been earlier anticipations of that. The investigations made by the AIDWA in 1992-93, especially in Surat and Bhopal, pointed out several similar features. Women were "tortured, molested, raped, and then burnt to death." Sometimes, their children were killed before their eyes. At the same time, more often than not, such atrocities were whispered about and not always confirmed openly. This time, rape victims as well as their male relatives have no inhibition about reporting rape and sexual torture; the police, however, do not admit FIRs on rape, a senior officer claims that mobs have no time for raping, and that Hindus, moreover, do not rape. Fernandes, on the other hand, says that rape is so universally prevalent that Gujarat rapes are not worth talking about. So, it has not happened, or it happens universally; in either case, it cannot or need not be mentioned. Women have been killed in very large numbers. At the mass grave that was dug on 6 March to provide burial to 96 bodies from Naroda Patiya, 46 women were buried. Bilkees Begum from the Godhra Relief camp told a tale that seemed to confirm a recurrent pattern in most places, according to survivors' accounts. She was stripped, gang-raped, her baby was killed before her, she was then beaten up, then burnt and left for dead. For variety's sake, other women also had acid thrown upon them, and then burnt in fires. A women's' fact-finding report sums up the usual procedure: " …rape, gang rape, mass rape, stripping, insertion of objects into their body, molestation… a majority of rape victims were burnt alive. " Before they were finally killed off, some were beaten up with rods and pipes for almost an hour. Before or after the killing, their vagina would be sliced, or would have iron rods pushed inside. Similarly, their bellies would be cut open or would have hard objects inserted into them. A thirteen year old girl, Farzana, had a rod pushed into her stomach, and was then burnt. A mother reported that her three year old baby girl was raped and killed in front of her, while elsewhere daughters reported on the rapes of their mothers, now dead. Kausar Bano, a young girl from Naroda Patiya was 9 month's pregnant. Several eyewitnesses testified that she was raped, tortured, her womb was slit open with a sword to disgorge the foetus which was then hacked to pieces and roasted alive with the mother. At Fatehpura, more than 50 young girls were paraded naked, and then asked to urinate. After they were rescued by a Muslim ambulance service, they travelled to the camp without a stitch on them. Other victims arrived naked at camps, too, after acid had been poured upon their clothes, which they tore off in agony from their burning and peeling bodies. Medina Mustafa Ismail Shaikh reported from Kalol camp: "My daughter was like a flower, still to experience life…The monsters tore my beloved daughter to pieces..the mob was saying, cut them to pieces, leave no evidence… I saw fires being lit. After some time, the mob started leaving. And it became quiet. " It became very quiet, for the voices of children could not be heard. A very large number of parents, especially mothers, had to see their children die in excruciating agony before they, too, were tortured and burnt. At the mass grave for 96 people, they buried a six-month old baby. Fatimabibi, who secretly came to Delhi to testify to the violence, kept repeating dementedly: " Innocent (masoom) tender babies were crying for water, they filled them up with petrol and then lit them up." At Randhikapur village, a young pregnant woman first saw her baby cut to piecs. Then she was raped and her foetus was ripped out and killed,. They beat her up and left her for dead. Four year old Asif died of 90% burns after several days' of agony. Before he died, The Hindu took a photograph of his bandaged face, out of which his large, beautiful, fully aware eyes were blazing out. One can go on narrating the ways in which babies and women were tortured and killed, but the point here is often the two acts were coupled together. The pattern of cruelty suggests three things. One, the woman's body was a site of almost inexhaustible violence, with infinitely plural and innovative forms of torture. Second, their sexual and reproductive organs were attacked with especial savagery. Third, their children, born and unborn, shared the attacks and were killed before their eyes. In readings of community violence, rape is taken to be a sign of collective dishonouring. The same patriarchal order that designates the female body as the symbol of lineage and community purity, would designate the entire collectivity as impure and polluted, once the woman is raped by an outsider. Rape, in Gujarat violence, obviously performed that function. But what, then, is the point of the elements of excess, the surplus of cruelty, and its multifarious forms? We need to remember that the Gujarati press invented the murder of 80 Hindu women on the Sabarmati Express at Godhra, who had been raped and had their breasts cut off - a complete invention, since even the Gujarat police denied the story. However, it served to justify rapes and mutilations of Muslim women within the structure of " action-reaction" discourse. The fact that revenge went far beyond that is not surprising for revenge is not revenge if it does not outstrip the original offence.. In Delhi, on 28 February, we heard RSS boys shouting: Ek Ka badla Sau me lenge. (We will avenge one death with a hundred"). Beyond Godhra are the legends that all boys in the shakhas are bred on: partition time rapes of Hindu women, rapes of Hindu queens under Muslim rule, abductions of Hindu women all through history by Muslims. There is also the perpetual fear of a more virile Muslim male body that lures away Hindu girls, a kind of penis envy and anxiety about emasculation that can only be overcome by violent deeds. Violence, for the Sangh, is maleness. In the 1990s, when communal violence had intensified, bangles were sent to localities where riots had not taken place, to taunt Hindu men with effiminacy. At Jawaharlal Nehru University, a post- Godhra procesion of the ABVP chanted: " Jis Hinduon ka khoon na khola, woh Hindu nahin, woh hijra hain". (Those Hindus whose blood does not boil, are not Hindus, they are eunuchs'). This identification between killing and masculinity, is a strong and uniquely Sangh teaching. In the Gujarat violence, mobs who raped, sometimes came dressed in khaki shorts or in saffron underwear, rape being obviously seen as a religious duty, a Sangh duty. In times of violence, Hindu male sexual organs must function as instruments of torture. There is more to it. For generations, anxieties had been whipped up about Muslim fertility rate, of their uncontrolled breeding and numerical outstripping of the Hindu majority. So coupled with anxieties of a comparatively less potent Hindu maleness, there is a fear of infertile Hindu femaleness, and a drying up of future progeny, - the longstanding image of dying Hindus. This is counterposed to that of vigorously self-multiplying Muslims. Fed on such self-invented self-doubt, Hindu mobs swooped down upon Muslim women and children with multiple but related aims. First, to possess and dishonour them and their men, second to taste what is denied to them and what, according to their understanding, explains Muslim virility. Third, to physically destroy the vagina and the womb, and, thereby, to symbolically destroy the sources of pleasure, reproduction and nurture for Muslim men, and for Muslim children. Then, by beatings, to punish the fertile female body. Then, physically destroying the children, they signified an end to Muslim growth. Then, by cutting up the foetus and burning it, a symbolic destruction of future generations, of the very future of Muslims themselves. The burning of men, women and children, as the final move, served multiple functions: it was to destroy evidence, it was to make Muslims vanish, it was also to desecrate Muslim deaths by denying them Islamic burial, and forcing a Hindu cremation upon them. There were, thus, many layers of signification, of symbolic meanings that went into the act that were repeated by different mobs at different locales, but on fairly identical lines. They can be aligned to Sangh teachings, stereotypes and fantasies. This also explains why the same female body was subjected to a series of sexual humiliation, torture, mutilation and obliteration. Conjoined with the bodies of their children, they provided a site where the entire drama of revenge was enacted in its long and complicated sequence."
    1. Sarkar, Tanika (May 2002). Ethnic Cleansing In Gujarat An Analysis of A Few Aspects. Indowindow. Archive.is Link. Retrieved November 22nd, 2018.
  57. ^ "A number of assumptions have been made about the effects of the male surplus on these men who are unable to marry. First, it has been assumed that the lack of opportunity to fulfill traditional expectations of marrying and having children will result in low self-esteem and increased susceptibility to a range of psychologic difficulties.9 It has also been assumed that a combination of psychologic vulnerability and sexual frustration may lead to aggression and violence in these men.10 There is good empirical support for this prediction: cross-cultural evidence shows that the overwhelming majority of violent crime is perpetrated by young, unmarried, low-status males.11 In China and parts of India the sheer numbers of unmated men are a further cause for concern. Because they may lack a stake in the existing social order, it is feared that they will become bound together in an outcast culture, turning to antisocial behaviour and organized crime, thereby threatening societal stability and security.9"
    1. Hesketh, T.; Lu, L.; Xing, Z. W. (2011). The consequences of son preference and sex-selective abortion in China and other Asian countries. Canadian Medical Association Journal. 183 (12): 1374–1377. doi:10.1503/cmaj.101368. ISSN 0820-3946.
  58. ^
    1. APJ Abdul Kalam, India's former president, dies. 27 July 2015. BBC. Retrieved August 17th, 2015.
    Quote: "Mr Kalam joined the Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre in the neighbouring state of Kerala in the 1960s as one of its first three engineers.
    He played a major role in the centre's evolution to a key hub of space research in India, helping to develop the country's first indigenous satellite-launch vehicle. He worked for the Defence Research and Development Organization and the Indian Space Research Organization. Indian scientists have hailed him as the father of the Indian nuclear bomb and its missile delivery systems. He also played a key role when India tested its nuclear weapons in 1998. The former president was proud of his Indian education and liked to describe himself as "Made in India", having never been trained abroad."
  59. ^ Quote: "A day before Memon was hanged, a widely-shared picture on Twitter showed both Memon and Kalam being laid to rest. Kalam had the Indian flag’s chakra above his head, Memon had a green crescent. Kalam was the ‘Indian’, Memon was the ‘Muslim’. When urban, tech-savvy Indians, in their celebratory frenzy, refer only to the Muslim-ness of Memon — with comments such as ‘his meeting with 72 virgins’ — it’s important to remind them that the man they claim to love so much, Mr Kalam, was also Muslim".
    1. Irena Akbar (August 6, 2015). ‘Indian’ Kalam and ‘Muslim’ Memon. The Indian Express. Retrieved August 20th, 2015.
  60. ^
    1. APJ Abdul Kalam, India's former president, dies. 27 July 2015. BBC. Retrieved August 17th, 2015.
    Quote: "Mr Kalam joined the Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre in the neighbouring state of Kerala in the 1960s as one of its first three engineers.
    He played a major role in the centre's evolution to a key hub of space research in India, helping to develop the country's first indigenous satellite-launch vehicle. He worked for the Defence Research and Development Organization and the Indian Space Research Organization. Indian scientists have hailed him as the father of the Indian nuclear bomb and its missile delivery systems. He also played a key role when India tested its nuclear weapons in 1998. The former president was proud of his Indian education and liked to describe himself as "Made in India", having never been trained abroad."
  61. ^ Quote: "A day before Memon was hanged, a widely-shared picture on Twitter showed both Memon and Kalam being laid to rest. Kalam had the Indian flag’s chakra above his head, Memon had a green crescent. Kalam was the ‘Indian’, Memon was the ‘Muslim’. When urban, tech-savvy Indians, in their celebratory frenzy, refer only to the Muslim-ness of Memon — with comments such as ‘his meeting with 72 virgins’ — it’s important to remind them that the man they claim to love so much, Mr Kalam, was also Muslim".
    1. Irena Akbar (August 6, 2015). ‘Indian’ Kalam and ‘Muslim’ Memon. The Indian Express. Retrieved August 20th, 2015.

References

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